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Abstract
Various security measures are ineﬀective having been designed without adequate
usability and economic considerations. The primary objective of this thesis is to add
an economic and socio-behavioral perspective to the traditional computer science
research in information security. The resulting research is interdisciplinary, and the
papers combine diﬀerent approaches, ranging from analytic modeling to empirical
measurements and user studies. Contributing to the ﬁelds of usable security and
security economics, this thesis fulﬁlls three motivations.
First, it provides a realistic game theoretical model for analyzing the dynamics of
attack and defense on the Web. Adapted from the classical Colonel Blotto games,
our Colonel Blotto Phishing model captures the asymmetric conﬂict (resource, in-
formation, action) between a resource-constrained attacker and a defender. It also
factors in the practical scenario where the attacker creates large numbers of phish-
ing websites (endogenous dimensionality), while the defender reactively detects and
strives to take them down promptly.
Second, the thesis challenges the conventional view that users are always the
weakest link or liability in security. It explores the feasibility of leveraging inputs
from expert and ordinary users for improving information security. While several
potential challenges are identiﬁed, we ﬁnd that community inputs are more com-
prehensive and relevant than automated assessments. This does not imply that
users should be made liable to protect themselves; it demonstrates the potentials
of community eﬀorts in complementing conventional security measures. We further
analyze the contribution characteristics of serious and casual security volunteers,
and suggest ways for improvement.
Third, following the rise of third party applications (apps), the thesis explores the
security and privacy risks and challenges with both centralized and decentralized
app control models. Centralized app control can lead to the risk of central judg-
ment and the risk of habituation, while the increasingly widespread decentralized
user-consent permission model also suﬀers from the lack of eﬀective risk signaling.
We ﬁnd the tendency of popular apps requesting more permissions than average.
Compound with the absence of alternative risk signals, users will habitually click
through the permission request dialogs. In addition, we ﬁnd the free apps, apps
with mature content, and apps with names mimicking the popular ones, request
more permissions than typical. These indicate possible attempts to trick the users
into compromising their privacy.
vii
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1. Introduction
While much focus has been given to technological advancement, security remains a
challenging problem impacting billions of users. Truth is that information security
is a multidisciplinary problem. Without a comprehensive view combining the tech-
nical, social, behavioral and economic aspects, security measures will fail to serve
their purposes in practice.
This thesis contributes to some missing pieces in information security research,
particularly from an economic and socio-behavioral perspective. Six papers of an-
alytic modeling, empirical, and experimental natures are included. The thesis will
ﬁrst present the background and related work in Section 1.1, research motivations
and methodology in Section 1.2, before describing the included papers and elabo-
rating the contributions in Section 1.3.
1.1. Background
The last decade has seen an exciting development in security research. Researchers
are starting to realize the importance of usability for a security measure to be
eﬀective. There is also a growing attention on the economic aspect of security
problems. This section presents the background and a survey of related works in
the two expanding ﬁelds of usable security and security economics.
1.1.1. Usable Security
The user is a central aspect of computer security. Strong cryptographic mecha-
nisms and secure protocols must be accompanied by an easy-to-use interface and
procedure. Putting unreasonable requirements on the users will risk user mistakes
or compelling them to embrace convenient but insecure behaviors. More than ease-
of-use, user mental models, behavioral biases and social norms are among the topics
of interest of the research community.
Usability
A written requirement of usability for good security can be dated back to Auguste
Kerckhoﬀs’s article [75] in 1883. Today, Kerckhoﬀs is widely known for the principle
that a cryptosystem must be secure even if everything about the system, except
the key, is public knowledge. Many do not realize that Auguste Kerckhoﬀs has
in fact pointed also the importance of usability [72, 103]. In particular, the sixth
principle in Kerckhoﬀs’s article states that a cryptosystem must be easy to use and
1
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must neither require stress of mind nor the knowledge of a long series of rules (as
translated by Fabien Petitcolas [98]).
The importance of usability is also highlighted in the inﬂuential paper by Saltzer
and Schroeder (1975) [106]. The authors identify eight design principles for infor-
mation protection in computer systems, namely, economy of mechanism, fail-safe
defaults, complete mediation, open design, separation of privilege, least privilege,
least common mechanism, and psychological acceptability. Psychological accept-
ability describes the importance of a human interface that is easy to use, and the
matching of user’s mental image of his protection goals and the mechanisms he
must use.
Adam and Sasse [8] observed in 1999 that requiring users to remember several
strong passwords and to change them periodically, has led to excessive cognitive
strain and the situation where users would simply write the passwords in plaintext
beside their computers. Research on the intersection of security and usability has
since begun to gain momentum. An area of interests is on improving the usability
and security of authentication scheme. Innovations we have seen include federated
(single-sign-on) authentication (e.g., OpenID [101], Microsoft Passport), graphical
passwords (see a survey of diﬀerent proposals in [110]), password managers (e.g.,
on Firefox), and biometrics (e.g., ﬁngerprint, voice).
Yet, despite the numerous innovations, password has remained the most pervasive
authentication scheme in practice. Surveying a wide range of web authentication
technologies, Bonneau et al. [27] ﬁnd that no alternative schemes are currently
dominant over the traditional passwords, considering the combination of usability,
deployability and security perspectives. By usability, the researchers evaluate if
an authentication method is memorywise-eﬀortless, scalable-for-users, nothing-to-
carry, physically-eﬀortless, easy-to-learn, eﬃcient-to-use, has infrequent-errors, and
can be easy-recovered-from-loss. The researchers ﬁnd that while certain technolo-
gies (e.g., federated login schemes) oﬀer a better usability than legacy passwords,
they are less easy to deploy. Many other schemes oﬀer a better security than pass-
words but are more diﬃcult to use or more costly to deploy. The authors note that
many academic proposals have failed to gain traction given that researchers rarely
take into account a suﬃciently wide range of real-world constraints [27].
Improving the usability of a security measure is indeed not a straightforward
process, nor it is a standalone problem. Over the years, a number of studies have
evaluated the usability of various security technologies, including the use of PGP
for email encryption [118], privacy control with peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing [62], secure
bluetooth pairing [113], and secure identity management [73].
Risk Communication
Two schools of thought in managing security risks are security by designation and
security by admonition [123]. Security by designation builds on the belief that user
actions simultaneously express command and extension of authority. Authority can
thus be inferred and granted to a system through users’ conscious actions, while
execution of insecure actions being prohibited altogether. Security by admonition,
2
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Figure 1.1.: The human-in-the-loop security framework provided by Cranor [44] for
reasoning about the cause of security failures attributable to human errors.
on the other hand, disrupts user attention to a secondary source of information
such as warning and conﬁrmation dialogs to request for an extension of authority.
While better in usability, security by designation is not always applicable, for
example, when inter-operating with another untrustworthy system, or when there
are too many ﬁne-grained user actions to consider [123]. Security by admonition can
help prompt users about the imminent danger or risk in these situations. However,
the secondary source of information such as warning and conﬁrmation dialogs, is
often inadequate and not context-aware. The frequent use of admonition dialogs
and the relative rare occurrence of insecure events have also led to a high level of
false positives. This may in turn cultivate user habituation to ignore and click-
through the warning and conﬁrmation dialogs. Given the pervasive reliance on
security by admonition today, risk communication is thus an important research
area in usable security.
There are plentiful examples of unsuccessful risk signaling in the literature. Wu
et al. [122] observe that users fail to notice or act upon risk signals from security
toolbars. Schechter et al. [107] ﬁnd that users also ignore HTTPS indicators and
site-authentication images – cues designed to mitigate phishing threats. At the
same time, research [61, 24] has found that users click-through the End User License
Agreement (EULA) and similar user-consent dialogs.
Cranor [44] presents the human-in-the-loop framework for investigating and rea-
soning the root cause of security failures that have been attributed to human er-
3
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rors. As depicted in Figure 1.1, the framework examines diﬀerent phases of risk
communication beginning from (i) the type of communication (warnings, notices,
status indicators, training or policies), (ii) potential communication impediments
(environment stimuli or interference), (iii) the human receiver, which depicts how
capabilities, intentions and personal variables interact with information processing
by the human receiver, and ﬁnally (iv) the induction of a desired behavior. The
information processing steps in this framework are adapted from the well-known
Communication-Human Information Processing (C-HIP) model by Wogalter [120]
in the warning science literature. The adapted information processing model con-
sists of six component steps: attention switch, attention maintenance, comprehen-
sion, knowledge acquisition, knowledge retention and knowledge transfer.
The human-in-the-loop framework reiterates the importance of salient risk signals
for attention switch and maintenance. Yet, the lack of human attention is only a
part of the extensive set of potential failures. Lack of security knowledge among
users has also been identiﬁed as a factor contributing to security problems (e.g.,
in phishing [47]). There have been initiatives to help users learn about security.
Sesame [109] helps users make security related decisions using interactive system
visualization. Meanwhile, Anti-Phishing Phil [108] teaches the users not to fall
for online phishing through an interactive and entertaining game starring Phil – a
small ﬁsh taking advices from his father.
1.1.2. Security Economics
To construct a framework for comparing various authentication schemes, Bonneau
et al. [27] has correctly considered the usability, deployability and security as three
central evaluation factors. Deployability says much about the economics of im-
plementing a particular scheme. Indeed, an economic perspective on information
security is essential because security measures come with a price. With a thriv-
ing underground economy, modern perpetrators are incentivized by ﬁnancial gains;
they are no longer mere hobbyists hackers. Information security problems also often
arise due to misaligned incentives, externality and information asymmetry, three
problems widely studied in economics [15].
The ﬁeld of security economics was kick-started with the inauguration of the
Workshop of Economics of Information Security (WEIS) in 2002. The annual event
has since provided a common platform for computer scientists, economists, soci-
ologists, industrial representatives and policymakers to come together and discuss
various security problems from diﬀerent perspectives. Research in security eco-
nomics has thus far encompassed security incentives and interdependence analysis,
investigation of the underground economy and modi operandi, as well as analytic
modeling of optimal security investment and analysis on the feasibility of security
insurance. A survey of notable works can be found in [16, 17]. The following de-
scribes several areas which have received much attention within this fast expanding
ﬁeld.
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Misaligned Incentives, Network Externality, Asymmetric Information
Anderson argues in the seminal paper [15] that economics underlies the many se-
curity problems we have today:
According to one common view, information security comes down to
technical measures. Given better access control policy models, formal
proofs of cryptographic protocols, approved ﬁrewalls, better ways of
detecting intrusions and malicious code, and better tools for system
evaluation and assurance, the problems can be solved. In this note, I
put forward a contrary view: information insecurity is at least as much
due to perverse incentives. Many of the problems can be explained more
clearly and convincingly using the language of microeconomics: network
externalities, asymmetric information, moral hazard, adverse selection,
liability dumping and the tragedy of the commons. – Anderson [15]
Anderson gives multiple examples in the paper. First is the problem of misaligned
incentives and liability dumping by banks in Britain, Norway and the Netherlands
in 1990s. At that time, consumers in these countries would need to present proofs
to dispute a fraudulent ATM transaction. It was diﬀerent to the situation in the
US where the burden of proof was on the banks. Given the lack of ﬁnancial re-
sponsibility, banks in Britain, Norway and the Netherlands implemented less secure
systems and suﬀered more frauds compared to the US counterparts [15].
Network externality presents another incentive problem. While users are proba-
bly willing to spend $100 for purchasing an anti-virus software, they are unwilling
to spend $1 for a software that will prevent their computers from causing harm
to others (e.g., becoming a bot and used to perform distributed-denial-of-service
attack on some other systems) [15]. The absence of incentives to prevent damages
external to the users matches the problem of ‘the tragedy of the commons’ [67] that
is long known to economists. Regulatory actions are needed to remedy the prob-
lem of network externality [15]. Indeed, Lichtman and Posner, two law professors
point out that the best way to mitigate the problem of botnets will be to hold the
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) accountable [83]. They note that the ISPs are in
the best position to ﬁx the problem due to several reasons. First, direct liability on
bad users, whose machines are bot-infested, is unsuitable as some of them would be
out of reach of law (e.g., cross-border, or incapable to pay ﬁnes) [83]. Furthermore,
it can be hard (costly) to expect the users to have the ability to ensure that their
machines are clean [83]. On the other hand, the ISPs are the best liability interme-
diaries given that they can detect bot-infested machines and regulate user access
to the Internet in addition to having the contact details of users [83]. Yet, holding
the ISPs accountable may not be a straightforward task, especially at places where
the risks of surveillance and excess centralized control are feared. Dealing with to
what extent the ISPs should be held responsible and be given the power of control
will certainly require eﬀorts from the regulators.
Perverse incentives in security can also be attributed to asymmetric information.
With a lack of user ability to distinguish between secure and insecure products (e.g.,
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software, websites), there will be no incentives for companies to actually invest in
security. This can lead to ‘the market of lemons’ – the scenario sketched by the
well known economist George Akerlof in [9] – where bad (insecure) products in the
market drive out the good ones eventually. Economic literature suggests to rely on
certiﬁcation intermediaries to approach both cases when the private information is
unknown (i) ex-ante, and (ii) ex-post, a user action. Albano and Lizzeri show that
if quality is endogenous, the existence of a certiﬁcation intermediary will improve
product quality [10]. If quality is exogenous, an intermediary will also improve
welfare by not certifying unsafe products [10]. However, a monopolistic certiﬁer
will be keen to disclose only minimal information to induce trade [85].
In practice, we have seen numerous criticisms on security and trust certiﬁcations.
Anderson [15] points out the faulty incentives with Common Criteria for IT Secu-
rity Evaluation (CC) [6]. The CC framework is problematic as product evaluation
is paid by the vendors rather than the potential users (e.g., the governments). This
motivates the vendors to shop for the easiest path, either in terms of cost, strict-
ness, or time, for certiﬁcation [15]. Although the Commercial Licensed Evaluation
Facility (CLEF) can have their licenses withdrawn, Anderson note that there is a
lack of sanctions for misbehavior [15]. In addition, it will be wrong to equate a
CC-certiﬁed product as secure. CC certiﬁcation only says that a product has been
evaluated to meet a set of security requirements and speciﬁcations, as documented
in the Protection Proﬁle (PP) and Security Target (ST), up to one out of seven
diﬀerent assurance levels. Lax requirements for certiﬁcation can indeed lead to
more harm than good. Edelman [48] reports the situation of ‘adverse selection’
with online trust certiﬁcations. He ﬁnd that sites certiﬁed by a large vendor are in
fact twice as likely to be untrustworthy as the uncertiﬁed sites [48]. Analogous to
certiﬁcation, sponsored advertisements on leading search engines are also found to
be more than twice as likely to be untrustworthy as to the corresponding organic
search results [48].
Given the challenges with third party certiﬁers, should we opt for mandatory
regulations, for example, to have the government intervenes and enacts strict se-
curity and privacy protection standards? On online privacy protection, however,
researchers have shown that when the expected loss due to privacy violation is mod-
erate, mandatory regulation is not socially optimal [112]. Are there alternatives?
Part of this thesis will investigate the feasibility of leveraging user inputs against
the security and privacy risks on the Web and application platforms.
Are We Investing Enough?
As security risks grow, an important question we may ask is whether we have
invested enough in security. How should companies approach an optimal investment
in security measures? An answer to this is given by the well known Gordon-Loeb
security investment model [63]. Assuming that an increasing security investment
decreases the probability of security breach, but at a decreasing rate, Gordon and
Loeb show that for two broad classes of security breach probability functions, the
optimal security investment does not exceed 37% (=1/e) of the expected loss due
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to a breach [63]. This calls for a thorough check on expensive security investment.
Their model also shows when the vulnerability is high, it may not be optimal to
continue to invest in protection. Security managers should in this case focus on
reducing the expected loss. It is necessary to note that, however crisp and simple,
the Gordon-Loeb security investment model does come with several limitations.
The model assumes a zero ﬁxed cost in security investment. In addition, it is not
easy to determine the levels of threats and vulnerabilities as well as the value of
the assets to be protected, so to work out the value of expected loss and optimal
investment. Assuming that the expected loss is ﬁnite, their model is also not
applicable to the protection of critical assets or infrastructures where a security
breach will be catastrophic.
The golden rule of an 1/e upper limit for optimal security investment has been
challenged in several subsequent publications. In particular, considering four classes
of security breach functions with diﬀerent characteristics of marginal security im-
provement, namely (i) decreasing, (ii) ﬁrst increasing but later decreasing (logistic
function), (iii) increasing, and (iv) constant, Hausken [68] shows that optimal secu-
rity investment is not universally capped at 1/e. Depending on the security breach
function, it may also be optimal to invest heavily to protect the extremely vulner-
able information or system, opposed to the recommendation from Gordon-Loeb’s
model. Indeed, it remains an empirical question as to which (if any) of the security
breach functions best captures the real world phenomenon.
In another extension work, Matsuura [89] introduces the concept of ‘productivity
space’ of information security to model the fact that security investment can reduce
both vulnerability and threat, making it harder or more costly for the attackers.
This extends Gordon-Loeb’s model which considers an exogenous threat level and
that security investment reduces only the vulnerability level. However, as it is with
deciding the best ﬁtting vulnerability-driven security breach probability function,
it is not straightforward how we should model the security threats and how they
would be reduced with an increasing investment. Indeed, uncertainty can make
a big diﬀerence in defender’s optimal strategy. Bo¨hme and Moore [25] show that
under a high uncertainty about the security threats (e.g., costs of attacks), assuming
the attacker will always go for the easiest or cheapest attack, it could be optimal
for the defender to protect nothing (in a static game) or to have a wait-and-see
reactive strategy (in a repeated game setting). This highlights the importance of
information and to have a better understanding of the attack modi operandi. It
also leads the controversial implication that security under-investment can in fact
be a rational strategy, calling for the need to rethink the wide condemnation on
seemingly lax security practices by the defenders [25]. While incentive misalignment
often leads to security under-investment, it is not a necessary condition [25].
Can We Insure Security Risks?
Apart from deciding the optimal security investment, an idea that has captured the
interests of many researchers in the ﬁeld of security economics is on the viability
of cyber insurance in improving information security. An early account on the
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advantages of cyber insurance is given in Varian (2000) [114]. Varian envisions
a two-step market approach in managing security risks. First, liability should be
assigned to parties that have the best access to relevant manpower and technical
resources for managing risks. For example, banks should be given the most of
liability in ATM frauds although a small share of liability can also be assigned
to users so that they will be careful. Secondly, as liability is straightened out,
Varian argues that liable parties will no doubt want to buy insurance. This may
seem counter-intuitive at ﬁrst, but factoring in that insurers will only insure good
clients, liable parties will be incentivized to comply to good security practices [114].
The conjecture that cyber insurance can improve information security has been
echoed widely but there remains little uptake of the idea in practice. Several an-
alytic works have highlighted the challenges. In [23] for example, Bo¨hme shows
that one particular challenge with cyber insurance, diﬀerent from other insurance
businesses, lies with the dominance of certain IT systems. This leads to the threat
of tremendous correlated losses. Indeed, a virus infecting a client’s system will hit
many others at the same time, causing the business of cyber insurance to be partic-
ularly risky. Thus, Bo¨hme [23] suggests that policies in support of cyber insurance
should simultaneously consider supporting the diversiﬁcation of IT systems. Apart
from correlated cyber risks due to monocultures of IT systems, there is the problem
of interdependent risks [80]. The security risks one faces depend on his and others’
actions. The reward of protection and insurance thus depends on the security of
other interconnected systems.
Yet, Lelarge and Bolot [80] show that in the presence of interdependent risks,
insurance remains a viable scheme to incentivize users to adopt good security prac-
tices. This optimistic view is perhaps not shared by the majority of other modeling
works, as surveyed by Bo¨hme and Schwartz [26]. The authors ﬁnd a discrepancy
between the conjecture favoring cyber insurance as a tool for aligning incentives
for good security practices, and the majority of analytical results challenging the
viability of a market for cyber insurance. They conclude by calling for future works
that will address the discrepancy so to advance the research of cyber insurance.
More than the Weakest Link
Security is often regarded as the problem of the weakest link – attackers will exploit
the most vulnerable part of a security system. Yet, following the analysis by Hir-
shleifer on public provisioning [71], security researchers have started to realize the
importance of an interdependency analysis in information security [115, 65]. Con-
sider the case of a walled village, defending the village from the attackers is more
than the weakest link problem. Depending on the underlying interdependency, the
probability of successful defense can be modeled as a function of multiple forms:
• Weakest link – if successful defense depends on the lowest part of the wall
• Weakest target – if only the villager who has the lowest part of wall suﬀers
• Total eﬀort – if the villagers build the wall together; the strength of the wall
and thus successful defense depends on the combined eﬀort of the villagers
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• Best shot – if the villagers build multiple layers of walls; successful defense
thus depends on the strongest layer
Game theory can be used to analyze the incentives of the villagers – whether they
will contribute to the defense of the village. Knowing the equilibrium outcomes, a
social planner (the village leader) can react to design a strategy that will incentivize
the villagers to achieve the social optimum. Note that the above list is by no means
exhaustive. Practical security scenarios can be a hybrid combination of the four
security games or other relevant models. In addition, there may be occasions where
we do not know the underlying interdependency structure; reverse-engineering from
empirical data to reveal the structure is a potential direction for research [42].
We can already obtain some useful insights into various practical security scenar-
ios with the above four security games. The weakest link game models the perimeter
defense in network security; censorship resistance where one standing server defeats
the attacker is an example of a best shot game; the strength of anonymity networks
such as Tor which depends on the number of users can be modeled as a total ef-
fort game [42]. These security games can also model the case of secure software
development. Given that the mistakes by any careless programmers can introduce
vulnerabilities (weakest link) to the system, one should consider hiring fewer but
better programmers [17]. At the same time, the best security architect available
should be hired for designing the system, while more testers should be employed
given the total eﬀort nature of software testing in removing bugs and vulnerabil-
ities [17]. Another application of the total eﬀort game is given by Floreˆncio and
Herley [55]. The authors argue that the password based authentication is a total
eﬀort game from the perspective of an attacker. While there remain many who will
use an unsafe password such as the name of their pet, these users are spared from
the attackers who must guess a large number of ‘easy’ passwords correctly in order
to become proﬁtable. In practical terms, the diversity of user passwords can thus
be more important the strength of individual passwords [55].
On the other hand, the weakest target game, introduced by Grossklags et al. [65],
can be used to model various types of Internet-scale attacks, such as phishing and
drive-by downloads, in which the perpetrators set out to victimize not all, but the
subset of the easiest targets or ‘low hanging fruits’. Grossklags et al. [65] consider
also the scenario where users are able to either protect themselves (through actions
such as installing ﬁrewalls and regular software patching), or insure themselves to
control the extent of losses (through actions such as regular backup and purchase of
cyber insurance). In this setting, Grossklags et al. [65] ﬁnd an important diﬀerence
between the weakest link and the weakest target models. As the number of users
increases, players will tend to protect themselves in the weakest target game, while
the players will shift from protection actions to insure themselves in the weakest
link game [65].
Underground Economy and Modi Operandi
We often hear astronomical ﬁgures of cyber crime proﬁtability and security losses.
In 2009, the chief security oﬃcer of AT&T testiﬁed to the US congress citing the
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global cyber crime revenues to be more than $1 trillion per annum [14]. To put in
perspective, $1 trillion is two times the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Norway.
Meanwhile, Detica, an information intelligence company part of BAE Systems, and
the UK Cabinet Oﬃce provided a joint report in 2011 which estimates the cost of
cyber crimes in the UK to be £27 billion per annum [46]. A large portion of the
cost (£21 billion) goes to the corporate sector, which includes losses due to theft
of intellectual properties and industrial espionages [46]. Cyber crimes thus seem
extremely lucrative. One should however take the ﬁgures with a pinch of salt.
An example of a gross mismatch in loss estimations can be seen with phishing.
In 2007, Gartner estimated a loss of $3.2 billion due to phishing in the United
States with 3.6 million victims and a $886 average per person loss [58]. With a
conservative set of parameters, however, Herley and Floreˆncio [69] estimate the
loss to be much smaller. Leverage their earlier study that 0.4% users do enter their
passwords at phishing sites [54], and a phishing victim rate of 0.34% estimated by
Moore and Clayton [91], Herley and Floreˆncio estimate that 0.185% (half of the
average victim rate) users will really lose money to phishing activities. Considering
the online population to be 165 millions in the US, and a median loss of $200 per
person, their estimate for phishing losses in the US is $61 million per annum [69].
Although it remains a non-negligible ﬁgure, there is a stark diﬀerence compared to
the estimate given by Gartner.
Indeed there is a lack of reliable estimates of security losses. Many ‘guesstimates’
are extrapolated from self-reported surveys. Moreover, there are incentives for
security vendors to report over-estimated ﬁgures. Researchers have been critical
with the estimates of the underground economy. Herley and Floreˆncio [70] challenge
the reliability of the estimates of underground economy obtained by monitoring the
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels. The duo argue that cheating is a way of life in
the IRC channels. Yet, while we should question the astronomical loss estimates,
what we currently know about the underground economy could well be just the tip
of the iceberg. We should also be aware of the tendency of under-reporting from
corporate victims to exercise reputation damage control. Many of them may even
not realize that an attack has taken place.
Hence, there is great scientiﬁc importance to dissect the underground economy
of cyber crimes in the academic settings, however challenging it may be. An ap-
plaudable work is by Levchenko et al. [82] who have conducted an end-to-end mea-
surement on how spams are being delivered through botnets, how spam-advertised
items are merchandised, and how the payments ﬂow. The researchers ﬁnd that it
will be more eﬀective to seek cooperation from a few banks to disrupt the ﬁnancing
of spammers, instead of improving on the detection, blacklisting and takedown of
spamming servers and domain names – areas where computer scientists convention-
ally focus on. Such a measurement study is thus valuable and needed. Not only
can an in-depth measurement study provide good insights into the structure and
the state of a given problem, it can also allow the defenders to strategically allocate
their resources to the most eﬀective security measures.
A closely related work is by Kanich et al. [74]. The authors present two methods
to estimate the rate of orders received by enterprises whose revenue drives spams,
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and to characterize the spam-advertised products and customers. They ﬁnd well
over 100,000 orders of spam-advertised products per month [74]. In addition, they
ﬁnd that the online illegal pharmacy market is huge with a projected annual revenue
in tens of millions, largely supported by a Western consumer base [74]. However,
the ﬁgure is much less than guesstimates given by others, and is also much less than
the annual expenditures on anti-spam solutions [74]. Besides providing a reality
check to the anti-spam industry, it certainly cautions us to rethink our security
strategies. Have we invested too much? How well are the resources allocated? Are
there alternative resources for information security?
Phishing has also received much academic attention in the recent years. Moore
and Clayton [91] investigate the modi operandi of phishers, the eﬀectiveness of take-
downs, and the victimization rate based on the lifetime of phishing sites. Another
of their work [92] ﬁnds how non-cooperation between the defenders contributes to
the long lifetime of phishing sites, and calls for information sharing in the anti-
phishing industry. The same authors investigate how vulnerable servers are being
exploited through the use of search engines for recompromise in another work [95].
Interestingly, they ﬁnd that phishing websites and thus the susceptible servers,
placed onto a public blacklist are recompromised no more frequently than the list
of susceptible servers only known within closed communities [95]. This adds to the
value of a public blacklist for giving better information to the defenders, although
the authors do caution for the need of continued monitoring so that the public
blacklist does not adversely favor the attackers [95].
Apart from spam and phishing, there have been also a number of research inves-
tigations on the ecosystems of fraudulent online activities, including online bullying
and threatening in Japan [41], illegal online pharmacies [81], and typo-squatting
domains [96]. These studies are particularly interesting. While fraudulent online
activities may not be explicitly harmful, there is no reason to assume that they are
separated from the economies of malicious activities. Furthermore, there is often
no clear assignment of responsibilities – which authorities should act upon the gray
areas of the Web – in practice.
1.2. Rethinking Information Security
Given the relative short history, there remain plentiful research problems and po-
tentials in the ﬁelds of usable security and security economics. While both ﬁelds
are cross disciplinary in nature, they tend to be treated separately in the research
community. This thesis looks at both the economic and socio-behavioral aspects
to provide new insights and to challenge conventional beliefs.
Figure 1.2 presents a framework to relate three diﬀerent perspectives – technical,
economic, and socio-behavioral – of information security. Traditionally, technical
research activities have encompassed areas including cryptography, cryptanalysis,
protocol design, trusted hardware, authentication, access control, anomaly detec-
tion, and privacy enhancing technologies. Technical security and privacy research
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Figure 1.2.: Technical, economic and socio-behavioral perspectives on information
security. SE and US denote the focuses of the ﬁelds of security economics and usable
security, respectively. M indicates the need for high security assurance in military
security, while WM denotes the need for a balanced trade-oﬀ of diﬀerent perspectives
on the web and app platforms.
ensures conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, non-repudiation, in ad-
dition to anonymity and unlinkability.
Meanwhile, research activities on the economics of information security can in-
volve a macro- or microscopic analysis. A macroscopic economic perspective on
security problems includes research activities on the optimal security investment,
risk management, feasibility of cyber insurance, as well as empirical investigations
of underground economies. On the other hand, a microscopic view on the economics
of information security typically concerns the analysis of incentives, liabilities and
strategies of interdependent actors using tools such as game and contract theories.
Thirdly, security measures can be ineﬀective without adequate consideration to
the users and society. A socio-behavioral perspective looks at the alignment of secu-
rity measures with social expectations and user behaviors. This encompasses multi-
ple areas investigated by the community of usable security, including the ease-of-use
of security features, risk communication, user habituation and cognitive biases, as
well as the attitudes, knowledge and awareness of the public.
A point in the triangle indicates the relative weights or focuses of a research
activity on diﬀerent perspectives. The area labelled as SE, for example, represents a
wide range of research works in security economics which look at the intersection of
technical security and economics. On the other hand, the area US indicates the ﬁeld
of usable security which looks at the socio-behavioral aspects of security measures.
Assuming ﬁnite resources and excluding those (e.g., nation state actors) who may
have access to enormous resources for a comprehensive program, focusing on a
particular perspective naturally comes at the expense of the other two. One may
thus want to attend to diﬀerent perspectives of information security strategically
depending on the contexts and requirements.
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This does not suggest that a security measure must always be cross disciplinary.
To illustrate, security measures for military purposes, as indicated by the area M
in Figure 1.2, may want to focus on the highest level of security assurance albeit
they may be more expensive and less user friendly. On the other hand, when
designing security measures for the public, one will inevitably need to trade oﬀ his
focus on security assurance with attentions to economic viability and usability. Yet,
the distinction of diﬀerent security contexts and requirements is often neglected in
the research community. Policymakers can play a role to guide and correct the
attentions by diﬀerent research groups accordingly.
Security on the Web, which remains a challenging issue today, will beneﬁt from
a balanced treatment of the three perspectives. A security measure to improve web
security would not be feasible without considerations to economic deployability
and usability, including the ability of users to comprehend the risk signals and
react to them expectedly. At the same time, while we should not underestimate
the web perpetrators, it will not be helpful to over-assume their abilities. The level
of security assurance on the Web diﬀers from the assurance level needed for the
military purposes, or for the protection of critical infrastructures. Shouldn’t we
model the web attack and defense accordingly?
There is also a lack of eﬃcient services and clear cut assignment of responsibil-
ities against various fraudulent online activities. Although not outright malicious,
fraudulent websites trick or harm the users through scams, illegal product sales,
deceptive information gathering, misuse of user data, and so on. While malicious
phishing sites are taken down between 4 to 96 hours, fraudulent websites for mule-
recruitment and illegal online pharmacies have an average life-time of two weeks and
two months respectively [94]. Other fraudulent activities on the Web include the
sales of counterfeit luxury goods or software [82, 74], adult sites (typically plagued
with malware and aggresive marketing [121]), typo-squatting domains mimicking
the URLs of popular brands [96], as well as online bullying and threatening [41].
Security vendors avoid ﬂagging fraudulent websites fearing the complication of liti-
gations, especially on subjective and potentially contentious matters. On the other
hand, online certiﬁcation issuers and search engines may have conﬂicts of interests in
certifying or accepting advertisement orders from websites in the gray category [48].
The gap of responsibility leads to the question of whether we can leverage inputs
from volunteers (expert and ordinary users) in improving web security.
Besides the Web, another domain needing an economic and socio-behavioral per-
spective is the third party application (app). As mobile device platforms compete
for third party applications to be more attractive to the users, more and more
device functionalities and personal information are made available to third party
developers. The openness and richness in functionalities and information improve
user experience, but increase also the incentives for malicious and fraudulent ac-
tivities. While the motivations of malicious or fraudulent third party apps may
be similar to that of bad websites, installing an app involves a diﬀerent mental
process, and can impose a higher level of risks to the users. This constitutes the
third motivation of this thesis to examine the risks and challenges following the
popularity of third party apps.
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1.2.1. Motivation and Related Work
This section details the motivations and related works of the thesis. As brieﬂy
sketched out earlier, there are three motivations (M1, M2, M3) in this thesis. Spe-
cially, the thesis will investigate the security and privacy risks facing the users on the
web and app platforms (M1 and M3), and the potentials of leveraging volunteering
eﬀorts, from expert and ordinary users, in mitigating the risks (M2).
M1: Realistic Economic Modeling of Web Attack and Defense
To learn about the attackers we are defending against is crucial for designing an
eﬀective defense measure. While we should never underestimate the perpetrators,
over-assuming their capabilities, resources and proﬁtability will do a disservice to
our community. Researchers ﬁnd that, for example, the actual losses due to phishing
activities can be of a few magnitude orders lower than the ﬁgures reported by
industrial players [69]. Not only can this lead to an over-spending for security,
a ‘rosy’ picture painted for the proﬁtability of online crimes will only serve to
attract more perpetrators, stressing the defense mechanisms even though many of
the perpetrators will not be proﬁtable [69]. Yet, it is not trivial to learn more
about the attackers through measurement experiments. A few papers measuring
the modi operandi and the economics of perpetrators have emerged over the last
few years (e.g., [91, 100, 121, 41, 81, 82]); the fact that one of the most complete
studies [82] involves 15 co-authors says a lot about the complexity behind the setup
of the end-to-end practical measurement.
Without an easy access to good empirical data, it is important to inform our
community on the strategies of rational perpetrators and how to mitigate their at-
tempts eﬀectively through analytic modeling. Yet, models capturing the incentives
and interdependence of diﬀerent actors are only useful when constructed to reﬂect
the practical scenarios. How should we realistically model the threats facing users
on the Web?
Use of game theoretical analysis in security has gained its popularity in the past
few years. An early work is by Liu and Zang (2003) [84] which advocates the use
of game theory in reasoning about the attacker behaviors. The authors propose a
conceptual framework that formalizes the modeling of attacker intent, objectives
and strategies in game theoretical settings. Further, there have been attempts to
integrate the modeling of system security and dependability, factoring in both cases
whether the underlying failure causes are intentional or not [105]. A comprehensive
survey of game theoretical literature for security and privacy problems can be found
in [87]. While there are numerous studies that look at the dynamics between an
attacker and a defender, they usually model the attack and protection of a set
of network systems (e.g., intrusions [11, 12, 20, 25]) or resources (e.g., jamming
attacks, denials of service [30, 13, 104]).
The interaction between the defender (e.g., takedown specialists, security ven-
dors) and the perpetrators on the Web is diﬀerent from the dynamics in network
security. First, web perpetrators should be distinguished from state sponsored at-
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tackers with potentially unlimited resources so not to focus an overly secure solution
at the expense of cost and usability. To be realistic, the actions of the defender
and attacker should be constrained by ﬁnite resources. Secondly, there is the dif-
ference that web perpetrators create new malicious or fraudulent websites on the
Web compared to the context of network security where the defender protects a
ﬁxed set of systems or resources. The newly created bad websites are unknown
to the defender. Furthermore, the defender is limited to use reactive strategies,
acting to detect and take down the bad websites created by the perpetrators. To
summarize, web security is hence a ﬁnite resource allocation problem between the
defender and attacker with information asymmetry (unknown bad websites) and
action asymmetry (reactive detect-and-takedown defense). How should we model
this analytically, and what can we learn from it?
M2: Exploring the Potentials of Community Inputs for Security
Have we invested too little for security, or have we not been able to better coor-
dinate our resources? Can we leverage voluntary eﬀorts in online communities as
alternative resources to improve information security?
The notion of ‘wisdom of crowds’ has gained much popularity ever since the book
by Surowiecki in 2005 [111]. Articles on the value of collective judgements can in
fact be traced back to more than a century ago. Sir Francis Galton observed in 1907
that the aggregate values (median and mean) of the entries to an ox weight-judging
competition were more accurate than individual guesses, indicating the trustwor-
thiness of a democratic judgement [57, 56]. Collective judgements are however not
always better. Surowiecki outlines four conditions for a wise crowd to outperform
a few experts [111]. He notes that the crowd members should be diverse (not ho-
mogenous), have independent thought processes to avoid mere information cascade,
be decentralized (to tap into local knowledge and specialization) in addition to the
need of a good aggregation strategy to collate the inputs from the individuals.
An example good use of the wisdom of crowds in modern IT systems is the
Wikipedia. Denning et al. [45] highlight six potential risks with Wikipedia, namely
accuracy, motives of contributors, uncertain expertise, volatility of content, sources
of information, and coverage. Despite critiques and skepticisms, Wikipedia has
evolved to be one of the most important information sources on the Web. Stud-
ies on Wikipedia are plenty. Many of them contribute to analyzing its reliability
(e.g., [60]), the contribution patterns (e.g., [77, 97, 119]), as well as its success
factors and suggestions for improvement (e.g., [43, 78, 59]). Researchers have also
examined the success factors of other collaborative systems, such as the Stack Over-
ﬂow [4], one of the fastest growing Question and Answer (Q&A) systems [86].
Can we leverage the wisdom of crowds for security purposes? PhishTank [3]
is among the ﬁrst out of the few practical systems that leverage crowd wisdom to
improve web security. PhishTank collates user reporting and voting against suspect
phishing sites. Another example is the Web of Trust (WOT) [7] which aggregates
both human and automated inputs from trusted blacklists to evaluate four aspects
of websites, namely trustworthiness, vendor reliability, privacy and child-safety.
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Moore and Clayton [93] evaluate the reliability of PhishTank. They ﬁnd that
the participation ratio in PhishTank is highly skewed, following a power-law distri-
bution. They argue that this makes PhishTank particularly susceptible to manip-
ulation. Compared to a commercial phishing blacklist, they ﬁnd that PhishTank
is less comprehensive and slower. In addition, they ﬁnd that inexperienced users
make many errors. However, most of the mistakes are corrected in the voting pro-
cess. The eventual assessment outcomes contain only few incorrect decisions, all of
which are later reversed.
Indeed, two challenges of collective eﬀorts for security purposes are the reliability
of user inputs, and the incentives of the contributors (e.g., whether there will be
adequate and sustainable volunteering eﬀorts in the long term). Compared to an
encyclopedia or a question & answer system, security may impose an even higher
bar of contribution barrier given the complexity of security evaluation. Further,
there are questions on why and how users, with limited resources, would keep up
with the large numbers of malicious and fraudulent websites created daily.
Yet, can we generalize the pessimisms on PhishTank to the use of crowd wisdom
for general security evaluation?1 Is the skewed contribution ratio, commonly found
in peer-production systems [119], a real threat? Will the less active users evolve
to play a more important role, as observed in Wikipedia [77]? Can ordinary users
ever contribute to information security? Are the mistakes by inexperienced users
outweighing the potentials of volunteering eﬀorts in complementing the existing
measures, and in evaluating aspects that are potentially contentious or subjective,
and not covered by security vendors and service providers? How about leveraging
inputs from sources which individual users trust?
M3: Risks and Challenges transitioning from the Web to Apps
The mobile industry has been through an exciting revolution over the past few
years. An exciting change to the mobile industry is arguably the opening up of
the access to various functionalities of the mobile devices and user information to
third party developers, as well as the setup of an application store (app store)
that channels the third party applications (apps) conveniently to the users.2 This
creates a win-win-win situation – users can now add advanced functionalities to
their devices, while third party developers proﬁt from selling apps, and platform
owners make a cut from the app sales besides gaining competitive advantages over
others as apps increase the attractiveness of a platform. To date, there are more
than half a million third party apps available for download on the App Store and
Google Play for iOS and Android mobile device platforms, respectively.
The rise of applications is not just a phenomenon on the mobile platforms. One
can develop third party apps on web platforms such as on Facebook and Google
1Mamykina et al. [86] note that the success of a collaborative system may depend not only on
tangible design decisions, but also an active community leadership by the developers. This
makes it hard to port the lessons learned from one to other community-based systems.
2Symbian and Java platforms has long allowed third party apps to gain access to some device
capabilities before the advent to the iOS. Yet, Apple was the ﬁrst to setup the App Store as
a centralized venue for distributing third party apps made for its iOS platform.
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Chrome. The HTML5 web standards has built in capabilities for developers to
build web apps that can run across diﬀerent browsers on diﬀerent device platforms.
The availability of comprehensive APIs including oﬄine caching makes it possible
for HTML5 web apps to oﬀer functionalities similar to native device applications.
Thus we are witnessing a transition from websites to mobile and web apps. Users
are, for example, installing an app to read online news, another app to check ﬂight
schedule, and yet another to access Internet banking. The growing popularity of
rich and integrated services by third party apps increases the incentives for ac-
tivities with security and privacy implications. Much research attention has been
given to the Android mobile device platform given that its ‘laissez-faire’ design
which allows anyone to develop and distribute an Android application without
much scrutiny from Google. Research on the Android platform has focused on
platform security architecture [53, 40, 50] and on identifying malicious applications
automatically [49, 124, 126]. Others have looked at the problem of a non-global
application identiﬁcation (appID) system and the emergence of alternative appli-
cation marketplaces [21]. In addition, there have been a number of surveys on
malicious applications on Android and mobile device platforms in general [51, 125].
Access to device functionalities and user information by third party apps is gov-
erned by the operating system and runtime platform security schemes to apply the
principle of least authority – one of the eight design principles for computer security
outlined by Saltzer and Schroeder [106]. The most common is the permission-based
platform security that has been adopted by modern mobile device application plat-
forms [79] as well as web application platforms on Facebook and Google Chrome.
Some of these platforms such as Apple’s iOS rely on a central authority to de-
cide what permissions can be granted to a given application while others (Android,
Facebook, Google Chrome) rely on the user making the authorization decisions.
We refer to the former category ‘centralized permission systems’ and the latter
’user-consent permission systems’.3
What are the diﬀerent security and privacy challenges with the centralized and
user-consent models? Intuitively, centralized permission systems take the burden of
judgment away from users. However, there is the question of whether centralized
judgment will always be suitable. Apple has received numerous objections for
disallowing or removing certain apps from the App Store, prompting some users to
‘jail-break’ the phone to be able to install the apps from alternative sources [2]. The
appropriateness of an application, for example, whether it is privacy-invasive or has
oﬀensive content, is a subjective matter, and may be problematic when judged by
a central authority.
On the other hand, there are also numerous challenges in the user-consent per-
mission systems. Do users understand the permission systems and pay attention
to them? A few studies have looked at the eﬀectiveness of user-consent permission
models. King et al. [76] survey the privacy knowledge, behaviors and concerns of
Facebook app users. More than a quarter of the survey participants report that
3Several HTML5 APIs, such as the geolocation API, currently support a user-consent permission
system. The decentralized nature of the Web implies that the user-consent permission systems
will become more widespread, if HTML5 web apps become dominant [88].
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they have never read the permission request dialog. While half of a quarter of
the participants are knowledgeable about Facebook apps, a quarter of them do not
even realize that apps are both created by Facebook and third party developers [76].
This highlights the challenge of risk communication, especially when third party
apps are tightly integrated onto the platforms, and distributed through oﬃcial
channels provided by well known platform owners (e.g., Facebook, Google, Apple).
Meanwhile, Felt et al. [52] analyze the permissions requested by the most popular
Android apps and Google Chrome extensions. They conclude that as dangerous
permissions are being requested frequently by the popular apps, the user-consent
permission model may not be an eﬀective tool for preventing the installation of
malware or alerting the users.
Will the above ﬁndings generalize to diﬀerent applications, popular or new, and
across diﬀerent platforms? How are users reacting to apps that request for more
permissions than average? Are there reliable risk signals at all that are assisting
the users to distinguish the potentially suspicious apps from the good ones? How
could we potentially cater for a subjective evaluation? How can we signal risks
to users eﬀectively? What are the trends of security and privacy risks facing the
users? This thesis contributes by providing answers to the above questions.
1.2.2. Research Methodology
Inline with the multidisciplinary research, the methodology of this thesis is mani-
fold, combining analytic modeling, empirical measurements, and user studies.
Game theoretical analysis is chosen as the tool to model the incentives and dy-
namics between the web perpetrator and defender (takedown specialist). In par-
ticular, we have surveyed for games that incorporate resource constraints and that
can be extended to model the practical information and action asymmetries. We
ﬁnd the Colonel Blotto model to be particularly suitable. This class of games has
a long history, ﬁrst introduced by Borel in 1921 [28] and studied by a few others
in [29, 64], before being neglected due to its complexity until a reemerged interest
in 2006 following the work by Roberson [102]. To have a realistic economic model
for web attack and defense, this thesis has taken on the phishing problem as a case
study, and surveyed the modi operandi and economics of phishing. In particular,
we have constructed our model with reference to practical measurement ﬁndings,
including those provided by academics (e.g., [94, 92, 90]) and the Anti-Phishing
Working Group (APWG) – a consortium of industrial, academic and governmental
partners (e.g., [18, 19]).
To evaluate the feasibility of leveraging user inputs for security purposes, the the-
sis investigates the Web of Trust (WOT) and compares its reliability to non-human
based automated systems provided by three popular vendors, namely McAfee,
Google and Symantec Norton. We have also managed to obtain multiple data sets
from the developers of WOT, based on which we have investigated the contribution
patterns in WOT, and evaluated its strengths and potential weaknesses.
On the other hand, the thesis has investigated the limitations of the current user-
consent based permission models, and some trends of exploitations on Android,
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Facebook and Google Chrome platforms through a large scale data collection and
analysis. Through an online survey, we have also studied the self-reported user
behaviors during the application installation process, and the attitudes on the se-
curity and privacy risks of third party applications. In addition, we have conducted
laboratory user studies to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of habituation mitigation mech-
anisms and integrated risk signals from personalized sources, leveraging a prototype
the thesis author developed during his master thesis project [31]. Results from the
survey and laboratory experiments are used to construct guidelines for designing a
trustworthy application installation process.
Working in relatively new research ﬁelds, the thesis has beneﬁted tremendously
from international contacts and collaborations. Research visits to well known se-
curity groups at Nokia Research Center, University of California (Berkeley) and
Carleton University have helped to form interesting research ideas besides laying
the foundation for joint papers. The thesis has also managed to tap into the talent
of master students at the home institution. In particular, an extended understand-
ing for Android and Facebook applications is gained through supervising a master
project focusing on implementing friends based risk signaling on Facebook, and
two master theses focusing on data analytics and machine learning methods for
identifying suspicious Android applications.
1.3. Thesis Contribution
A total of eleven research papers are co-authored during the doctoral program. As
depicted in Figure 1.3, the papers can be broadly categorized into two abstract
themes: (i) exploring security and privacy risks facing the users, or Security For
Users (SFU), and (ii) exploring the potentials of leveraging volunteering eﬀorts from
expert and ordinary users for security purposes, or Users For Security (UFS). On
the other hand, the thesis has focused on two problem domains: issues on the web,
or on the app platforms. Figure 1.3 also indicates how a paper relates to the three
thesis motivations M1, M2 and M3, and whether a paper takes mainly an economic,
or a socio-behavioral perspective of information security, using the circled e or sb.
Six papers (A–F [33, 37, 34, 32, 36, 39]) on security and privacy problems facing
the web and app users, and the potentials of users in contributing to mitigate
such problems are included in this thesis, with minor editorial changes. They are
depicted in Figure 1.3 as solid nodes. Non-included papers are shown in nodes
with dashed line. Paper G [35] is in submission to a conference, while H [22] is
a working paper. Meanwhile, paper I [117] analyzes the potential ramiﬁcations of
an incentive scheme to anonymity management in Tor. Paper J [99] and paper
K [38] take a diﬀerent focus to study the use of trust information in recommender
systems. The list of papers and their publication venue, name of publisher, abstract
and acceptance rate, if available, are shown in the following. Section 1.3.2 further
summarizes the contributions of the included papers.
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SFU UFS
We
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p
A: Colonel
Blotto Phishing
(GameSec 2011)
M1
e
G: Whack-a-mole
M1
e
B: Reevaluating
Wisdom of
Crowds (FC 2011)
M2
sb
I: Gold Star in
Split Tor (Se-
cureComm 2011)
M2
e
C: Community-
based Web Secu-
rity (CSCW 2012)
M2
sb
D: Incentives in
Community-based
Security (SESOC 2011)
M2
e
E: Trustworthy
App Installation
(NordSec 2010)
M3,M2
sb
F: Is this App Safe?
(WWW 2012)
M3
sb
H: Interdependent
Privacy
M3
e J & K: Trust in
Recommender
Systems (IFIPTM
2011 & JIP 2012)
sb
Trust
Figure 1.3.: List of papers co-authored on the theme of security for users (SFU),
or users for security (UFS), concerning web or app issues. Papers included in the
thesis are shown in solid nodes; non-included papers are depicted in dashed nodes.
M1, M2 and M3 indicate how a paper relates with three thesis motivations. Circled
labels e and sb indicate if a paper provides mainly an economic or socio-behavioral
perspective of information security. Paper J and paper K have a diﬀerent focus;
they study the use of trust information in recommender systems.
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1.3.1. List of Papers
A. P. H. Chia, J. Chuang. Colonel Blotto in the Phishing War, In Proceedings
of 2011 Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec),
LNCS vol. 7037, pp. 201–218, Springer (2011).
Abstract. Phishing exhibits characteristics of asymmetric conﬂict and guer-
rilla warfare. Phishing sites, upon detection, are subject to removal by take-
down specialists. In response, phishers create large numbers of new phishing
attacks to evade detection and stretch the resources of the defenders. We
propose the Colonel Blotto Phishing (CBP) game, a two-stage Colonel Blotto
game with endogenous dimensionality and detection probability. We ﬁnd that
the optimal number of new phishes to create, from the attacker’s perspective,
is inﬂuenced by the degree of resource asymmetry, the cost of new phishes,
and the probability of detection. Counter-intuitively, we ﬁnd that it is the less
resourceful attacker who would create more phishing attacks in equilibrium.
And depending on the detection probability, an attacker will vary his strate-
gies to either create even more phishes, or to focus on raising his resources
to increase the chance he will extend the lifetime of his phishes. We discuss
the implications to anti-phishing strategies and point out that the game is also
applicable to web security problems more generally.
Contribution statement. Pern Hui Chia was the main contributor of this
work. Analysis and programming in Mathematica were due to Pern Hui Chia.
John Chuang contributed to active discussion and parts of the writing, as well
as the original ideation to adapt Colonel Blotto games for phishing dynamics.
B. P. H. Chia, S. J. Knapskog. Re-Evaluating the Wisdom of Crowds in
Assessing Web Security, In Proceedings of 15th International Conference
on Financial Cryptography & Data Security (FC), LNCS vol. 7035, pp. 299–
314, Springer (2011). (Acceptance rate: 16/56=29%)
Abstract. We examine the outcomes of the Web of Trust (WOT), a user-
based system for assessing web security and ﬁnd that it is more comprehen-
sive than three automated services in identifying ‘bad’ domains. Similarly to
PhishTank, the participation patterns in WOT are skewed; however, WOT has
implemented a number of measures to mitigate the risks of exploitation. In
addition, a large percentage of its current user inputs are found to be based
on objective and veriﬁable evaluation factors. We also conﬁrm that users are
concerned not only about malware and phishing. Online risks such as scams,
illegal pharmacies and misuse of personal information are regularly brought up
by the users. Such risks are not evaluated by the automated services, high-
lighting the potential beneﬁts of user inputs. We also ﬁnd a lack of sharing
among the vendors of the automated services. We analyze the strengths and
potential weaknesses of WOT and put forward suggestions for improvement.
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Contribution statement. Pern Hui Chia was the main contributor of this
work. Data collection and analysis were due to Pern Hui Chia. Svein J. Knap-
skog provided valuable feedbacks and contributed to parts of the writing. Two
of the data sets used in this work were provided by the developers of WOT.
C. P. H. Chia, J. Chuang. Community-based Web Security: Comple-
mentary Roles of the Serious and Casual Contributors, In Proceed-
ings of 15th Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW),
pp. 1023–1032, ACM (2012). (Acceptance rate: 40%, note the new two-
phase conference-journal hybrid reviewing system of CSCW starting from 2012:
http://cscw.acm.org/CSCW-review-process-statement.pdf)
Abstract. Does crowdsourcing work for web security? While the herculean
task of evaluating hundreds of millions of websites can certainly beneﬁt from
the wisdom of crowds, skeptics question the coverage and reliability of inputs
from ordinary users for assessing web security. We analyze the contribution
patterns of serious and casual users in Web of Trust (WOT), a community-
based system for website reputation and security. We ﬁnd that the serious
contributors are responsible for reporting and attending to a large percentage
of bad sites, while a large fraction of attention on the goodness of sites come
from the casual contributors. This complementarity enables WOT to provide
warnings about malicious sites while diﬀerentiating the good sites from the
unknowns. This in turn helps steer users away from the numerous bad sites
created daily. We also ﬁnd that serious contributors are more reliable in eval-
uating bad sites, but no better than casual contributors in evaluating good
sites. We discuss design implications for WOT and for community-based sys-
tems more generally.
Contribution statement. Pern Hui Chia was the main contributor of this
work. Data collection and analysis were due to Pern Hui Chia. John Chuang
contributed to active discussion and parts of the writing, particularly the ab-
stract and introduction. Two of the data sets used in this work were provided
by the developers of WOT.
D. P. H. Chia. Analyzing the Incentives in Community-based Security
Systems, In 9th International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Com-
munications (PerCom), Workshop Proceedings – 4th International Workshop
on Security and Social Networking (SESOC), pp. 270–275, IEEE (2011). (Ac-
ceptance rate: 7/23=30%)
Abstract. Apart from mechanisms to make crowd-sourcing secure, the reli-
ability of a collaborative system is dependent on the economic incentives of
its potential contributors. We study several factors related to the incentives
in a community-based security system, including the expectation on the social
inﬂuence and the contagion eﬀect of generosity. We also investigate the ef-
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fects of organizing community members diﬀerently in a complete, random and
scale-free structure. Our simulation results show that, without considering any
speciﬁc incentive schemes, it is not easy to encourage user contribution in a
complete-graph community structure (global systems). On the other hand, a
moderate level of cooperative behavior can be cultivated when the community
members are organized in the random or scale-free structure (social networks).
Contribution statement. Pern Hui Chia was the sole author of this work.
E. P. H. Chia, A. P. Heiner, N. Asokan. Use of Ratings from Personalized
Communities for Trustworthy Application Installation, In Proceedings
of 15th Nordic Conference in Secure IT Systems (NordSec), LNCS vol. 7127,
pp. 71–88, Springer (2010).
Abstract. The problem of identifying inappropriate software is a daunting
one for ordinary users. The two currently prevalent methods are intrinsically
centralized: certiﬁcation of “good” software by platform vendors and ﬂagging
of “bad” software by antivirus vendors or other global entities. However, be-
cause appropriateness has cultural and social dimensions, centralized means
of signaling appropriateness is ineﬀective and can lead to habituation (user
clicking-through warnings) or disputes (users discovering that certiﬁed soft-
ware is inappropriate). In this work, we look at the possibility of relying on
inputs from personalized communities (consisting of friends and experts whom
individual users trust) to avoid installing inappropriate software. Drawing from
theories, we developed a set of design guidelines for a trustworthy application
installation process. We had an initial validation of the guidelines through an
online survey; we veriﬁed the high relevance of information from a personal-
ized community and found strong user motivation to protect friends and family
members when know of digital risks. We designed and implemented a proto-
type system on the Nokia N810 tablet. In addition to showing risk signals
from personalized community prominently, our prototype installer deters un-
safe actions by slowing the user down with habituation-breaking mechanisms.
We conducted also a hands-on evaluation and veriﬁed the strength of opinion
communicated through friends over opinion by online community members.
Contribution statement. Pern Hui Chia was the main contributor of this
work. Andreas P. Heiner contributed to active discussion and parts of the
writing, particularly the section on user cognition during application installa-
tion. N. Asokan also contributed to active discussion and parts of the writing,
particularly the abstract and introduction. The online survey and hands-on
evaluation were jointly designed by all three authors. The hands-on evaluation
was conducted by Pern Hui Chia and Andreas P. Heiner. The two also jointly
analyzed the ﬁndings of the survey and hands-on evaluation. The web imple-
mentation of the survey was due to Pern Hui Chia. Meanwhile, the prototype
system was adapted from the master thesis project of Pern Hui Chia, which
was conducted at Nokia Research Center and supervised by Andreas P. Heiner.
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F. P. H. Chia, Y. Yamamoto, N. Asokan. Is this App Safe? A Large Scale
Study on Application Permissions and Risk Signals, In Proceedings of
21st International World Wide Web Conference (WWW), pp. 311–320, ACM
(2012). (Acceptance rate: 108/885=12%)
Abstract. Third-party applications (apps) drive the attractiveness of web and
mobile application platforms. Many of these platforms adopt a decentralized
control strategy, relying on explicit user consent for granting permissions that
the apps request. Users have to rely primarily on community ratings as the
signals to identify the potentially harmful and inappropriate apps even though
community ratings typically reﬂect opinions about perceived functionality or
performance rather than about risks. With the arrival of HTML5 web apps,
such user-consent permission systems will become more widespread. We study
the eﬀectiveness of user-consent permission systems through a large scale data
collection of Facebook apps, Chrome extensions and Android apps. Our anal-
ysis conﬁrms that the current forms of community ratings used in app markets
today are not reliable indicators of privacy risks of an app. We ﬁnd some evi-
dence indicating attempts to mislead or entice users into granting permissions:
free applications and applications with mature content request more permis-
sions than is typical; “look-alike” applications which have names similar to
popular applications also request more permissions than is typical. We also
ﬁnd that across all three platforms popular applications request more permis-
sions than average.
Contribution statement. Pern Hui Chia was the main contributor of this
work. Yusuke Yamamoto contributed to active discussion and parts of the writ-
ing, particularly the section on look-alike third party applications. N. Asokan
also contributed to active discussion and parts of the writing, particularly the
abstract, introduction and results sections. Data collection and a large part of
the analysis were due to Pern Hui Chia. The analysis of look-alike application
names was done by Yusuke Yamamoto.
Other Papers (not included in thesis)
G. P. H. Chia, J. Chuang, Y. Chen. Whack-a-mole: Asymmetric conﬂict
and guerrilla warfare in web security. (in submission)
H. G. Biczo´k, P. H. Chia. Interdependent privacy: Your actions aﬀect my
privacy. (working paper)
I. B. Westermann, P. H. Chia, D. Kesdogan. Analyzing the gold star scheme
in a split Tor network, In Proceedings of 8th International Conference on
Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm), Springer
(2011). (Acceptance rate: 23/95=24%)
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J. G. Pitsilis, P. H. Chia. Does trust matter for user preferences? A study
on Epinions ratings, In Proceedings of 4th IFIP International Conference on
Trust Management (IFIPTM), pp. 232–247, Springer (2010). (Acceptance rate:
18/61=30%)
K. P. H. Chia, G. Pitsilis. Exploring the use of explicit trust links for ﬁl-
tering recommenders: a study on Epinions.com, Journal of Information
Processing (JIP), 19:332–344, Information Processing Society of Japan (IPSJ),
(2011).
1.3.2. Summary of Contribution
The contribution of this thesis according to the three identiﬁed motivations are
summarized in the following:
M1. Realistic Economic Modeling of Web Attack and Defense (Paper A)
• We observe that realistic web attack and defense exhibits characteristics of
asymmetric conﬂict and guerrilla warfare, diﬀerent from protecting a known
set of assets in the context of network security. The defenders are constrained
by information and action asymmetries, not knowing which new malicious
sites have been created, and reactively taking down the detected ones. While
the defenders may be more resourceful given the help from service providers,
policymakers and law enforcers, web perpetrators create large numbers of
malicious sites to stretch the resources of the defenders.
• We propose a two-step resource allocation game with endogenous dimension-
ality and detection probability to model the asymmetric conﬂict on the Web.
Our model is adapted from the Colonel Blotto two-player game, ﬁrst intro-
duced by Borel in 1921 [28], studied by Borel and Ville in 1938 [29], and Gross
and Wagner in 1950 [64]. Colonel Blotto games have been largely neglected
arguably due to a lack of pure-strategy equilibriums and the complexity of
the solution for the case of asymmetric resources, until the work by Roberson
(2006) [102], which successfully characterizes the unique equilibrium payoﬀs
under all conﬁgurations of resource asymmetry.
• When applied to the scenario of phishing, our Colonel Blotto Phishing (CBP)
model gives several interesting insights. Somewhat counter-intuitively, we
ﬁnd that a less resourceful attacker will create more phishing attacks than a
resourceful counterpart in equilibrium. Further, we ﬁnd that it is optimal for
an attacker to vary his strategies, to reduce cost so as to create large numbers
of new phishes given a low detection probability, or to focus on raising his
resources when the detection probability is high.
• Our ﬁndings provide some implications to the anti-phishing industry. In-
creasing the degree of resource asymmetry by either raising the defender’s
resources or disrupting the attacker’s infrastructures, increasing the cost of
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new phishes, and increasing the probability of detection, can all reduce the
attacker’s utility. However, raising the cost of new phishes may be hard in
practice given tricks such as the use of stolen credit card numbers for register-
ing new domains, and the use of compromised servers as phishing hosts. An
increased detection probability can be achieved through data sharing among
the defenders, or volunteering eﬀorts such as user reporting. Lastly, we note
the importance of good estimates of the state of the problem to help the
defender to prioritize diﬀerent measures accordingly. For example, it will be
optimal to focus on disrupting the attacker’s infrastructures when the de-
tection probability is high, and to focus on making it harder to create large
numbers of new phishes by patching vulnerable servers or cooperating with
domain registries, otherwise.
M2. Exploring the Potentials of Community Inputs for Security (Paper B,C,D,E)
• One of the few community-based systems for web security is the Web of
Trust (WOT). WOT comes in the form of a browser add-on which has been
downloaded more than 30 million times, and a central community portal
which has more than 3 million registered contributors by early 2012. We
study the performance and characteristics of WOT inline with our motivation
to explore the potentials of volunteering eﬀorts in contributing to web security.
• We evaluate the reliability of WOT comparing it to three well known services
based on automated assessments, namely, McAfee’s SiteAdvisor, Norton’s
Safe Web and Google’s Safe Browsing Diagnostic Page. We ﬁnd that WOT’s
general coverage is low, but it is actually more comprehensive than the three
automated services in identifying bad domains. While this could be due to
the larger evaluation scope of WOT and the tendency of service providers
to be more conservative in order to avoid potential litigations, it is to the
credit of the WOT community in providing comprehensive warnings against
potentially suspicious websites.
• We conﬁrm that users are concerned not only about malware and phishing.
Online risks such as scams, illegal pharmacies and misuse of personal infor-
mation are regularly brought up by the users. Such risks are not evaluated
by the automated services, highlighting the potential beneﬁts of user inputs.
There is also a lack of data sharing between service providers; only a few sites
are commonly classiﬁed as bad by the automated services.
• We ﬁnd that the contribution ratios in WOT are skewed, similar to those
in PhishTank as found by Moore and Clayton [93]. We further study the
characteristics of diﬀerent contributors, and observe the complementary roles
by serious and casual members. Serious contributors are responsible for the
bulk of inputs in WOT, and they report the majority of bad websites, often
based on some blacklists. Negative aspects of sites evaluated in WOT are
mostly objective; this mitigates the risk of a skewed contribution ratio. On
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the other hand, a large percentage of attention to the goodness of sites comes
from the casual contributors. While they do not evaluate bad sites extensively
and reliably, assessments for the good sites are equally valuable in the context
of web security. Whitelisting can play an equally important role to steer users
away from the numerous bad sites created daily. In addition, while serious
contributors give reliable evaluations on bad sites, their evaluations on good
websites are not signiﬁcantly more reliable than the casual contributors.
• We present an inﬁnitely repeated total eﬀort security game, adapted from the
static versions presented in [65, 66], to model the incentives in a community-
based security system. In the reverse manner of the tragedy of the com-
mons [67], contributing to common protection is a problem of public goods
provisioning. Our model reﬂects that, without any incentive schemes, the
level of user contribution can be expected to be low. Cultivating a sense
of social responsibility can increase contribution level; however, this is chal-
lenging in practice. Further, we ﬁnd that in the presence of a few generous
users, who contribute unconditionally, the overall contribution level increases
but with only a limited contagion eﬀect. Over-reliance on a small group of
generous users, on the other hand, is responsible for a skewed contribution
ratio, reﬂecting the case in many practical systems including WOT. We ﬁnd,
however, that it is possible to encourage a moderate level of contribution
when organizing the users in a random or scale-free structure. This points
to a potential research direction in exploiting community structures in social
networks for increasing user contribution. Indeed, we ﬁnd in an online survey
that users are motivated to protect their friends and family members when
they know of digital risks. We look into the use of inputs from personalized
communities for trustworthy application installation in Paper E (see M3).
• We ﬁnd that WOT is not without several potential weaknesses. A potential
pitfall we identify is the current lack of distinction between subjective and ob-
jective evaluation factors. Evaluating if a site has malicious content, browser
exploits, or is a phish is an objective process and can be veriﬁed. However,
deciding if a site is good or has ethical issues is subjective and can be con-
tentious. The risks of manipulation given a skewed contribution ratio and a
black-box rating aggregation process, can be high when the underlying evalu-
ation factors are subjective. We suggest that WOT should restrict the use of
the mass-rating-tool, which enables the serious contributors to evaluate mul-
tiple sites conveniently, to only objective evaluation factors. We also suggest
to improve the veriﬁability of user inputs through a better referencing system
when it comes to objective evaluations, and a structured evaluation process
when it comes to subjective factors. In addition, we note the importance of
evaluating the reliability of individual contributors per context basis; WOT
should not mix the reliability of contributors across subjective and objective
evaluation factors.
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• We ﬁnd multiple strengths of WOT. First, the browser add-on is easy to use
and saliently signals against potentially suspicious sites. It caters for multiple
user concerns on the Web not evaluated by automated services. It integrates
inputs from trusted blacklists and has multiple anti-gaming measures built
in, including abilities to automatically monitor for suspicious rating behav-
iors, and a rating aggregation algorithm which factors in the reliability of
individual contributors. The rating process is easy. We also observe the de-
velopers to be actively engaged with the community of volunteers, in addition
to sharing the aggregate assessments back to the public. WOT exempliﬁes
the feasibility of leveraging the wisdom of crowds to improve web security.
M3. Risks and Challenges transitioning from the Web to Apps (Paper E, F)
• Installing an application (app) on the mobile device or in the browser imposes
a higher level of security and privacy risks than browsing on the Web. It also
involves a diﬀerent mental process. We deﬁne the terminology of ‘inappro-
priate software’ to refer to the set of applications that may cause a bad user
experience. It includes applications that fundamentally disregard user choice,
have malicious intents, or adopt bad practices such as installing additional un-
expected software and using incomprehensible End User License Agreement
(EULA) that hinder an informed consent. More than the notion of badware
by StopBadware.org [5], we regard inappropriate software to include those
that may be culturally or socially oﬀensive.
• We identify two diﬀerent risks with a centralized approach to trustworthy
application installation – risk of centralized judgment, and risk of habitua-
tion. On platforms such as the iOS, a central authority like Apple decides
if an application can be distributed in the oﬃcial app store. Such central-
ized judgment has not been without any controversies. Apple’s decisions have
been objected in numerous occasions [2]. Software certiﬁcation (e.g., Symbian
Signed) is another prominent centralized approach to govern if an application
can access certain device capabilities. Application installers will normally
display warning and disclaimer notices when an application to be installed is
not certiﬁed. However, such notices are often context insensitive and uninfor-
mative. Besides degrading user experience, they rarely indicate a true risk,
causing many users to habitually click-through them.
• Drawing from cognitive and information ﬂow theories, we develop a set of
design guidelines for a trustworthy application installation process. We iden-
tify three guidelines, namely: (i) avoid requiring user actions that can be
easily habituated, (ii) employ signals that are visually salient, relevant and
of high impact, and (iii) incorporate mechanisms to gather and utilize feed-
backs from personalized communities. To mitigate habituation, we note that
frequent user actions in the normal context could be made implicit, and re-
placed with an attention capture mechanism that will signal any deviations
from this context. By personalized communities, we refer to friends and ex-
pert users whom individual users trust. Experts could be vendors or gurus
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who are knowledgeable in the technical evaluation of software, while friends
refer to ones whom users have personal contacts with and who could help by
sharing their personal experience with apps or relaying information.
• We validate the design guidelines through an online survey. Speciﬁcally, most
of the survey participants admit that they seldom read the EULA, privacy
policy, and disclaimer notices during application installation. The self-report
survey also ﬁnd the high relevance of inputs from personalized communities,
and a strong motivation to protect friends and family members when users
know of digital risks.
• We conduct a laboratory experiment using a prototype application installer
adapted from the doctoral candidate’s master thesis project [31]. In addi-
tion to showing risk signals from personalized communities prominently, the
prototype installer deters unsafe actions by slowing the user down through
a habituation-breaking mechanism. Through the user study, we verify that
opinions given by friends are of a higher impact than those given by unknown
online community members. Warnings by friends overrule the positive feed-
backs by online community members, but not vice-versa. The habituation-
breaking mechanism receives a mixed response, and can be improved. At the
same time, we ﬁnd that most of the participants are positive with the idea of
an integrated app appropriateness rating from personalized communities.
• Opposite to a centralized approach to application scrutiny, more and more
platforms including the Android, Facebook, Chrome and HTML5 web apps,
are adopting a decentralized ‘laissez-faire’ control strategy. Application in-
stallers on these platforms request for explicit user consent for granting the
permissions that the apps request. Users are to left to rely primarily on
community ratings to avoid the potentially harmful and inappropriate apps.
This is despite that the current rating systems typically reﬂect opinions about
perceived functionality or performance of apps, instead of risks or appropri-
ateness. We analyze the current state of risk signaling on app intrusiveness,
and if there is any evidence of attempts to mislead or entice users into com-
promising their privacy. This is done through a large scale data analytics,
covering three user-consent permission based platforms, namely Facebook,
Chrome, and Android. The data sets are shared on our project website [1].
• In spite of the diﬀerent UI designs and permission granularities, we ﬁnd that
the popularity of an app correlates with the number of permissions it requests,
even when considering information-sensitive permissions only. This has two
implications. First, displaying the permissions an app requests to signal the
potential security and privacy risks is likely to be ineﬀective. As popular
apps request for more permissions, users will be trained to habitually accept
permission requests. Second, there appear no disincentives for developers who
intentionally or mistakenly over-privilege their apps currently.
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• Our analysis conﬁrms that the current community rating systems used in
app marketplaces are not reliable indicators of app risks. The same goes
for signals such as the availability of a developer website, and the number
of apps published by the developer. If they are to be reliable to help users
detect privacy intrusive apps, they should exhibit a negative correlation with
the number of dangerous permissions requested by an app. However such
negative correlations are not observed. On the other hand, we ﬁnd some ex-
ternal services that show potentials in signaling app risks. One is the website
reputation scores from WOT, and another is the ﬂagging of spam apps by
AppBrain.com. We suggest to prominently display such external signals in
app marketplaces to help users recognize those that are potentially intrusive.
• We ﬁnd some evidence indicating attempts to mislead or entice users into
granting permissions; free apps and applications with mature content request
more permissions than is typical. The trends hold even when considering
only the information-sensitive permissions. Excluding permissions that are
commonly required by third party advertisement libraries, we ﬁnd that free
apps still request for more permissions than the paid apps.
• We ﬁnd the ‘look-alike’ applications, which have names similar to popular
applications, also request more permissions than is typical. While the fraction
of look-alike apps is small, there is an underlying problem of ‘cheap identity’
with app names and IDs currently.
1.4. Conclusions
This thesis contributes to the ﬁelds of security economics and usable security in
three ways. First, a realistic model of web attack and defense, adapted from the
classical Colonel Blotto game, is presented. The model factors in the practical
asymmetric conﬂict and endogenous dimensionality, to reﬂect the realistic scenario
of a resource constrained attacker creating large numbers of malicious sites to evade
detection and to stretch the resources of the defender.
Second, this thesis highlights the feasibility of community-based eﬀorts for secu-
rity purposes. While several potential challenges are identiﬁed, leveraging commu-
nity inputs for information security has the beneﬁts of being more comprehensive
and relevant than automated assessments. This does not imply that the respon-
sibility of security should be removed from service providers or security vendors,
and assigned to the users. It demonstrates the potentials of volunteering eﬀorts in
complementing the conventional security measures.
Third, the thesis studies the risks and challenges of centralized and decentral-
ized controls of third party applications. Centralized app control causes the risk of
central judgment and the risk of habituation, leading to user disputes and careless
behaviors. The increasingly widespread decentralized user-consent model also suf-
fers from the lack of eﬀective risk signaling. Permissions shown on the user-consent
dialogs will be habitually ignored given the tendency of popular apps requesting
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more permissions than average, and the absence of alternative risk signals. Free
apps, mature apps, and apps with names mimicking the popular ones, also request
more permissions than typical, indicating possible trends of exploitations.
1.4.1. Directions for Future Research
There are multiple potential directions for future research. The economic model
presented in this thesis has not factored in the practical competition and collabo-
ration between multiple attackers. In addition, it does not consider heterogeneous
‘battleﬁelds’, and thus does not model targeted attacks on the Web, such as spear-
phishing. To improve on realistic economic modeling of web attack and defense,
further measurement studies will continue to be helpful to inform about attacker
modi operandi and the state of the underground economies.
Apart from the dark side of information security, it will also be interesting to
measure the resources of the defenders. Should we invest more for security, or have
we not been able to coordinate our resources well enough? Security volunteers
represent the alternative resources of the defenders. This thesis is among the few to
evaluate the reliability of volunteering eﬀorts for security purposes. Future studies
can take a deeper look into the sustainability of security volunteering, as well as
the risk of gaming given the increasing threat of malicious crowdsourcing [116].
Against the backdrop of ever increasing malicious and fraudulent activities on the
web and app platforms, there is a lack of good metrics to quantify the security and
privacy risks facing the users currently. App permissions are problematic as they
are being used to apply the principle of least privilege on developers, and to convey
risks to users simultaneously. This creates conﬂicting signals. In addition to risk
metrics, further research to improve the eﬀectiveness of risk signaling, taking into
account of user behaviors and cognitions, will remain important and interesting.
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Abstract
Phishing exhibits characteristics of asymmetric conﬂict and guerrilla warfare. Phis-
hing sites, upon detection, are subject to removal by takedown specialists. In re-
sponse, phishers create large numbers of new phishing attacks to evade detection
and stretch the resources of the defenders. We propose the Colonel Blotto Phishing
(CBP) game, a two-stage Colonel Blotto game with endogenous dimensionality and
detection probability. We ﬁnd that the optimal number of new phishes to create,
from the attacker’s perspective, is inﬂuenced by the degree of resource asymmetry,
the cost of new phishes, and the probability of detection. Counter-intuitively, we
ﬁnd that it is the less resourceful attacker who would create more phishing attacks
in equilibrium. And depending on the detection probability, an attacker will vary
his strategies to either create even more phishes, or to focus on raising his resources
to increase the chance he will extend the lifetime of his phishes. We discuss the im-
plications to anti-phishing strategies and point out that the game is also applicable
to web security problems more generally.
A. Colonel Blotto in the Phishing War
A.1. Introduction
Phishing, among other web security issues, has remained a tricky problem today.
While it is non-trivial to measure the exact ﬁnancial losses due to phishing, and that
many estimated loss ﬁgures appear overstated [9], the damage inﬂicted by phishing
activities is never negligible. Realizing that technical sophistication alone will not
be suﬃcient to fend oﬀ phishing activities, over the past few years, researchers have
started to look at the ecosystem and modi operandi of phishing activities.
McGrath and Gupta found that phishers misuse free web hosting services and
URL-aliasing services, and that phishing domains are hosted across multiple coun-
tries with a signiﬁcant percentage of hosts belonging to residential customers [13].
Moore and Clayton identiﬁed diﬀerent types of phishing attacks according to the
way a phishing site is hosted [16]. The most common hosting vectors were found to
be compromised web servers and free web-hosting services. While system admins
and hosting companies are usually cooperative and quick to take down the phishing
pages once notiﬁed, noticing them in the ﬁrst place is challenging [16]. Moreover,
victim servers were found to be re-compromised by the attackers to host phishing
pages as the vulnerabilities of the servers remain unpatched [17]. Two notorious
gangs, known as ‘Rock Phish’ and ‘Avalanche’1 even showed much technical so-
phistication in their massive and concerted phishing attacks. Both gangs exploited
malware-infested machines and the fast ﬂux method (mapping the domain name
to diﬀerent IP addresses (of diﬀerent bots) by changing the DNS records in a high
frequency) to extend the lifetime of a phishing site. Taking down the phishing pages
from a large number of bots is extremely diﬃcult, especially when the ISPs have
only limited control and responsibility over malware-infested machines. This forces
the defender to takedown the phishing sites by suspending the phishing domain
names with the help from registrars and registries.
The above highlights several important challenges in defending against phishing
activities. First, it is challenging to detect all phishing attacks out there. Second,
taking down phishing attacks that have been identiﬁed (e.g., to remove the phishing
sites, or to ensure that a vulnerable web server is patched to prevent re-compromise)
is also non-trivial. The situation is worsened by a lack of information sharing in
the anti-phishing industry [16]. Meanwhile, despite a spike in the count of phishing
attacks2 in 2009 due to the Avalanche gang [2], the number of unique phishing
domains found (per six months) has remained steady at around 30,000 over the
past few years, except in the second half of 2010 where 43,000 unique phishing
domain names were recorded partly due to new data inputs from the China Internet
Network Information Center (CNNIC) who operates the .cn registry [3].3 This
1An account of the modi operandi of the Rock Phish and Avalanche gangs can be found in [14]
and [2] respectively.
2An attack is deﬁned by Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) as a unique phishing site
targeting a speciﬁed brand.
3Measurement of unique phishing attacks, uptime of phishing sites and in-depth surveys on the
trends and domain name use by phishing sites can be found in a series of reports (e.g., [2, 3])
by the APWG on http://www.antiphishing.org.
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suggests that the phishers do factor in the cost consideration when carrying out
phishing attacks.
Diﬀerent from prior studies that have largely taken the empirical approach, we
propose in this work a theoretical model to aid researchers and policymakers in
better analyzing the diﬀerent aspects of phishing defense. We build on the Colonel
Blotto game, an old but interesting game that has been largely neglected due to
its complexity, until the recent work by Roberson [18] which gives a complete char-
acterization to the unique equilibrium payoﬀs of a two-player asymmetric Colonel
Blotto game. The game is particularly suitable to capture the resource allocation
problem between a phisher and a defender with asymmetrical resources. In addi-
tion to mapping the phishing problem into the Colonel Blotto game, our model
extends the two-stage Colonel Blotto game in [10] to include a detection probabil-
ity to factor in the consideration of asymmetric information that not all phishes
will be known to the defender. We regard the defender in this work as a take-
down company (e.g., MarkMonitor4, BrandProtect5 and Internet Identity6) that
has been contracted by its clients (e.g., ﬁnancial institutions, e-commerce services)
to remove phishing sites that masquerade as the clients’ legitimate sites. Although
the defender is in a disadvantage position for not being able to detect all phishes
that have been created, and that the attacker can always exploit the next weakest
link whenever a phishing server is taken down, we expect that the defender can
garner more resources than the attackers from the contract with its clients, plus
the support from the ISPs, service providers, law enforcers, registrars and registries.
In the following, we ﬁrst give a quick introduction to the Colonel Blotto game
and related work in Section A.2. We propose the Colonel Blotto Phishing (CBP)
game in Section A.3 to model phishing attack and defense. We present the results
from our analysis based on the CBP model in Section A.4. And lastly, we discuss
the implications to the anti-phishing strategies in Section A.5.
A.2. Background and Related Work
The Colonel Blotto game was ﬁrst introduced in 1921 by Borel [6] as a two-player
constant-sum game, where the players strategically distribute a ﬁxed and symmet-
rical amount of resources over a ﬁnite number of n contests (battleﬁelds). The
player who expends a higher amount of resources in a contest wins that particular
battleﬁeld, similar to an all-pay auction. The objective of the players is to maxi-
mize the number of battleﬁelds won. Gross and Wagner [8] in 1950 described the
game with asymmetrical resources between the two players, but have only solved
the case where the number of battleﬁelds n = 2.
The complexity for the case when there are n ≥ 3 battleﬁelds and the lack of
pure strategies have arguably led to the Colonel Blotto game being largely neglected
by the research community. A resurgence of interests in the Colonel Blotto game
4http://www.markmonitor.com
5http://www.brandprotect.com
6http://internetidentity.com
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(e.g., [4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 19]) follows the recent work by Roberson [18] which has
successfully characterized the unique equilibrium payoﬀs for all conﬁgurations of
resource asymmetry, and the equilibrium resource allocation strategies (for most
conﬁgurations) of a constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with n ≥ 3 battleﬁelds.
Roberson and Kvasov have later studied the non-constant-sum version in [19]. We
summarize the main results from Roberson [18] below:
Theorem 1 (case a, b and c correspond to Theorem 2, 3 and 5 in [18])
Let n denote the number of battleﬁelds, while Rw and Rs denote the resources of
the weak (w) and strong (s) players respectively such that Rw ≤ Rs, the Nash
equilibrium univariate distribution functions (for allocating resources to individual
battleﬁelds strategically), and the unique equilibrium payoﬀs (measured in the ex-
pected proportion on battleﬁelds won), depending on the RwRs ratio and the number
of battleﬁelds n, are given in the following:
case a: 2n ≤ RwRs ≤ 1
In the unique Nash equilibrium, player w and s allocate xj resources in each battle-
ﬁeld j ∈ {1, ..., n} based on the following univariate distribution functions:
Fw,j(x) = (1 − RwRs ) + nx2Rs (RwRs ) , x ∈ [0, 2Rsn ]
Fs,j(x) = nx2Rs , x ∈ [0, 2Rsn ]
The unique equilibrium payoﬀs (expected proportions of battleﬁelds won) of player
w and s are independent of the number of battleﬁelds, given as follows:
πw = Rw2Rs
πs = 1 − Rw2Rs
case b: 1n−1 ≤ RwRs < 2n
In the unique Nash equilibrium, player w and s allocate xj resources in each battle-
ﬁeld j ∈ {1, ..., n} based on the following univariate distribution functions:
Fw,j(x) = (1 − 2n ) + xRw ( 2n ) , x ∈ [0, Rw]
Fs,j(x) =
{
(1 − RsnRw )( 2xRw ) , x ∈ [0, Rw)
1 , x ≥ Rw
The expected proportions of battleﬁelds won by player w and s are as follows:
πw = 2n − 2Rsn2Rw
πs = 1 − 2n + 2Rsn2Rw
case c: 1n <
Rw
Rs
< 1n−1
In a Nash equilibrium, player w allocates zero resources to n − 2 of the battleﬁelds,
each randomly chosen with equal probability. On the remaining 2 battleﬁelds, he
randomizes the resource allocation over a set of bivariate mass points. On the other
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hand, player s allocates Rw resources to each of n − 2 randomly chosen battleﬁelds.
On the remaining 2 battleﬁelds, player s also randomizes the resource allocation
over a set of bivariate mass points. Let m =  RwRs−Rw(n−1) such that 2 ≤ m < ∞,
the unique expected proportions of battleﬁelds won by player w and s are given as
follows:
πw = 2m−2mn2
πs = 1 − 2m−2mn2
Note that the univariate distribution functions constitute the players’ mixed
strategies in Nash equilibrium. The allocation of resources across the n battle-
ﬁelds must additionally be contained in the set of all feasible allocations
{
x ∈
Rn+|
∑n
j=1 xi,j ≤ Ri
}
where i = w, s.7 In general, player s uses a stochastic ‘com-
plete coverage’ strategy (which expends non-zero resources in all battleﬁelds, and
locks down in a random subset of battleﬁelds by allocating Rw resources to them
in case b and c), while player w uses a stochastic ‘guerrilla warfare’ strategy (which
optimally abandons a random subset of the battleﬁelds). Despite the resource
asymmetry, player w can expect to win a non-zero proportion of the battleﬁelds,
except in the case of Rs ≥ nRw, where the player s can trivially lock down (win)
all battleﬁelds by allocating Rw resources to each of them.
Note that also the proportion of battleﬁelds won by the player w is a function of n
in the case b and c of Theorem 1. In a recent work, Kovenock et al. [10] presented a
two-stage Colonel Blotto game which endogenizes the dimensionality of the classic
Colonel Blotto game, allowing the players to create additional battleﬁelds in the
additional ‘pre-conﬂict’ stage. They show that with such possibility, player w will
optimally increase the number of battleﬁelds in the ‘pre-conﬂict’ stage, given a low
battleﬁeld creation cost, so to thin the defender’s resources and reduce the number
of battleﬁelds player s can lock down in the ‘conﬂict’ stage. We outline the main
results from [10] below:
Theorem 2 (see Theorem 2 in [10])
In the pre-conﬂict stage of the game with n0 initial battleﬁelds and resource asym-
metry that satisﬁes 1n0−1 ≤ RwRs ≤ 1, assuming that the cost to create additional
battleﬁelds, c is strictly increasing and strictly convex, the optimal numbers of new
battleﬁelds that player w and s will create, n∗w and n∗s respectively, in the subgame
perfect equilibrium, are given as follows:
case a: If RwRs satisﬁes
2
n0
≤ RwRs ≤ 1, then n∗s = n∗w = 0.
case b: If RwRs satisﬁes
1
n0−1 ≤ RwRs < 2n0 , then n∗s = 0, and let nwr ∈ (0, 2RsRw − n0)
denotes the real number that solves:
− 2(n0+nwr)2 + 4RsRw(n0+nwr)3 − c′nwr = 0
7We refer interested readers to Roberson [18] for proofs and details on how the equilibrium
univariate distribution functions give a n-variate joint distribution function satisfying the con-
straint that
∑n
j=1 xi,j ≤ Ri where i = w, s.
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then, n∗w is either nwr or nwr	 depending on which of it results in a higher utility
for player w, given n∗s = 0.
Note that Theorem 2 has not formally treated the case c of Theorem 1. The
analysis of case c will be more complicated as the expected proportion of battleﬁelds
won by both players have points of discontinuity, but the underlying intuition is
the same as case b. [10] Note that also Theorem 2 assumes that the cost of creating
additional battleﬁelds is expended separately from the players’ resources.
A.3. Modeling
With an introduction to the classic Colonel Blotto game and the extension with
endogenous dimensionality, we are now ready to model the economics for phishing
activities in this section. We will ﬁrst apply the classic Colonel Blotto game to
phishing attack and defense. Then, we will extend the game to model endogenous
dimensionality following the two-stage Colonel Blotto game in [10], and asymmetric
information using an additional detection probability to reﬂect that not all phishes
will be known to the defender in practice.
A.3.1. Applying Colonel Blotto to Phishing
We map the basics the Colonel Blotto game in the context of phishing attack and
defense in the following.
Players. Like the classic Colonel Blotto, we consider here a two-player constant-
sum game between a phisher and a defender. We regard the defender here to be
a takedown company such as MarkMonitor, BrandProtect and Internet Identity
as aforementioned. The takedown company is contracted by its clients, including
banks and popular brand owners, to remove phishing sites attacking the clients’
brands. On the other hand, the phisher plays to keep alive the phishing sites, or
to launch new attacks, to victimize as many users he can.
Resources. We assume the phisher to be the weak player (w) and the takedown
company to be the strong player (s). Although this may be debatable, assuming
such resource asymmetry is reasonable if we consider that takedown companies will
usually maintain good contacts with and can thus get assistance from the ISPs,
service providers, law enforcers, registrars and registries in the process of taking
down the phishes. By resources, we thus mean not ﬁnancial ﬁgures but mainly
the technologies, infrastructure (e.g., access to a botnet), time and manpower.8
Phisher’s proﬁtability is also not as lucrative as it appears in the news. A num-
ber of estimates on the losses due to phishing attacks have been criticized to be
overstated [9]. The resources, Rs and Rw respectively, are ﬁnite with Rs ≥ Rw.
They are of the ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ nature, meaning that unused resources will give
no value to the players in the end of the game.
8Resource asymmetry should not be confused with asymmetry in coverage where the defender
needs to protect all assets while the attacker can target any of them.
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Battleﬁelds. We deﬁne a battleﬁeld to be a unique phishing site (a fully qual-
iﬁed domain name or IP address, or a site on a shared hosting service) targeting
a speciﬁc brand, following the deﬁnition of a phishing attack by APWG (see e.g.,
page 4 in [3]). Diﬀerent URLs directing to the same phishing page, crafted to evade
spam ﬁlters or to trick the URL-based anti-phishing toolbars, are considered the
same battleﬁeld. Deﬁned this way, creating a battleﬁeld hence involves some costs
ranging from low (e.g., to register a subdomain on a shared hosting service, to
copy the login page of a brand) to high (e.g., to register a new domain name, to
compromise a vulnerable web server). In this paper, we use the terminologies ‘a
phish’ and ‘a phishing attack’ interchangeably.
Objectives & Contests. We model the objective of the phisher and the de-
fender to be maximizing the expected proportion of phishing attacks kept online
and taken down, respectively. We consider that either the phisher or the defender
can outperform the other party to win a battleﬁeld by allocating more resources to
it. And given that we have not factored in the uptime and the number of victims
per attack in our model, we loosely deﬁne that a speciﬁc battleﬁeld (phishing at-
tack) is won by the phisher if the phish has a long enough uptime. For example,
having the resources of a botnet infrastructure, an attacker can use ‘fast-ﬂux’ IP
addresses and malware-controlled proxies, to make it hard for the defender to take
down the phishing server, prolonging the uptime of the phishes, as the defender will
have to turn to the responsible registrar or registry to suspend the domain name.
We elaborate on other tricks used by phishers, including the two infamous Rock
Phish and Avalanche gangs, in Section A.3.2.
Given the above conﬁgurations, we can already gain a number of useful insights.
For example, we can expect that there will be always some phishes that will have
long uptime unless that the defender is much more resourceful than the phisher
(i.e., Rs ≥ nRw). However, the classic colonel blotto game alone does not describe
the practical scenario quite yet. Why are there a large number of phishing attacks
instead of just a few? Indeed, it is to the phisher’s advantage to create an optimal
number of additional phishes (battleﬁelds), so to thin the defender’s resources in
removing each of them. Furthermore, how does the asymmetric information aﬀect
the strategies of the phisher? We extend the two-stage Colonel Blotto game in [10]
to include an additional parameter, the expected probability of detection Pd, to
reﬂect that not all phishes will be known to the defender – a major challenge in the
anti-phishing industry. [16]
A.3.2. The Colonel Blotto Phishing Game
We name our model as the Colonel Blotto Phishing (CBP) game. It consists of
two stages: (i) create–detect, (ii) resist–takedown, similar to the ‘pre-conﬂict’ and
‘conﬂict’ stages in [10]. Table A.1 summarizes the ﬂow of the CBP game. We detail
on the game stages in the following.
Stage 1: Create–Detect. We consider that game starts with the phisher
having a number of phishes n0 that are known to the defender, and both players are
allowed to increase the dimensionality of the game by introducing new battleﬁelds
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Stage Phisher (w) Defender (s)
i) create – a. create and market n∗w new phishes a. detect new phishes
detect b. learn about detection b. publish ﬁndings
ii) resist –
takedown
c. expend ε resources to undetected
phishes, while allocating Rw − ε re-
sources to phishes known to the defender
to resist removal
c. expend all Rs re-
sources strategically
to remove the newly
detected and known
existing phishes in a
promptly manner
Table A.1.: The ﬂow of the Colonel Blotto Phishing game.
in the ﬁrst stage. Obviously, the defender will not create any phishes. However,
it is to the phisher’s advantage to create a number of new phishing attacks nw
so to stretch the defender’s resources, in hope to increase the expected proportion
of phishes that will stay online for more than a certain period of time. Hence,
we have the total phishing attacks n = n0 + nw. We expect the phisher then
advertises the newly created phishes through spams and online social networks.9
We assume a linear cost c for creating and advertising the new phishes; c can be
low or high depending on the way the phisher carries out the attack (e.g., through
free subdomain services, paying for a newly registered domain, taking the eﬀort to
hack a vulnerable web server, and so on).
A new aspect we incorporate into the classic Colonel Blotto game is the situation
where some of the newly created phishes might not be detected by the takedown
company. We analyze both cases where the expected detection probability Pd is (i)
exogenously determined, and (ii) endogenously inﬂuenced by the number of new
phishing attacks in Section A.4. The expected proportions of phishes that trivially
get away undetected, or that will possibly stay online long enough depending on
the resource allocations of both the phisher and defender in the second stage, are
depicted in Figure A.1. In practice, takedown companies learn about new phishing
attacks through their own infrastructures (e.g., spam ﬁlters) in addition to ‘raw’
feeds bought, negotiated or obtained from the ISPs or phishing clearinghouses, such
as the APWG and PhishTank10.
An assumption we make here is that the phisher will then learn about which
of his phishes have been detected before proceeding to the next game stage. This
is reasonable, regardless of whether the takedown company shares their detection
results11, as we expect that the phisher can achieve this using public clearinghouses
9McGrath and Gupta [13] observed that most domains created for phishing become active almost
immediately upon registration.
10PhishTank – a community based phishing collator. http://www.phishtank.com
11Individual takedown companies often will validate the ‘raw’ URLs of potential phishes to remove
false positives, and they might not voluntarily share their validated feeds for competitive
advantages. Moore and Clayton showed how sharing of phishing data could have helped to
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nw new phishes 
detected undetected 
expected proportion of  
n0+Pdnw phishes removed 
determined by classic  
Colonel Blotto game 
(1-Pd)nw  
phishes  
get away 
n0 
known 
existing 
phishes 
Pd 1-Pd 
Figure A.1.: Expected proportion of phishes in diﬀerent states.
(e.g., phishtank) or through anti-phishing APIs that come with modern browsers
(e.g., Google Safe Browsing API12 for FireFox and Chrome).
Stage 2: Resist–Takedown. Knowing the identity of the detected phishes
Jd, the optimal move for the phisher in the second stage is hence to expend all
his resources strategically on the detected phishes only, so to resist the takedown
process. Here, we assume that the resources (e.g., technologies, infrastructure,
manpower) are of the ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ nature, typical to a constant-sum game. In
other words, unused resources will give no value to the players. We further assume
that the phisher will optimally allocate ε ≈ 0 resources for the undetected phishes
j /∈ Jd given that the defender does not know about them. We note that this
assumption is reasonable as the resources are ﬁnite.
We regard that either the phisher or the takedown company will ‘succeed’ with
respect to a particular phishing attack depending on the amount of resources they
put in: the player who expends more resources wins. Speciﬁcally, with xi,j and
x−i,j denoting the amount of resources player i ∈ {w, s} and his opponent puts
into the phish attack j respectively, the success of player i at attack j is given by:
πi,j(xi,j , x−i,j) =
{
0 if xi,j < x−i,j
1 if xi,j > x−i,j
where in the case of xw,j = xs,j (a tie), we assume that defender s will succeed
in taking down the attack promptly. As for undetected phishes, i.e., ∀j /∈ Jd, we
regard that xs,j = 0 and the phisher will trivially win the battleﬁeld with xw,j = ε
resources.
Can the phisher still win in an already detected phish in practice?
While it may not be intuitive at ﬁrst, the answer is ‘yes’ given our deﬁnition that a
phishing attack is won by the phisher (defender) if the phish has an uptime more
(less) than a certain threshold. The longer a phish can resist being removed, the
halve the lifetime of phishes, translating to a potential loss mitigation of $330 million per year,
based on data feeds from two takedown companies [15].
12http://code.google.com/apis/safebrowsing/
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more users could fall victim to it. While a weak phisher may simply abandon his
phishes (given that he cannot win) when facing a much more resourceful defender
(i.e., when Rs ≥ nRw), there have been practical examples of how a skilled phisher
attempts to extend the lifetime of his phishes via diﬀerent tricks. For example,
a phisher may conﬁgure his phishes not to resolve on every access so to misguide
the defender, but remain online to trick more users (see e.g., [3], footnote 5). The
phisher may also temporarily remove the phishing pages from a compromised web
server so to avoid further actions from the defender or admin (e.g., to patch up
speciﬁc vulnerabilities) and re-plant the phishes at a later time. Indeed, APWG
(see e.g., [3], footnote 5) ﬁnds that more than 10% of phishes are re-activated after
being down for more than an hour. Moore and Clayton also found that 22% of all
compromised web servers are re-compromised within 24 weeks to be used as the
host for phishing sites [16].
With more resources, a phisher can even increase technical sophistication so to
use malware-controlled proxies and fast-ﬂux IP addresses as demonstrated the large-
scale attacks by the infamous ‘Rock Phish’ and ‘Avalanche’ phishing gangs. The
fast-changing nature of IP address that the phishing site resolving to indicate that
the attacker has in control of a large number of compromised machines (bots) make
it infeasible for the takedown company and the responsible ISPs to take the phishing
servers oﬄine promptly. Instead, the defender will have to work towards suspending
the domain names in use, which could take a while if the responsible registrars are
not responsive or have limited experience in abuse control. The ‘Avalanche’ gang
was found to have exploited this; at the same time as they launched their massive
attacks using domains bought from a few registrars (resellers), the gang scouted for
other unresponsive registrars for future use (see page 7 of [2]). Meanwhile, in [14]
Moore and Clayton found that the fast-ﬂux phishing gang used 57 domain names
and 4287 IP addresses for fast-ﬂux phishing. The 1:75 skewed ratio is interesting as
it suggests that the fast-ﬂux phishing gang was highly resourceful (having access to
a botnet infrastructure). However, we note that these resources are not unlimited.
For example, the operations of the ‘Avalanche’ gang was disrupted as the security
community aﬀected a ‘temporary’ shut-down of the botnet infrastructure in Nov
2009 [2]. Later, although the gang managed to re-establish a new botnet, they
were also found to prefer using their resources for a more proﬁtable opportunity to
distribute the Zeus malware, which has been designed to automate identity theft
and facilitate unauthorized transactions. [3]
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We consider the objective of the phisher (the
takedown company) is to maximize the proportion of phishes that he succeeds in
keeping alive for a certain period (removing promptly), minus the cost for creating
new phishing attacks. With xi and x−i denoting the resource allocations across
all phishing sites by player i ∈ {w, s} and his opponent respectively, the utility of
player i can be written as:
Ui({xi, ni}, {x−i, n−i}) = 1
n
(
∑
j∈Jd
πi,j +
∑
j /∈Jd
πi,j) − cni
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Note that xi and x−i must be contained in the set of all feasible allocations, given
by {xi ∈ Rn+|
∑n
j=1 xi,j ≤ Ri}.
The optimal number of new phishes to create n∗i and the optimal utility U∗i
in subgame perfect equilibrium can be obtained by backward induction. First,
we can work out the expected proportion of success of each player in the ‘resist–
takedown’ stage based on Theorem 1 and the fact that a fraction of phishes will
get away undetected as given by Pd. Then, returning to the ‘create–detect’ stage,
the optimization problem of the phisher becomes:
max
nw
E(Uw|nw) = 1
n
E(
∑
j∈Jd
πw,j) +
(1 − Pd)nw
n
− cnw
= nd
n
E(πw) +
(1 − Pd)nw
n
− cnw
where
E(πw) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Rw
2Rs if 1 ≥ RwRs ≥ 2nd2
nd
− 2Rs(nd)2Rw if 2nd ≥ RwRs ≥ 1nd−1
0 if 1nd ≥ RwRs
nd = Pdnw + n0
n = nw + n0
As with many real life security problems, the defender in this model is disadvan-
taged in that he takes only reactive measures against the phisher. Note that also
we have omitted the case c of Theorem 1 (i.e., when 1nd−1 >
Rw
Rs
> 1nd ), a relatively
small region with points of discontinuity, for simplicity.
A.4. Analysis
We analyze using the CBP game three diﬀerent scenarios: (i) the hypothetical case
of perfect detection of phishing attacks, i.e., Pd = 1, (ii) Pd < 1 and is exogenously
determined, and (ii) Pd < 1 and is endogenously inﬂuenced by the number of
phishes the attacker creates.
A.4.1. Perfect Phish Detection.
Let us start with the hypothetical case where the probability of detection, Pd = 1.
Figure A.2 plots the optimal number of additional phishing attacks n∗w that the
phisher will launch depending on cost c, knowing that all newly created phishes
will be detected by the defender. Note that this is exactly the scenario analyzed
in [10], and that the dashed and solid lines plot the case a and b of Theorem 2
respectively. When the resource asymmetry is small (with 2n0 ≤ RwRs = 12 , dashed
line), the phisher optimally chooses not to create additional phishes. There is
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Figure A.2.: The optimal new phishes n∗w and utility U∗w given Pd = 1. Solid and
dashed lines plot the case where RwRs =
1
900 and
1
2 respectively, with n0 = 1000.
no advantage to further stretch the defender as the attacker, given his resources,
is expected to win in equilibrium a proportion of battleﬁelds equals Rw2Rs =
1
4 as
shown in Figure A.2(b).
However, when the resource asymmetry is large (with 2n0 >
Rw
Rs
= 1900 , solid
line), the phisher will create additional phishing attacks to reduce the ability of the
defender in locking down all of them. Especially when cost c (measured in terms of
the normalized utility) is negligible, n∗w approaches 2RsRw −n0 = 800 given RwRs = 1900
and n0 = 1000. Even so, interestingly, the utility of the phisher is still less than
10−3. Meanwhile, as c increases (see Figure A.2(a)), the optimal number of new
phishing attacks n∗w quickly approaches zero.
A.4.2. Imperfect Phish Detection (Exogenous).
In practice, we can expect that a signiﬁcant fraction of phishing attacks will get
away undetected by the defender. The problem is exacerbated by non-sharing
of data between diﬀerent security vendors as observed in [15]. Figure A.3(a)
and A.3(b) plot the optimal number of new phishes n∗w and the corresponding
utility of the phisher U∗w depending on Pd ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that the phisher will
be able to estimate Pd based on past experience.
Let us ﬁrst focus on the game between a resourceful (strong) phisher and the
defender, with the resource asymmetry 2n0 ≤ RwRs = 12 (as shown by the solid lines).
Here, with Pd < 1, the phisher will now create additional phishes knowing that the
defender will fail to detect some of the attacks, diﬀerent from the case of perfect
detection. The undetected phishes add on to the phisher’s utility, which has a lower
bound at Rw2Rs =
1
4 . As for the game between a less resourceful (weak) phisher and
the defender given a large resource asymmetry of 2n0 >
Rw
Rs
= 1900 (as depicted by
the dashed lines), observe that the optimal numbers of new phishing attacks are
now much higher than 800, the upper bound for the case of perfect detection.
Another interesting observation is that the utility gap between a strong and a
weak phisher reduces as Pd decreases from 1 to 0. Improving on Pd thus will hurt
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Figure A.3.: Optimal number of new phishes to create n∗w and the corresponding
optimal utility U∗w. Solid and dashed lines plot the case where RwRs =
1
900 and
1
2
respectively, with n0 = 1000. The eﬀect of a decreasing cost c going from 5 × 10−5
to 1 × 10−5 and 2 × 10−6, measured in terms of the normalized utility, is depicted
by the thick-black, normal-black and thin-gray lines, respectively.
a weak phisher, but has less impact on a strong phisher as he can leverage on his
resources (technologies, infrastructure, manpower, etc.) to resist the takedown of
some of his phishes. The trend also suggests that an attacker will optimally vary his
strategies to create more phishes when Pd is low, but strive to increase his resources
as Pd increases.
Regardless of the extent of resource asymmetry, an increased cost (see the thick-
dark lines versus the thin-gray lines) reduces both the optimal number of phishes
and the utility of the phisher. But, somewhat counter-intuitively, the lower the
detection probability, the more phishes the attacker will want to create. An attacker
does not settle with having a fraction of undetected phishes, but will exploit the
weakness of the defender in detecting all phishes and create even more phishes to
increase his utility.
Another counter-intuitive and interesting ﬁnding is that in fact it is optimal for
a less resourceful phisher to create more new phishes (than if he is a resourceful
phisher) in equilibrium. This can be seen in Figure A.3 where the solid lines
(RwRs =
1
900 ) remain above the dashed lines (
Rw
Rs
= 12 ) for all diﬀerent costs c.
This is surprising as large-scale phishing attacks are more often associated with
resourceful attackers such as the ‘Rock Phish’ and ‘Avalanche’ gangs empirically.13
There could be several reasons to this. First, while the ‘Avalanche’ phishes can be
recognized easily with their distinctive characteristics, we do not know if the bulk
of other phishing attacks are not related (carried out by a single organization) for
sure. Secondly, could there be really a ‘tragedy of the commons’ due to the a large
number of phishers (as described in [9]) that has forced the less resourceful attackers
out of the phishing endeavor? We note that analyzing the eﬀect of competition
13For example, the ‘Avalanche’ gang was responsible for 84,250 out of 126,697 (66%) phishing
attacks recorded by the APWG in the second half of 2009.
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between several phishers would be an interesting extension to our current model.
Another more likely explanation would be that most of the phishing attacks are in
fact detectable by the defender today, forcing the less resourceful attacker to gain
too little utility to be proﬁtable (observe that U∗w for the less resourceful attacker
is almost zero as Pd → 1 in Figure A.3(b)). Furthermore, having a large number of
phishes can also increase the probability of detection by the defender. We analyze
the case when Pd depends on the nw in the next section.
A.4.3. Imperfect Phish Detection (Endogenous).
Let us model the eﬀective Pd to depend on the number of phishes an attacker
creates with a simple formulation:
Pd = Pd0 × (nw)α
where with α = 0, we thus have the exogenous case as discussed in the previous
section. The interesting analysis here is when α = 0 as depicted in Figure A.4.
There are many examples where increasing the number of phishing attacks (bat-
tleﬁelds) can lead to a higher detection rate by the defender. For instance, the way
the ‘Rock Phish’ and ‘Avalanche’ gangs hosted a number of phishing attacks (i.e.,
diﬀerent phishing pages targeting diﬀerent brands) using the same domain name14,
while reducing cost, increases the chance that all these phishes (battleﬁelds) will be
detected and taken down altogether. An attacker who register multiple domains for
phishing purposes may also risk leaving visible patterns in the WHOIS database
that is being used by the defender to identify and suspend suspicious domains
quickly.15
As shown in Figure A.4(a) and A.4(b), both the n∗w and U∗w curves are now
steeper than before. The optimal number of additional phishing attacks to create
quickly approaches zero as Pd0 increases. Other than that, the main results from
the case of exogenous detection probability (where α = 0) remain applicable. First,
it is optimal for a weak phisher to create more phishes than a resourceful attacker.
The lower the detection probability is the more phishes will an attacker create.
Also, improving the baseline detection technologies (Pd0) hurts a weaker phisher
more than a stronger phisher.
It is harder to think of some practical examples where an increased number
of phishes helps to reduce the eﬀective detection rate by the defender (i.e., with
α < 0). A possible but unlikely scenario would be if the phishing attacks that a
phisher creates cannot be correlated to each other, and that the larger number of
attacks stretch the defender’s capability in detecting all of them. We include the
plots of optimal n∗w and U∗w under such scenario in Figure A.4(c) and A.4(d) for
reference purposes. Notice that the optimal utility of the phisher is now bounded
only by the cost of creating new phishes.
14A typical ‘Avalanche’ domain often hosted around 40 phishing attacks at a time [2].
15APWG reported that attackers often utilize a single or small set of unique names, addresses,
phone numbers, or contact email addresses to control their portfolio of fraudulent domain
names [1].
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Figure A.4.: Optimal n∗w and U∗w when the eﬀective probability of detection, Pd =
Pd0×(nw)α. Graphs a and b plot the case where α = 0.05 > 0, while graphs c and d
plot the case of α = −0.2 < 0. Solid and dashed lines plot the case where RwRs = 1900
and 12 respectively, with n0 = 1000. The eﬀect of a decreasing cost c going from
5× 10−5 to 1× 10−5 and 2× 10−6 is depicted by the thick-black, normal-black and
thin-gray lines, respectively.
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A.5. Discussion: Implications to Anti-Phishing
Strategies
The success of anti-phishing defense depends on a number of interacting variables.
As captured in our model, increasing the cost of creating new phishes c, improving
the detection rate of new phishes Pd, as well as, increasing the resource asymmetry
between the defender and phisher, RsRw are all crucial factors to be considered.
Increasing the cost for creating new phishes will hurt the attacker especially a
weak phisher, who has no resources to resist the prompt removal of his phishes.
Raising the cost (both in ﬁnancial and procedural terms) for registering a domain
name can therefore help, but only to a certain extent. Take the decision by CNNIC
to make the registration of domain names more restrictive for example, the number
of .cn phishing domains dropped, but phishing attacks on Chinese institutions
remained high as phishers shifted to use other domain names such as .tk and the
co.cc subdomain service (see [3] page 5). Phishers would also usually register new
domains using stolen credit cards. Furthermore, studies have found that a larger
percentage of phishing attacks (80%) are actually performed using compromised
web servers of innocent domain registrants (see e.g., [2, 3, 17]). To raise the cost c
will thus involve patching a large number of vulnerable servers, which is challenging
if not impossible without a proper incentive plan.
A more eﬀective alternative is hence to focus on improving the detection rate
of new phishes. While automated spam ﬁlters help to detect potential phishing
URLs, the ’Rock Phish’ gang, for example, used GIF image in phishing email to
evade detection. The popularity of URL shortening services and wall postings on
online social networks add up to the challenge of detecting all phishing advertise-
ments. Calls to share the phishing data in the anti-phishing industry have been
made before (e.g., in [15]), but sharing can also create concerns as takedown compa-
nies leverage on their phishing data for competitive edges. Here, we see a room to
employ and better coordinate the crowds to help improving the detection probabil-
ity. Collecting user reports against potential phishes (or potentially harmful sites),
without necessarily demanding from them higher skilled tasks such as evaluating if
a phish is valid (or that a site is secure), can already be helpful.
Naturally, the value of data sharing and crowd-based phish-reporting will depend
on the state of information asymmetry (i.e., the detection probability Pd). As can be
seen in Figure A.3, an ‘intelligent’ phisher will leverage on a large number of phishes
for optimal utility when Pd is low. Meanwhile, as Pd → 1, a phisher will improve
his utility by increasing his resources to match the defender’s. This includes, for
example, to gain access to a botnet infrastructure so to prolong the uptime of his
phishes. Should a good estimate of Pd is available, the defender can thus decide
whether to prioritize on increasing the cost of creating new attacks (to reduce
the number of phishes the attacker can create), or to prioritize on disrupting the
channels a phisher can increase his resources (e.g., access to a botnet infrastructure,
malicious tools, the underground market to monetize stolen credentials, or domain
resellers with shady practices), accordingly.
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A.6. Conclusions
We have proposed the Colonel Blotto Phishing (CBP) game to help better under-
standing the dynamics of the two-step detect-and-takedown defense against phis-
hing attacks. We gained several interesting insights, including the counter-intuitive
result that it is optimal for the less resourceful attacker to create even more phishing
attacks than the resourceful counterpart in equilibrium, and that the attacker will
optimally vary his strategies to either increase the number of phishes or to focus
on raising his resources depending on the detection probability. We then discussed
the implications to the anti-phishing industry.
Capturing the conﬂicts between an attacker and a defender with asymmetric re-
sources and information, it is our hope that the CBP game can be eventually used
to analyze other interesting problems, including measuring the eﬀects of competi-
tion between multiple phishers, and the beneﬁts of cooperation between multiple
takedown companies. We also see the suitability of the CBP game to be applied to
web security problems in general. Indeed, various web security problems, including
malicious sites, illegal pharmacies, mule-recruitment and so fourth, are currently
mitigated through a detect-and-takedown process similar to in the anti-phishing
industry.
Future Work. Like other stylized models, the CBP game can be extended in
several directions. A potential extension is to include the time dimension into the
game, for example, using repeated games to model the uptime of a phish, which is
often used to measure the damage caused by phishing activities. Using the variants
of the classic Colonel Blotto game, such as the non-constant sum version [19] in
which players might optimally choose not to expend all their resources, may also
yield interesting results. We note that it may be interesting also to test our CBP
model through experimental studies. Existing studies as conducted in [4, 5, 7,
12] have largely found that subjects were able to play the equilibrium strategies
of the classic Colonel Blotto game, with the weak and strong players adopting
the ‘guerrilla warfare’ and ‘stochastic complete coverage’ strategies respectively.
Testing how the subjects will play our two-stage CBP game can be an interesting
future work.
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Abstract
We examine the outcomes of the Web of Trust (WOT), a user-based system for as-
sessing web security and ﬁnd that it is more comprehensive than three automated
services in identifying ‘bad’ domains. Similarly to PhishTank, the participation
patterns in WOT are skewed; however, WOT has implemented a number of mea-
sures to mitigate the risks of exploitation. In addition, a large percentage of its
current user inputs are found to be based on objective and veriﬁable evaluation
factors. We also conﬁrm that users are concerned not only about malware and
phishing. Online risks such as scams, illegal pharmacies and misuse of personal
information are regularly brought up by the users. Such risks are not evaluated by
the automated services, highlighting the potential beneﬁts of user inputs. We also
ﬁnd a lack of sharing among the vendors of the automated services. We analyze
the strengths and potential weaknesses of WOT and put forward suggestions for
improvement.
B. Wisdom of Crowds in Assessing Web Security
B.1. Introduction
Security on the web remains a challenging issue today. Losses due to online banking
fraud in the UK alone stood at $59.7 million in 2009, with more than 51,000
phishing incidents recorded (up 16% from 2008) [21]. Provos et al. [18] found that
over 3 million malicious websites initiate drive-by downloads and about 1.3% of
all Google search queries get more than one malicious URL in the result page.
Meanwhile, Zhuge et al. [23] found that 1.49% of Chinese websites, sampled using
popular keywords on Baidu and Google search engines, are malicious.
There is also a lack of eﬃcient services to identify sites that are not outright
malicious, but are ‘bad’ in the sense that they try to trick or harm users in many
aspects, such as scams, deceptive information gathering and misuse of user data.
Several fraudulent activities such as money-mule recruitment and illegal online
pharmacies seem to have fallen out of the speciﬁc responsibilities or interests of
the authorities and security vendors. While banking-phishing sites are taken down
between 4 to 96 hours, the average life-time was found to be 2 weeks for mule-
recruitment and 2 months for online pharmacy sites [16]. Problems with the adult
sites may also be serious; while it is a personal judgment whether adult content
in general is inappropriate, Wondracek et al. [22] conﬁrmed that adult sites are
plagued with issues such as malware and script-based attacks and they frequently
use aggressive or inappropriate marketing methods.
Online certiﬁcation issuers, such as BBBOnline.org and TRUSTe.com strive to
distinguish ‘good’ sites from the ‘bad’ ones. This is, however, not a straightforward
task. Most websites are not entirely good or bad. There is also sometimes a
conﬂict of interest. Problems, such as adverse-selection [14] have been observed
when certiﬁers adopt lax requirements to certify sites in the ‘gray’ category.
B.1.1. The wisdom of crowds for security
A typical argument against the idea of the wisdom of crowds for security is on the
limited ability of ordinary users in providing reliable security evaluation. There
is a general uneasiness in relying on the ordinary users for this seemingly serious
task. Indeed, diﬀerent from the general quality assessment, an incorrect security
evaluation can cause harm to the users. Yet, this should not preclude the feasibility
of collating user inputs for security purposes. Surowiecki gives multiple real life
examples where inputs by non-experts collectively performed better than experts’
advices when handling complex and serious tasks [20].
PhishTank[8] and Web of Trust (WOT)[10] are two of the few existing systems
that employ the wisdom of crowds to improve web security. PhishTank solicits for
user reporting and voting against sites suspected to be phishes, while WOT collects
public opinions on the trustworthiness, vendor reliability, privacy and child-safety
aspects of domains. Both services operate on the principle that a collective decision
by ordinary users, when harnessed wisely, can yield good outcomes as errors made
by individuals cancel out each other. There is also the advantage of scale to cater
for a large volume of items needing an evaluation.
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In this work, we measure the reliability of WOT compared to 3 automated ser-
vices by well known vendors, namely, McAfee’s SiteAdvisor[5], Norton’s Safe Web[7]
and Google’s Safe Browsing Diagnostic Page[3]. We also investigate the participa-
tion pattern in WOT. Our ﬁndings can be summarized as follows:
• Only a few sites are commonly classiﬁed as bad by the prominent security
vendors, indicating a lack of data sharing.
• WOT’s coverage for general sites is low compared to the automated services.
• WOT’s coverage increases when considering only domains registered in re-
gions where active user participation is currently observed.
• WOT is more comprehensive in identifying the ‘bad’ domains.
• False negatives in identifying ‘bad’ domains are more often labeled as unknown
by WOT, while they are often wrongly labeled as good by the other services.
• Contribution ratios in WOT are skewed with the comment contribution fol-
lowing a power law distribution.
• WOT has built a number of mitigation measures against manipulation.
• A majority of the current user inputs in WOT is based on objective evaluation
criteria, and hence veriﬁable.
• User concerns on web security are not limited to malware and phishing.
B.2. Related Work
Surowiecki [20] outlines 4 conditions for a wise crowd to outperform a few experts.
Firstly, the crowd members should be diverse (not homogenous). They should also
have independent thought processes to avoid mere information cascade. The crowds
should be decentralized to tap into local knowledge and specialization, which should
be collated wisely with a good aggregation strategy.
In [15], Moore and Clayton evaluated the reliability and contribution patterns
in PhishTank. They found that the participation ratio in PhishTank was highly
skewed (following a power-law distribution), making it particularly susceptible to
manipulation. Compared to a commercial phishing report, they also found that
PhishTank was slightly less comprehensive and slower in reaching a decision. Our
work is inspired by theirs, combined with the curiosity of why PhishTank has
become widely adopted despite the initial criticisms.
While a number of studies look at the eﬃciency of various blacklists or tools for
the issue of phishing (e.g., [19, 13]), there is little eﬀort in evaluating the tools for
web security as a whole. To our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst to evaluate the
reliability of WOT, comparing it with three automated alternatives.
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B.3. The Web of Trust (WOT)
WOT is a reputation system that collates user inputs into global ratings about
sites under evaluation. It takes the form of an open-source browser add-on and a
centralized database [10]. User inputs and the evaluation outcomes are structured
around 4 aspects with ratings ranging from very poor (0-19), poor (20-39), unsat-
isfactory (40-59) to good (60-79) and excellent (80-100%). WOT describes the 4
aspects as follows:
• Trustworthiness (Tr): whether a site can be trusted, is safe to use, and
delivers what it promises. A ‘poor’ rating may indicate scams or risks (e.g.,
identity theft, credit card fraud, phishing, viruses, adware or spyware).
• Vendor Reliability (Vr): whether a site is safe for business transactions.
A ‘poor’ rating indicates a possible scam or a bad shopping experience.
• Privacy (Pr): whether a site has a privacy policy that protects sensitive
information (e.g., whether it has opt-in privacy options or allows users to
determine what can be made public and what should remain private). A
‘poor’ rating indicates concern that user data may be sold to third parties,
be stored indeﬁnitely or given to law enforcement without a warrant.
• Child-Safety (Cs): whether a site contains adult content, violence, vulgar
or hateful language, or content that encourages dangerous or illegal activities.
WOT applies Bayesian inference to weigh user inputs diﬀerently based on the
reliability of individual contributors, judging from their past rating behaviors. In-
dividual user ratings are kept private to the contributors. Neither is the actual
formula used in the computation publicly available. WOT argues that the hidden
formula and individual inputs, plus the Bayesian inference rule, help to mitigate
typical threats facing reputation and recommender systems such as a Sybil attack
in which dishonest users register multiple identities to attempt inﬂuencing the out-
comes. The aggregate rating is accompanied by a conﬁdence level (0-100%) rather
than the count of the individual ratings. The developers argue that the conﬁdence
level is more appropriate as it takes into account both the number of inputs and
the probable reliability of the contributors. WOT requires a minimal conﬁdence
level before publishing the aggregate rating.
Besides numerical ratings, users can also comment about the sites under evalu-
ation. To give a comment, they must ﬁrst register themselves on WOT’s website.
Non-registered users can only rate a site via the add-on, which gives a unique
pseudonym to every WOT user. Users select one out of 17 categories which best
describes their comment. Comments do not count towards the aggregate ratings.
Unlike the individual ratings, they are publicly accessible.
WOT has built a number of community features on its website, including a
personal page per registered user, a scorecard for each evaluated site, messaging
tools, a discussion forum, a wiki, and mechanisms to call for public evaluation on
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speciﬁc domains. Meanwhile, the browser add-on allows a user to conveniently rate
the sites he visits, in addition to signaling the reputation of diﬀerent URI links,
and warning the user as he navigates to sites that have been given a ‘poor’ rating.
The child-safety rating is ignored by default, but the settings (for risk signaling and
warning in general) are conﬁgurable to suit diﬀerent users.
Besides user ratings and comments, WOT also receives inputs from trusted third
parties. For example, it receives blacklists of phishes, spammers and illegal phar-
macies from PhishTank[8], SpamCop[9] and LegitScript[4], respectively.
B.4. Data Collection
To evaluate the reliability of WOT, we compared its aggregate ratings with the
outcomes provided in the querying pages of the three automated services, as iden-
tiﬁed in Section B.1.1. We collected the outcomes on 20,000 sites randomly selected
from the top million frequently visited sites as published by Alexa[1]. This gives
us a realistic evaluation scenario in which we measure the reliability of WOT for
sites that users normally visit. For each site, our program queried the assessment
report from each service, parsed and stored the result (referred to as dataset-I).
The querying process took place from the end of July to mid of August 2010. We
have conﬁrmed with the developers that WOT does not take inputs from any of
the three automated services.
In addition, we have requested and obtained two more datasets (hereafter re-
ferred to as dataset-II and dataset-III) from the developers. Dataset-II contains
the contribution level of 50,000 randomly selected users, out of >1.5 million regis-
tered users at the time of data collection. It describes the total numbers of ratings
and comments which have been contributed by a user, as well as his date of reg-
istration. Dataset-III consists of 485,478 comments randomly selected from >8
million at that time. Besides the comment text, it includes the date of writing and
a category chosen by the contributor to best describe the comment. The comments
evaluate a total of 412,357 unique sites. To study the users’ commenting behavior,
we downloaded also the aggregate ratings of the 412k sites using the public query
API of WOT. Both dataset-II and III contain only information that are publicly
accessible for all who login to WOT’s website.
B.5. Analysis
We started by studying the characteristics of the automated services:
• McAfee’s SiteAdvisor (SA)[5] evaluates a site based on various propri-
etary and automated tests on aspects such as downloads, browser exploits,
email, phishing, annoyance factors (e.g., pop-ups) and aﬃliations with other
sites. SiteAdvisor also receives inputs from TrustedSource[6] which evaluates
aspects such as site behavior, traﬃc and linking patterns, as well as site regis-
tration and hosting. Among others, it helps SiteAdvisor to identify spamming
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and phishing sites. SiteAdvisor allows users to comment on a particular site,
but comments are not factored into the evaluation outcomes.
• Norton’s Safe Web (SW)[7] tests if a site imposes threats e.g., drive-by
download, phishing, spyware, Trojan, worm, virus, suspicious browser change,
joke program and identity theft. It collects also user ratings and comments,
but like SiteAdvisor, they do not count towards the overall rating.
• Google’s Safe Browsing Diagnostic Page (SBDP)[3] warns about sites
that have been the hosts or intermediaries which download and install (ma-
licious) software on a user’s device without consent. It should be noted that
warnings about phishing activities are not included in the diagnostic page.
Phishing reports may only be accessible via the Safe Browsing API. We note
that this should not aﬀect our results as we do not expect the frequently
visited sites (used in our study) to be potential phishes.
To enable comparison, we mapped the evaluation outcomes of the respective
services into 4 classes: good, caution, bad and unknown, as shown in Table B.1. We
classiﬁed WOT’s ratings based on its default risk signaling strategy, which regards
Trustworthiness (Tr) as the most important evaluation aspect, given that it covers
the scopes of Vendor Reliability (Vr) and Privacy (Pr). A site is considered good if
its Tr rating is ≥ 60 without any credible warning (i.e., rating < 40 and conﬁdence
level ≥ 8) in Vr or Pr.1 We did not consider child-safety in the classiﬁcation as
it is ignored by the browser add-on in the default settings. Neither is content-
appropriateness evaluated by the automated services.
B.5.1. The reliability of WOT
We ﬁrst evaluated the coverage of individual services (see Table B.2). Coverage
measures the fraction of evaluated sites (i.e., those with an assessment outcome
= unknown). SiteAdvisor has the highest coverage while WOT scores the lowest.
This can be attributed to the fact that decisions in WOT depend on manual user
contribution. It may be also due to that the popularity of WOT is still limited to in
Europe and North America, as shown by the breakdown of user activity by region
on WOT’s statistics page. Considering only sites registered in the North America,
the EU plus Norway and Switzerland, the coverage of WOT increases from 51.23%
to 67.46%, while the coverage of SiteAdvisor increases to 94.98%.
The breakdown of the evaluated outcomes is included in Table B.2. SiteAdvisor
classiﬁes 1.48% sites as bad. This is interestingly close to the result in [23] which
found 1.49% of Chinese sites, sampled using popular keywords on Baidu and Google
(diﬀerent from our sampling method), are malicious. WOT classiﬁes 3.16% sites
to be bad. This larger value is likely due to the broader evaluation scope of WOT,
which is not limited to the malicious sites only. In comparison, results by Safe Web
and Safe Browsing Diagnostic Page may be too optimistic.
1We evaluated also the case which weighs all aspects equally (i.e., a site is classiﬁed as bad if
either Tr, Vr or Pr is < 40), but found no signiﬁcant changes in results.
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Figure B.1.: Venn diagram shows the divergence in the classiﬁcation of ‘bad’ sites.
Out of 948 that have been marked as bad by any services, only 2 receive the same
verdict from all, while only 98 sites are classiﬁed as bad by >1 services.
The Venn diagram in Figure B.1 shows that out of 296 and 102 bad sites that
SiteAdvisor and Safe Web ﬁnd respectively, only 8 are on their common blacklist.
The small percentage of the common ﬁndings about bad sites indicates the diﬀerent
testing methodologies employed and a lack of sharing between the two vendors. The
lack of data sharing is also notable in the anti-phishing industry [17]. Previously
this was a problem also in the anti-virus industry, but security vendors were found
to have learned the lesson and are now sharing virus samples [17]. On the other
hand, WOT ﬁnds 21 bad sites in common with Safe Web and 73 with SiteAdvisor.
This hints on the better ability of WOT in identifying ‘bad’ sites that have been
found by the others.
We measured Recall (R = Tp/(Tp + Fn)), Precision (P = Tp/(Tp + Fp)) and
F-Score (FS = 2PR/(P + R)) to quantify the reliability in identifying ‘bad’ sites.
A challenge here is to determine the count of true positives (Tp), false positives
(Fp) and false negatives (Fn) given that we do not know the ‘correct’ assessment
outcomes or truth values. We approached this by comparing the outcomes of a par-
ticular service with the consensus result of the three others. Thus, in this context,
Recall (R) describes the success rate of a service in recognizing all consensus-bad
sites, while Precision (P) measures the fraction of bad sites identiﬁed by a service
matching the consensus of the others. We deﬁne two types of consensus: optimistic
and conservative. In the optimistic case, the consensus-bad sites are the ones
classiﬁed as bad by other services without any contradictory classiﬁcation of good.
In the conservative case, the consensus-bad sites include those that have mixed
bad and good verdicts by individual services. We note that the conservative case
may depict a more realistic scenario given the divergence in the classiﬁcation of
bad sites. Table B.3 shows the deﬁnitions of Tp, Fp and Fn. Table B.4 presents the
R, P and FS values of diﬀerent services.
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Having the highest R in both optimistic and conservative cases, we ﬁnd that WOT
renders a more comprehensive protection against ‘bad’ sites in comparison to the
three automated services. On a closer look, we also ﬁnd that in the event that WOT
fails to warn against sites having a consensus-bad rating, a higher percentage of
these false-negatives are classiﬁed by WOT as unknown or caution rather than
good, as indicated by the Fn,u, Fn,c, Fn,g values in Table B.4. Conversely, most of
the false-negatives by SiteAdvisor and Safe Web are classiﬁed as good rather than
unknown or caution. This adds on to the reliability of WOT. Meanwhile, users
may have to remain cautious even when a site has received a good rating from
SiteAdvisor or Safe Web.
However, WOT has a low Precision (P) value in comparison to the others. As
we learned from the developers that the browser add-on will only prompt the user
a warning dialog when a ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ rating (in either aspect of Tr, Vr or
Pr) has a conﬁdence level ≥ 8 (i.e., credible), we measured the precision of WOT
considering ‘bad’ sites to be only those with such a credible warning (i.e., those
that will be explicitly warned against). As shown in the 5th row of Table B.4, the
Precision of WOT increases, but only slightly. The low P value may reﬂect that
that WOT covers a broader evaluation scope than the others. Yet, a very low P
value may result in a situation where users habitually regard all warnings as false
positives as they do not observe similar warnings from the other services. It is thus
important for WOT to inform the users about the diﬀerences.
If we weigh false-positives and false-negatives equally, the tradeoﬀ between Recall
and Precision can be measured by FS – the harmonic mean of R and P. In the
optimistic case, all FS values are small (3.1% to 5.6%) with Safe Web having the
highest FS (despite a low R). In the conservative case, the diﬀerence in FS values
becomes evident. WOT has the highest FS of 17.3%. SiteAdvisor has a FS of
15.2% and interestingly, the FS of Safe Web remains at 5.5%.
One may reason that the low R and high P values of the automated services could
be an artifact of comparing them with WOT which has a broader evaluation scope.
As a robustness check, we measured the reliability of the automated services using
only the outputs of the other two automated services to determine the consensus
outcomes. As shown in the last three rows of Table B.4, the P values drop without
an evident improvement in R. All FS values are low (3.4% to 5.4%) even in the
conservative case.
The above shows that WOT is reliable in comparison to the three automated
services, especially when users should be cautious about web security as captured
in the case of conservative consensus. Overall, WOT has shown a better ability in
recognizing ‘bad’ sites among the popular online destinations. Some of its warnings
may concern risks that are not currently evaluated by the others.
B.5.2. The few dominating contributors
Moore and Clayton argue that the highly skewed participation ratio in PhishTank
increases the risks of manipulation; the corruption of a few highly active users can
completely undermine its validity and availability [15]. It is also not diﬃcult for a
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Figure B.2.: The complementary CDF of ratings and comments. Dashed lines
depict the best ﬁtted power law distribution with α=1.95, xmin=4 (rating, left)
and α=2.05, xmin=3 (comment, right).
highly active user to disrupt the system under cover of a large body of innocuous
behavior [15]. We investigated if similar problems exist in WOT.
We analyzed dataset-II which describes the contribution level of 50k randomly
selected users. Of these users, the total rating and comments posted are 214,872
and 20,420 respectively. However, only 38.34% of them have rated and 7.16% have
commented about a site at least once.
The seemingly straight lines in the log-log graphs (in Figure B.2) suggest that
the contribution of ratings and comments could be following the power law distri-
bution. We computed the best-ﬁt of power-law scaling exponent α and the lower
cutoﬀ xmin using maximum-likelihood estimation, based on the approach in [12].
We obtained the best ﬁtted scaling exponent α=1.95 and lower cut-oﬀ xmin=4
for rating contribution, and α=2.05 and xmin=3 for comment contribution. The
goodness-of-ﬁt of these values were evaluated using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
test. We obtained a high p-value (0.76) for the parameters of comment contribu-
tion, indicating that it is likely to follow a power law distribution. This is, however,
not the case for rating contribution where we rejected the null hypothesis that it is
power-law at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
We did not proceed to test if the rating contribution follows other types of heavy-
tailed distributions (e.g., log-normal, Weibull) given that it is visually intuitive
that a large percentage of the contribution comes from a small group of users.
We observed that the complementary cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
rating contribution begins to curve-in among the top contributors2 (Figure B.2,
bottom left). Adapting from the 80:20 rule of the Pareto principle, we measured
the Skewness (S) such that S is the largest k% of the total inputs coming from
(100-k)% of the contributors. We found that S is 89 for rating and 95 for comment
contribution. Put in words, 89% of the total ratings are provided by 11% of the
2Excluding users who have contributed >3000 ratings, the KS test gives a p-value of 0.36,
indicating that it may be a power law distribution only with an upper cut-oﬀ.
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(%). (Right) Percentage of comment provision by the top 2, 5 and 10% contributors.
rating contributors while the top 5% comment contributors gave 95% of the total
comments. Both contribution ratios are skewed.
We then studied the evolution of user participation using dataset-III, which con-
tains 485,478 comments contributed by 16,030 unique users. Figure B.3 (left) shows
an increasing number of comments and unique contributors per quarter. Unfortu-
nately, the contribution ratio has become more skewed as WOT evolves, as shown
by the S values. Since 2009 Q2, more than 90% of the total comments are actually
provided by the top 2% active users as shown in Figure B.3 (right). The increasing
trend of skewness is likely to be caused by the mass rating tool which allows one
to rate and comment 100 sites at once. The privilege to use the tool was initially
given to both the Gold and Platinum users since Sep 2008 (according to WOT’s
wiki). As cases of misuse were detected, WOT began to award new privileges only
to the Platinum users, from 28 Dec 2009. Revoking the privilege from those who
have misused the tool might be the reason that has caused the dip in S and total
comment during 2010 Q1.
We cannot inspect the evolution of rating contribution as individual ratings are
kept private in WOT. Our guess is that rating contribution evolves similarly but
not as skewed given that it does not ﬁt well as a Power Law distribution and that
it has a smaller S value than that of comment. In addition, WOT has made the
rating process more convenient than commenting. Using the browser add-on, users
neither need to ﬁrst register themselves, nor visit the WOT’s website in order to
give a rating.
Skewed participation patterns are not entirely unexpected; some users are nat-
urally more inclined to contribute than the others. WOT also has put in place a
number of features to mitigate the risks of exploitation. First, in its current form,
security decisions in WOT are not easily guessable due to the hidden nature of the
aggregation formula and individual ratings. WOT also states that it does not weigh
the user inputs based on the activity level of individual contributors; the weights are
computed from the reliability of their past rating behavior. These measures make
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the repeated cheating by a single highly active user diﬃcult. One may be able to
cast biased ratings unnoticed amidst a large number of innocuous inputs, but this
is only valid if it is cost-eﬃcient for the attacker to build up a reputation in order
to rate up or down a few targeted sites. An attack may be more easily done with
the help of several accomplices, or through a ‘pseudo reliability’ built by automatic
rating with reference to some public blacklists. We learned from the developers
that there are automatic mechanisms in WOT which monitor for suspicious user
behavior. Yet, to the root of the challenges, WOT should work towards diversifying
the user contribution so that it does not become a centralized/homogenous system
overwhelmed with the inputs of a few. The mass rating privilege should be handled
with care.
B.5.3. Exploitability, disagreement and subjectivity
Grouping the comments according to their respective category, we observed that
there are many more comments of negative type than positive (see Figure B.4).
We measured the percentages of conﬂict (%-conﬂict) and unique contributors (%-
UC) of each comment category. A ‘conﬂict’ is deﬁned to arise when a comment
of positive type is given to a site that has a poor rating (<40 in either Tr, Vr, Pr
or Cs aspect), or when a comment of negative type is given to a site that has a
good rating (≥60 for all aspects). A conﬂict can happen due to several reasons.
Firstly, it can be due to the diﬀerence in scope between the comment and rating.
Speciﬁcally, whether a site is useful or not, and whether it is entertaining are factors
not evaluated by the four rating aspects. Secondly, assuming that the ratings reﬂect
the true state of a site, a conﬂict can be due to user attempts to cheat (e.g., to
defame or lie about a site of interests) or simply divergent views. We could not
easily diﬀerentiate between exploitation and disagreement, but underlying the two
are common factors of subjectivity and non-veriﬁability.
Excluding categories that are not in the scope of rating (i.e., Entertaining, Use-
ful and informative, and Useless), we found that categories that concern user ex-
perience and content (except for ‘adult content’) have a %-conﬂict value of >5.
In comparison, there is little conﬂict resulting from comments which warn about
browser exploits, phishing sites or adult content. We attribute this to the diﬀerent
levels of objectivity. For example, feedback on whether a site has annoying ads
and whether a site provides good customer experience are subjective. Meanwhile,
one cannot believably allege a site for phishing, browser exploit or adult content
without veriﬁable evidence.
In addition, we found no association between a low %-conﬂict value and a small
group of contributors. Comments with categories such as ‘Adult content’, ‘Mali-
cious content, viruses’ and ‘Spam’ are provided by >5% of total contributors but
have a low level of conﬂict. Conversely, comments about ‘Child friendliness’ and
‘Ethical issues’ are given by fewer users but result a higher level of conﬂict.
The above observations have several implications. First, signaled by the low %-
conﬂict, identifying a phishing site is an objective process. Given that an objective
evaluation is veriﬁable, there is a reduced chance for successful manipulation going
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unnoticed, even by the highly active users. This may have served to mitigate
the risks and incentives of exploitation in PhishTank. Indeed, despite the early
criticisms on its highly skewed (power law) participation ratio [15], PhishTank is
now adopted by multiple vendors including Yahoo!, Mozilla, Kaspersky Lab, Opera
and McAfee [2].
Risks of exploitation can, however, be a real issue for WOT since several of its
evaluation aspects, such as trustworthiness and vendor reliability are subjective in
nature. Fortunately, in its current state, we found that a large majority of the
user comments actually come under categories that have a low level of conﬂict e.g.,
‘adult content’, ‘malicious content, viruses’, ‘spam’ and ‘phishing or other scams’.
Although we cannot know for sure, the pattern exhibited here does imply that
the existing user ratings are largely based on objective criteria. While evaluation
based on objective criteria do not equate honest assessment, for example one can
accuse an innocent site to be malicious, such manipulation can be discovered and
punished with an appropriate level of monitoring. This reduces the incentives of
such an attack.
Yet, it is not unreasonable to expect an increase of subjective user inputs in the
long run. 7 of the 13 comment categories in the scope of rating actually have a
%-conﬂict value of more than 5. Comments that come under these categories were
also in fact contributed by more than half of the unique contributors. Subjective
opinions, if provided honestly, are valuable to a user-based system as they mark
the diversity of the participants. The challenge lies in that we cannot assume the
honesty of users. Subjective and non-veriﬁable evaluation criteria can be exploited
more easily.
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B.5.4. User concerns on web security
We also looked at popular words used in user comments and how the trend may
have changed over time. As we discovered that a large number of comments are
made with exactly the same description (likely to be caused by the mass rating
tool), we used only unique comments in our analysis. We parsed for nouns and
transformed them into the singular form. Table B.5 shows the most frequently
used words ranked in popularity. We observe that ‘spam’ and ‘scam’ are among the
most common issues discussed in user comments. The word ‘information’ is also
frequently used in conjunction with ‘personal’ and ‘sensitive’ describing privacy
concerns. Another popular word is ‘pharmacy’ which is found in warnings against
fake or illegal online pharmacy sites. The use of the word ‘phishing’ becomes
dominant since late 2008. Meanwhile, concern about malware on the web, virus
and Trojan included, is increasing.
This analysis indicates that user concerns on web security are not limited to only
phishing and malware. This brings up the limitation of the automated services
in catering for user concerns on online risks such as scams, illegal pharmacies,
information protection and inappropriate content in general.
B.6. Discussion
The strengths of WOT lie in a number of its characteristics. First, it caters for
diﬀerent user concerns about web security and does so reliably. Its overall rat-
ings are not easily guessable and hence there is little chance of manipulation. The
browser add-on has also made the process of rating a site very easy. Sub-domains
are designed to inherit the reputation of the parent domain unless there are suﬃ-
cient ratings for the sub-domain itself, avoiding redundant user eﬀort. WOT also
encourages users to contribute responsibly by weighing the inputs according to the
reliability of individual contributors through statistical analysis. In a private com-
munication with the developers, we were told that WOT has also factored in the
dynamics of aggregate ratings as the weight of individual ratings is set to decay
(until the respective contributors re-visit the sites). The system is also capable
of ignoring spammers and suspicious ratings as WOT monitors for unusual rating
behavior automatically. Finally, the community features such as discussion forum,
messaging tools and the ability to call for public evaluation for speciﬁc sites, have
all contributed to a reliable reviewing process.
Yet, WOT is not without several potential weaknesses. We discuss several of
them and suggest the potential mitigating strategies in the following:
• Skewed contribution patterns. The contribution patterns of rating and
comment are skewed, most likely due to the mass rating tool. A highly skewed
contribution pattern can cause WOT to be overwhelmed by the inputs of a
few, violating the diversity and decentralization conditions of the wisdom
of crowds. While the risks of exploitation due to a skewed participation is
expected to be limited given the measures taken in WOT and the observation
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that a majority of the current user inputs are based on objective evaluation
factors, we suggest to handle the mass rating tool with a greater care. It may
be wise to restrict the highly active users to use the tool only for evaluation
aspects that are objective and veriﬁable. At the time of writing, it is also not
mandatory for them to provide the evidence of their mass ratings, although
they are required to submit a comment in which it is recommended to include
the relevant references and that they must be contactable by anyone who
disagrees with the rating. Attention must also be given to potential gaming
behavior such as building up a ‘pseudo reputation’ by simply referencing the
publicly available blacklists. Essentially, WOT should work on diversifying
the sources of bulk contribution.
• A hidden approach. While the hidden aggregation formula and user ratings
may have played a part in making the assessment outcomes in WOT less
easily guessable and less vulnerable to manipulation, a hidden approach may
in general result in a lack of user conﬁdence. The situation can be more
tricky given that warnings by WOT may not be frequently supported by
the automated services (as characterized by the low precision value). Users
unaware of the broader evaluation scope of WOT may doubt the reliability
of the black-box computation and regard its warnings as mere false-positives.
Neither will a hidden approach beneﬁt from the scrutiny and suggestions for
improvement from the community. It may be worth the eﬀort for WOT to
educate the users concerning its diﬀerences from the automated services. A
more transparent approach capable of withstanding manipulation would be
the preferred option in the long run.
• Subjective evaluation criteria. Subjective evaluation factors can result
in contentious outcomes besides increasing the risk of manipulation. In the
current state, WOT does not seem to diﬀerentiate between objective and
subjection evaluation criteria. Improvement can be made in this respect. For
example, the rating aggregation strategy may factor in the subjectivity level
of the underlying evaluation factor. WOT may also consider tapping into
the potentials of personalized communities as proposed in [11] to deal with
subjective factors. Inputs from personalized communities have the advantages
of being more trustworthy, relevant and impactful than those provided by
unknown community members [11].
There are several limitations to our study. First, as our evaluation sample consists
of sites randomly chosen from the one million most-frequently visited sites, we have
not evaluated the reliability of WOT when dealing with ‘bad’ sites that are more
frequently found in the long-tail of web popularity. Further, we have also not tested
the timeliness of WOT’s assessment. It may appear that an assessment by WOT
can take a longer time than the automated systems as it depends on user inputs
and can miss out on malicious sites which are often online for a short period of time
only. While these concerns are valid, we note that they are being covered in WOT
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by the inclusion of blacklists from trusted third party sources. Future investigation
on these concerns would be interesting.
B.7. Conclusions
We have found that the Web of Trust (WOT) is more comprehensive than three
popular automated services in identifying ‘bad’ domains among the frequently vis-
ited sites. Contribution patterns in WOT are found to be skewed with the comment
contribution following a power-law distribution. However, WOT has implemented
a number of measures to mitigate the risks of exploitation. In addition, a large ma-
jority of its current user inputs is found to be based on objective evaluation factors
and hence veriﬁable. This may have also helped to reduce the risks and incentives
of exploitation in PhishTank. We ﬁnd that user concerns on web security are not
limited to malware and phishing. Scams, illegal pharmacies and lack of informa-
tion protection are regular issues raised but are not evaluated by the automated
services. There is also an evident lack of sharing among the vendors of the auto-
mated services. We include a discussion on the strengths and potential weaknesses
of WOT which may be helpful for designing user-based security systems in general.
In short, WOT clearly exempliﬁes that the wisdom of crowds for assessing web
security can work, given a careful design.
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Abstract
Does crowdsourcing work for web security? While the herculean task of evaluating
hundreds of millions of websites can certainly beneﬁt from the wisdom of crowds,
skeptics question the coverage and reliability of inputs from ordinary users for as-
sessing web security. We analyze the contribution patterns of serious and casual
users in Web of Trust (WOT), a community-based system for website reputation
and security. We ﬁnd that the serious contributors are responsible for reporting
and attending to a large percentage of bad sites, while a large fraction of attention
on the goodness of sites come from the casual contributors. This complementarity
enables WOT to provide warnings about malicious sites while diﬀerentiating the
good sites from the unknowns. This in turn helps steer users away from the numer-
ous bad sites created daily. We also ﬁnd that serious contributors are more reliable
in evaluating bad sites, but no better than casual contributors in evaluating good
sites. We discuss design implications for WOT and for community-based systems
more generally.
C. Community-based Web Security
C.1. Introduction
Despite the eﬀorts of a multi-billion dollar computer security industry, web security
remains a largely unsolved problem. Large numbers of malicious sites continue
to serve as platforms for phishing, malware, and other security exploits. Provos
et al. [22] found over 3 million URLs (hosted on more than 180,000 sites) that
initiated drive-by downloads – automatic installation and execution of malware on
the machines of unsuspecting visitors. Zhuge et al. [26] found that 1.5% of Chinese
websites, sampled using popular keywords on Baidu and Google search engines,
were malicious. Meanwhile, the Anti-Phishing Working Group recorded more than
67,000 phishing attacks worldwide in the second half of 2010 [8].
Detection, blacklisting, and takedown of malicious sites have been traditionally
handled by security vendors such as anti-virus and brand protection companies.
Detection and blacklisting of suspicious sites are typically done with automated
sensing and classiﬁcation using heuristics and machine learning. Given that the
takedown of a malicious site can be cumbersome and protracted in time, tools have
been created to warn the users about suspicious sites on the web.
However, many of the automated risk signaling tools, including McAfee’s SiteAd-
visor [2] and Norton’s Safe Web [3], fall short in identifying ‘bad’ sites that try to
trick or harm users in a variety of subtle ways. Problems of increasing concern
that are not adequately handled by security vendors include the misuse of personal
information, scams and fraudulent sites such as illegal online pharmacies. The au-
tomated tools also do not evaluate content appropriateness. While it is a personal
judgment whether adult content is appropriate, the fact that adult sites regularly
rank among the top 50 most visited sites and are often associated with malware,
script-based attacks and aggressive marketing strategies [25], do indicate a serious
problem. Furthermore, verifying the goodness of sites is not a straightforward task.
Online certiﬁcation issuers, such as BBBOnline and TRUSTe, strive to distinguish
the ‘good’ sites from the ‘bad’ ones, but conﬂicts of interest can sometimes arise.
When certiﬁers adopt lax requirements in certifying sites in the ‘gray’ category, the
problem of adverse selection may result in the certiﬁed sites having lower trustwor-
thiness than those that forego certiﬁcation [15].
The limitations of automated tools and the potential risks of centralized judgment
have prompted the alternative approach of leveraging community input for web
security. Encouraged by the success of peer-production systems such as Wikipedia,
yelp, and reCAPTCHA, the crowdsourcing of website security evaluation holds the
promise of scalability. Yet, there remain concerns on the ability of community
members in providing timely and reliable evaluation of a large number of websites.
In addition to the typical problem of malicious or misinformed contributors present
in a peer-production system, there are additional challenges in the context of web
security. First, one would expect a certain level of security expertise, and therefore
a higher contribution barrier, to evaluate the security of a website. Determining if a
website engages in a variety of security exploits is diﬀerent from bookmarking a page
using reddit or reviewing a book on Amazon. Second, attackers play a game of cat-
and-mouse by creating large numbers of malicious websites every day, typically with
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short lifespans. The challenges of coverage and timeliness are therefore diﬀerent
from the case of Wikipedia, where the number and content of articles are relatively
static.
Despite these concerns, several community-based systems for web security such
as Web of Trust (WOT) [6] and PhishTank [4] have achieved signiﬁcant impact.
PhishTank collects user reporting and voting on suspected phishing sites. Its assess-
ments are used by popular vendors including Yahoo!, McAfee, Mozilla and Opera.
On the other hand, WOT collates individual user ratings into aggregate ratings
on four aspects of web security, namely trustworthiness, vendor reliability, privacy,
and child safety. Facebook has recently incorporated the assessments by WOT to
protect its users from potentially harmful URLs [7]. A recent study by Chia and
Knapskog [11] found that WOT was more comprehensive than three automated
counterparts namely SiteAdvisor, Safe Web, and Safe Browsing Diagnostic Page in
identifying bad domains among the frequently visited sites.
There is certainly value in leveraging on community inputs for web security.
Beyond comparing the overall reliability of community-based systems against the
automated counterparts, in this paper, we set out to study how diﬀerent types of
contributors (casual and serious) play their parts in advancing WOT in the chal-
lenging domain of web security. Understanding the roles of diﬀerent contributors
can lead us to a clearer picture of the underlying success factors and potential
pitfalls. Speciﬁcally, in this work: (I) We ask how do the casual contributors add
value to WOT given the steep contribution barrier of assessing web security? (II)
We study how diﬀerent types of contributors may choose to focus on diﬀerent types
of websites (popular/unknown, malicious/benign) or diﬀerent trustworthiness as-
pects of websites (e.g., phishing, spam, inappropriate content). (III) We also seek
to characterize the contribution patterns of casual and serious contributors, and
to examine if there is a room to better coordinate the limited human resources.
(IV) We also determine if diﬀerent types of contributors realize diﬀerent levels of
reliability in their assessments. We hope that these questions can yield insights
applicable to other contexts beyond web security.
In the following, we ﬁrst describe the related works before detailing on how
WOT works in practice and our methodology. We then present our analysis results
focusing on the coverage, coordination, and reliability of inputs by the serious
and casual contributors. Finally, we discuss the design implications to WOT and
community-based systems more generally.
C.2. Related Work
C.2.1. Collective Wisdom in General
A large number of prior works on collective wisdom have focused on the participa-
tion patterns in Wikipedia (e.g., [9, 17, 21, 23]), its potential pitfalls and risks (e.g.,
[14]) as well as its success factors and how to improve it (e.g., [12, 13, 16, 18]). Our
work is related to that of Kittur et al. [17] and Welser et al. [23] in the way that
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we are interested in the roles played by diﬀerent types of contributors for collective
intelligence. While Kittur et al. [17] has observed a shift of workload from the elite
class contributors to the less active ones over time, Ortega et al. [21] concluded
that the contribution pattern in Wikipedia has remained highly skewed even in the
stable phase. We note that however contribution should measure more than just
the count of article edits and submissions. Indeed, even though the role by the less
active contributors might appear overshadowed by the few serious contributors,
prior research (e.g., [9]) has pointed out that even the readers (lurkers) can and
do contribute to a collaborative system like Wikipedia. In this work, rather than
focusing only on the count of comments and ratings, we measure the roles of dif-
ferent types of contributors judging from the coverage, coordination and reliability
of their assessments.
Wilkinson [24] describes two macroscopic characteristics in peer production sys-
tems and shows how the two regularities arise from simple dynamic rules. First,
he demonstrates that the probability a person stops contributing is inversely pro-
portional to the number of contributions he has made, which in turn leads to a
power law contribution distribution in all four systems (Wikipedia, Bugzilla, Digg
and Essembly) he investigated. He found also a lognormal distribution of per topic
activity – a small number of very popular topics accumulate the vast majority of
contributions due to a multiplicative popularity reinforcement mechanism. We do
not evaluate if the contribution patterns in WOT follows a speciﬁc distribution in
this paper, but we observe that both the distributions of per person contributions
and per site inputs do have a heavy tail. The skewed attention distribution among
sites evaluated by the casual contributors is interesting as it suggests the possibility
of better coordinating the security crowds for a higher level of eﬃciency.
Mamykina et al. [19] argued that the success of Stack Overﬂow attributes not only
to the careful design considerations, but also to the high visibility and interactive
involvement of the design team in the community. The authors further highlighted
that this model of continued community leadership presents challenges to port
the success of Stack Overﬂow easily over to other domain speciﬁc systems. This
argument has only made it more appealing to better understand the roles played
by diﬀerent contributors as we aim for in this paper.
C.2.2. Collective Wisdom for Web Security
Denning et al. [14] highlighted six areas of potential risks in Wikipedia, namely
accuracy, motives of contributor, uncertain expertise, volatility of content, sources
of information and coverage. The ﬁrst ﬁve areas relate to the correctness of in-
formation, suggesting a heavier focus on content reliability. All six areas are valid
concerns facing the community-based web security. We note that however coverage
is just as important given that it is the strategy of attackers to create numerous
new bad sites to thin the resources of the defenders.
Moore and Clayton [20] evaluated the eﬀectiveness of PhishTank – a community-
based system for reporting and voting against suspected phishing sites. They found
that the participation ratio in PhishTank was highly skewed (following a power-law
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distribution), making it particularly susceptible to manipulation. Compared to a
commercial phishing report, they found that PhishTank was slightly less compre-
hensive and slower in reaching a decision. 3% of the sites reported as suspicious
(out of a total of 176,654) were found to be invalid phishes. A large percentage
of the incorrect submissions came from the less active contributors. However, con-
sidering the eventual assessment outcomes (when the initial reporting is validated
or corrected by the subsequent voting mechanism), they have found only 39 false
positives and 3 false negatives in total.
The study by Chia and Knapskog [11] was the among the ﬁrst that evaluated
WOT comparing it with the assessment outcomes of SiteAdvisor, Safe Web and
Safe Browsing Diagnostic Page. They found that the participation ratio in WOT
was also highly skewed. However, WOT was in fact more comprehensive than
the three automated systems in identifying bad domains (amongst the top million
most visited sites as published by Alexa [1]). The study also concluded that user
concerns on web security are not limited to malware and phishing. Scams, illegal
pharmacies and misuse of personal information are regular issues raised by WOT’s
community while they are not evaluated by the automated services. In a similar
study, Ayyavu and Jensen [10] rejected the unfair generalization on the low reliabil-
ity of community-based rating systems as they found that, among frequently visited
sites that have been co-evaluated by WOT and SiteAdvisor, the disagreement in
assessments was actually less than 10%.
Building on the above studies, our work here looks beyond the overall reliability
of crowdsourcing for web security. Acknowledging the potentials of such systems,
we examine the roles being played from diﬀerent types of contributors to better
understand the underlying success factors and potential pitfalls. We center our
analysis around the coverage, coordination and reliability of user assessments in
line with the typical concerns of collaborative systems and web security.
C.3. Web of Trust (WOT)
WOT is a reputation system that collates community inputs into aggregate ratings
for diﬀerent websites. It takes the form of an open source browser add-on and a
website (mywot.com) with a number of community features including a personal
page per registered user, discussion forums, a wiki as well as messaging and polling
tools. The add-on has been downloaded for more than 23 million times by August
2011.
C.3.1. User Ratings and Comments
Individual user ratings and the aggregate ratings for diﬀerent sites in WOT are
structured around four aspects: trustworthiness, vendor reliability, privacy and
child safety. The ratings range from very poor (0-19%), poor (20-39%), unsatisfac-
tory (40-59%) to good (60-79%) and excellent (80-100%).
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Positive category Negative category Other
Entertaining Useless Other
Useful, informative Annoying ads or popups
Child friendly Ethical issues
Good customer experience Hateful, violent/illegal content
Good site Bad customer experience
Browser exploit
Spyware or adware
Adult content
Phishing or other scams
Malicious content, viruses
Spam
Table C.1.: Comment categories of positive or negative nature in WOT.
WOT weighs the input ratings diﬀerently based on the reliability of individual
contributors. The reliability of a contributor, decoupled from his activity level or
contribution count, is computed with Bayesian inference based on his past contri-
butions. Individual user ratings are kept private to the contributors. The rating
aggregation formula is also not publicly available. WOT argues that the hidden
formula and individual inputs, plus the Bayesian inference rule, help to mitigate
gaming behaviors. We learned from the developers that they have built in auto-
mated mechanisms to monitor for suspicious contribution behaviors. They have
also factored in the freshness of user ratings by setting the weight of individual
ratings to decay over time (until the rater re-visits the site).
Other than numerical ratings, users can also evaluate a site by textual comments.
To give a comment, they must ﬁrst register themselves on mywot.com. There are
more than 2 millions registered users to date. Unregistered users (i.e., anyone who
has downloaded the add-on) can only rate a site through the add-on, which assigns
a unique pseudonym to the user. When submitting a comment, the user selects one
out of 17 comment categories that best describes their concern. As shown in Table
C.1, excluding the category ‘Other’, 5 of the comment categories are positive in
nature, while the remaining 11 are negative. Comments do not count towards the
aggregate ratings, but they provide a way of reasoning as to how a user has rated
a particular site. Unlike the individual ratings, comments are publicly accessible
on the scorecard of each evaluated site. The scorecard of a particular site refers
to a uniquely reserved page on mywot.com that shows the aggregate ratings and
user comments given to the site along with other details such as its traﬃc ranking,
server location, description and links for further information.
C.3.2. Mass Rating Tool
WOT ranks the community members starting from rookie, bronze, silver, gold
to the platinum level. The ranking is done based on the activity score which is
computed from the total ratings and comments contributed, diﬀerent from the reli-
ability score that is kept private and designed to incentivize the users to contribute
responsibly. Platinum members are given the privilege to use the mass rating tool
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which allows them to evaluate (at maximum) 100 sites at the same time with the
same rating and comment. It is a handy tool for those who have access to some
blacklists (e.g., on spamming, phishing and malicious sites) to submit the bulk
evaluations conveniently.
C.3.3. Trusted sources
Besides user ratings and comments, WOT does factor in inputs given by trusted
third parties. For example, it receives blacklists of phishes, spamming sites and
illegal online pharmacies from PhishTank, SpamCop.net and LegitScript.com re-
spectively. Inputs from the trusted third parties play an important role in improving
the coverage and timeliness of WOT in responding to new bad sites created by the
attackers daily. We do not have access to the inputs from these trusted sources
(nor the ratings from individual contributors). We will focus only analyzing the
user comments in this paper.
C.3.4. Risk Signaling and Warning
WOT signals the reputation of diﬀerent URLs through the browser add-on us-
ing colored rings (red for ‘bad’, yellow for ‘caution’, green for ‘good’, gray for
‘unknown’). By default, the reputation of a site is computed based on the trust-
worthiness (tr) rating which covers whether a site can be trusted and is safe to use
(without malicious content). A site is considered bad if tr<40, caution if 40≤tr<60,
good if tr≥60, and unknown if tr is not available or if a minimal conﬁdence level has
not been obtained. A special case is when WOT ﬁnds a credible warning in either
aspect of vendor reliability or privacy and thus treating the site as bad. By credible
warning, we refer to the case when a particular aspect is given an aggregate rating
below 40% with a conﬁdence level above 8%. The conﬁdence level is computed
based on both the number of ratings and the reliability scores of the contributors.
In the presence of a credible warning, besides displaying a red ring next to the URL,
WOT prompts a large warning dialog to the user if he clicks on the link. The child
safety rating is ignored by default. The settings for risk signaling and warning can
however be conﬁgured to suit the needs of diﬀerent users.
C.3.5. Evaluation Statistics
According to its statistics page, WOT has evaluated more than 32 million sites
by August 2011. The community may however have quite some catch-up to do
considering that there are more than 205 million domain names now (as estimated
in [8] and [5]), giving WOT an overall coverage of 15.6%. As found in [11], the
coverage of WOT among Alexa’s top million most visited sites was 51.2%, but
still lower than SiteAdvisor (87.9%) and Safe Web (68.1%). Among the 32 million
sites evaluated by WOT, 3.4 millions (10.6%) are regarded as bad with a low
trustworthiness rating. While no one can be sure about the total bad sites on the
web (given that many of them are undetected), researchers found that 1.5% of
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the frequently visited Chinese sites were malicious [26], and 1.3% of Google search
queries received more than one malicious URL in the result page [22]. Putting
the above ﬁgures together, WOT does appear to have a better coverage for bad
sites than the good ones in its current state. Indeed, WOT was found to be more
comprehensive than SiteAdvisor, Safe Web and Safe Browsing Diagnostics Tool in
identifying bad domains among the frequently visited sites [11].
C.4. Methodology and Data Collection
For this study, we have obtained two valuable datasets from the WOT developers
(hereafter referred to as DS-Comment and DS-Activity). DS-Comment consists of
600,000 comments randomly selected from more than 12 millions in total in WOT
in early 2011. The comments evaluate a total of 504,874 sites and were submit-
ted by 20,657 unique contributors. Each comment in the dataset is accompanied
by details including the user ID, date of writing, evaluated domain as well as a
comment category as speciﬁed by the contributor. We made use of the positive or
negative nature of a comment category (as classiﬁed in Table C.1) to determine the
positive or negative sentiment of the contributor’s assessment. We thus refer to a
negative (positive) comment as one that has been given a negative (positive) com-
ment category in this article. On the other hand, DS-Activity describes the total
ratings and comments that each of the 20,657 contributors has given considering
the entire database of WOT. The dataset thus indicates the activity level of the
contributors in WOT in entirety; we made use of it to distinguish between diﬀerent
types of contributors (casual or serious). Put together, these two datasets allow
us to evaluate the coverage (attention) provided by diﬀerent types of contributors,
various characteristics of sites they attend to, and the potential coordination among
themselves.
To evaluate the reliability of inputs given by diﬀerent contributor types, we then
randomly selected 5,000 domains from the 504,874 evaluated in DS-Comment and
queried for their aggregate ratings from WOT. Note that the aggregate ratings of
WOT have factored in the reliability scores of diﬀerent contributors and additional
inputs (if any) from trusted third parties. For each of the 5,000 sites, we queried also
the assessments by SiteAdvisor (SA) and Safe Web (SW) – two services provided
by McAfee and Norton respectively. SA evaluates a site based on proprietary and
automated tests on aspects such as downloads, browser exploits, email, phishing and
annoyance factors (e.g., pop-ups). It also receives inputs from TrustedSource.org
(also owned by McAfee) which evaluates aspects including site behavior, traﬃc and
linking patterns, and site registration and hosting. Similarly, SW run automated
tests to determine if a site imposes threats such as drive-by download, phishing,
spyware, Trojan, worm, virus, suspicious browser change, joke program and identity
theft. Both SA and SW do collect user comments (and ratings in the case of SW)
but these inputs do not count towards the eventual assessment. We parsed the
reports and obtained the assessment outcomes which constitute our third dataset,
DS-Reliability. The querying process took place in April 2011. We repeated the
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queries in mid May and found no signiﬁcant changes in the assessment outcomes
by all three services.
C.4.1. Limitations
We list here several limitations to our study. First, given that we do not have
access to the ratings given by individual contributors (which are kept private in
WOT), we will be projecting the attention and concern of diﬀerent contributor
types judging from their comment contribution. This should not be problematic
as we ﬁnd a strong correlation (r=0.89 with p<.001) between the total ratings and
total comments one has contributed from DS-Activity.
Secondly, for our analysis on coverage and attention, we will assume that the
contributors have speciﬁed a category that ﬁts their comment correctly. The same
assumption is used as we will leverage on the nature of a comment category (positive
or negative) to evaluate the reliability of diﬀerent contributor groups in assessing
bad and good sites. We note that this assumption is reasonable given that there is
no motivation for a user to cheat or game the system by choosing a false category
as comments do not aﬀect the aggregate outcome.
Another limitation relates to the fact that we will measure the coverage and reli-
ability of diﬀerent contributor groups based on the sites evaluated in DS-Comment.
The ratio of comments given a category of negative nature is much higher than the
positive ones in DS-Comment, in line with the statistics on mywot.com. While
this gives us an accurate representation of the state of contribution distribution in
WOT, it may be misleading to take, for example, the loss of coverage in the absence
of the casual contributors to be minimal (2.16% as we will show in the next sec-
tion). The impact will be larger if we consider sites relevant to the daily browsing
patterns of ordinary users. For example, among the top million most visited sites,
WOT rated 45.9% of them as good [11] – a stark diﬀerence to the small proportion
of positive comments (5%) in DS-Comment. This suggests a more important role
played by the casual contributors than it may appear.
We note that also DS-Comment contains comments that may have been later
removed by the contributors (e.g., when a negative comment is disputed by other
users as a false positive). We pay attention to this when evaluating the reliability
of diﬀerent contributor groups given that the test sample is smaller.
C.5. Analysis / Results
We will ﬁrst describe the macroscopic contribution patterns in WOT and how we
categorize the contributors based on their activity level. Then, we delve into the
characteristics of the two extreme types of contributors (serious or casual) and
measure their roles in covering sites of diﬀerent natures as well as evaluating them
reliably. We study also how the diﬀerent contributors may have (mis-)coordinated
themselves.
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Figure C.1.: Distribution of comment and rating contribution.
C.5.1. Characterizing Diﬀerent Types of Contributors
Figure C.1 plots the contribution distributions of ratings and comments using DS-
Activity. Both of them do not ﬁt a power-law distribution (diﬀerent from in [11]
where the comment contribution was found to be following a power-law distribu-
tion). We did not test if they ﬁt some other types of heavy tailed distributions (e.g.,
log-normal, Weibull) but it is visually intuitive that the distributions are skewed.
This is not entirely unexpected; a skewed contribution distribution of a community-
based system can be characterized by the ‘participation momentum’ [24] – the more
contributions one has made, the lower it is the likelihood of him quit contributing.
An interesting observation (not shown in ﬁgure) is that not all the highly active
contributors actually arrived from the beginning. WOT has managed to attract
new highly active members as the community evolves.
While more ratings have been given than comments (per person) on average, the
diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. There is a strong correlation (r=0.89 with
p<.001) between the number of ratings and number of comments contributed per
person. This indicates the feasibility to study the diﬀerent characteristics of the
contributors based on the comments given instead of ratings that are not publicly
available.
We categorize the contributors according to the number of comments one has
given, with u0 denoting the group of casual contributors who have provided less
than 10 comments, and u5 denoting the group of serious contributors who have
given at least 100,000 comments. In other words, each contributor group corre-
sponds to a diﬀerent contribution level measured in terms of the base 10 magnitude
order of the total comments contributed. Table C.2 details on the categorization
rules, total comments, total unique sites covered and the size of each contribu-
tor group. 67.41% of the contributors belong to the casual type while more than
76.61% of the comments comes from the few serious contributors. As demonstrated
in [19, 23], there may be ways to reﬁne the contributor categorization using vari-
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Statistics from DS-Comment
Contr. Total comments # comments # sites # unique
group (from DS-Activity) contributed evaluated users
u0 1 – 9 15,493 12,932 13,924
u1 10 – 99 18,727 17,306 5,850
u2 100 – 999 8,569 8,197 703
u3 1000 – 9999 16,956 16,641 106
u4 10000 – 99999 80,607 73,965 44
u5 100000 or more 459,648 407,778 30
All groups 600,000 504,874 20,657
Table C.2.: Grouping based on total comments one has given in WOT.
ous structural attributes (e.g., the temporal patterns of comment submission, the
nature of sites evaluated). However, we note that an activity-based categorization
scheme does serve the research questions we pursue in this paper. In addition
to comparing the characteristics of the casual (u0) and serious (u5) contributors,
we include also the results of comparing the combinations of u0+u1 (less active
members) and u4+u5 (highly active members) whenever suitable. We expect the
combination of u4 and u5 to represent those who have the privilege of using the
mass rating tool.
C.5.2. Coverage: Complementary Attention and Concern
We ﬁrst analyze the attention and concern by diﬀerent contributor groups judging
from the comments they have given.
C.5.2.1. Attention Divide on Goodness and Badness of Sites
Figure C.2 (right) depicts the percentage breakdown of comments given by diﬀerent
contributor groups in each comment category. Notice that the ﬁrst 5 categories are
positive in nature, followed by 11 others that are negative, as classiﬁed in Table C.1.
We made use of the positive or negative nature of a comment category to determine
the contributor’s attention on the goodness or badness of a site. An interesting
ﬁnding is that a large percentage of attention or concern on the goodness of sites
(i.e., whether they are entertaining, useful, child friendly, oﬀers good customer
experience, or good) actually comes from the less active contributors (especially
u0). Conversely, other than the ‘Useless’ and ‘Annoying ads or pop-ups’ categories,
a large percentage of comments among the negative categories actually come from
the highly active contributors (especially u5). These include the attention on the
technical security of sites (e.g., whether a site contains malware, spyware, browser
exploits, or whether a site is related to spamming, phishing or scams) as well as
the attention on adult and other potentially inappropriate content. While this
may be largely due to the fact that the serious contributors have been rating and
commenting a large number of sites based on some blacklists they maintain or
reference to, the distinctive divide on the attention for the goodness and badness
of sites does highlight the role of the casual contributors.
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The ﬁnding is consistent when we look at the ratio of positive versus negative
comments that have been given by the casual and serious contributors respectively.
As shown in Figure C.2 (left), the casual contributors (u0) are indeed more inclined
to comment about the good aspects of a site, diﬀerent from the serious contributors
(u5) who have produced much more negative comments versus the positive ones.
Next, we quantify the roles of serious and casual contributors in covering for sites
of speciﬁc nature in Table C.3. Speciﬁcally, we measure the loss of coverage should
a particular contributor is absent in the community. Most notable is that, without
the inputs from the highly active contributors (u4 and u5), 92.77% of the 473,273
potentially bad sites would have gone undetected. Meanwhile, the loss of coverage
for potentially bad sites should u0 and u1 are absent is 2.55%.
While it may appear that the casual contributors provide little value to web secu-
rity, we argue the reverse is true as they enable a system like WOT to signal against
sites that are good from those that have not been evaluated. Indeed, without the
less active contributors (u0 and u1), 50.1% of potentially good domains (i.e., those
that have received at least a positive comment in the our dataset) would have been
given an ‘unknown’ status. This is important, as attackers tend to leverage on
a large volume of bad sites to thin the defenders’ resources. Given an adequate
coverage of good sites, users who are conservative on web security can regard sites
with an unknown status as potentially questionable.
C.5.2.2. Attention Divide for Popular Sites and The Long Tail
Among sites that have been attended to by more than one contributors, we ﬁnd that
4.91% of these sites were in fact ﬁrst discovered (ﬁrst commented) by a member of
either u0 or u1. This is close to the 4.69% loss of coverage on all kinds of sites (as
shown in Table C.3) should we ignore the inputs from u0 and u1 contributors. The
corresponding ﬁgures considering the u0 contributors only are 1.98% and 2.16%.
Note that however the above ﬁgures are computed based on the total number of
sites covered in DS-Comment, which contains a disproportionately large share of
bad sites (93%) typically found in the long tail of the web popularity. The value of
the casual contributors will be larger should we consider only sites that are more
relevant for daily browsing. Not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that only 3.4% of the sites
evaluated by the u5’s comments appear on Alexa’s list of top million most visited
sites. On the other hand, 51.9% of the sites attended to by u0 are among the
top million most visited sites. The corresponding ﬁgure is 29.6% for u1 and 4.3%
for u4 respectively. Considering only those that appear on Alexa’s list, the mean
traﬃc ranking of sites attended to by u0 is lower than that of attended to by u5
(p<.01). The mean traﬃc ranking comparing u0+u1 to u4+u5 is also signiﬁcantly
lower (p<.01).
While serious contributors identify most of the bad sites in the long tail of web
popularity, we note that the coverage for the more popular sites by the casual con-
tributors is equally important. Following our earlier argument, coverage for known
sites would allow the users to be correctly cautious about unrated or unknown
websites. Evaluations for the more frequently visited sites are also of a higher rele-
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Figure C.3.: Distribution of comments per site considering all contributors (× mark-
ers) and each contributor group separately (black/color lines).
vance and can thus be of a higher value. There is however a potential pitfall. Sites
from well-known vendors should not be unnecessarily occupying the attention of
the contributors. We look into the issue of eﬃciency and redundancy in the next
section.
C.5.3. Coordination: Redundancy versus Eﬃciency
Figure C.3 plots the distribution of comments per site considering all contributors
together (depicted by the × markers), and considering the individual contributor
groups separately (depicted by the black and color lines). An interesting observation
is the heavy tail of the overall distribution of comments. This is largely due to the
highly redundant coverage given by the less active contributors (u0 and u1). Notice
that both the u0 and u1 lines exhibit also a long tail. In particular, a number
of sites have received tens of comments from u0 alone. The redundancy is much
larger in practice given that our dataset represents only a 5% sample of all available
comments.
While a certain degree of redundancy is needed to ensure a reliable assessment
outcome (the law of large number), excessive redundancy indicates ineﬃciency. It
may be reasonable to expect controversial sites to receive more attention than the
others. We examine the cases where u0 contributors have given more than one
comments to a site, and measure the controversy of a site as 1 − |ni − pi|/(ni + pi)
with ni and pi denoting the number of negative and positive comments given to site
i respectively. However, we ﬁnd only a low correlation (r=0.08, p<.01) between
the number of comments of a site and its level of controversy. Indeed, the top
most commented sites by u0 (and their controversy level) include WOT’s own
website, mywot.com (0.17) and other well-known sites such as google.com (0.38),
facebook.com (0.95), youtube.com (0.66) and mail.google.com (0.10). This suggests
the potential to coordinate the casual contributors for a higher eﬃciency.
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Among sites identiﬁed as bad Among sites identiﬁed as good
Cntr. by WOT by WOT & SA by WOT by WOT & SA
grp. # c (–) # c (+) # c (–) # c (+) # c (–) # c (+) # c (–) # c (+)
u0 30 34 1 1 15 50 15 48
u1 99 7 34 - 11 28 11 28
u2 32 4 7 - 8 27 7 27
u3 107 3 20 - 3 18 3 15
u4 698 1 326 1 1 20 1 16
u5 3,826 4 1,232 - 9 41 7 38
Table C.4.: Error rate of diﬀerent contributor groups in assessing bad and good
sites comparing the number of positive (+) and negative (–) comments to (i) the
sole assessments by WOT, and (ii) the common assessment outcomes (bad/good)
of WOT and SiteAdvisor (SA). Texts in red denote the counts of false-negative or
false-positive cases accordingly.
Contr. % comments mean comment
group with web link length (# char)
u0 3.10 91
u1 8.07 118
u2 10.07 76
u3 26.56 99
u4 64.29 108
u5 49.38 138
Table C.5.: Percentage of comments containing a web link, and average comment
length (in terms of the number of characters) excluding comments containing non-
Latin characters.
The distributions of comments given by u4 and u5 seem to follow a diﬀerent
trend. A large number of sites evaluated by the serious contributors (u5) have
actually received only one or two comments (in DS-Comment). While it may appear
that there is an implicit coordination, we ﬁnd that the three most common issues
(spam, phishing and malicious sites) are actually attended to by 27 out of the 30
serious contributors. 15 of them have used the blacklists on malwaredomains.com
for malicious sites, while 14 have referred to joewein.net for spamming activities.
While further investigation is necessary, there may be also some room to better
coordinate the volunteering eﬀorts by the serious contributors.
C.5.4. Reliability and Veriﬁability
Thus far, we have studied various characteristics of the comments given by diﬀer-
ent contributor groups but we have yet to consider the reliability of their inputs.
We would expect some of the comments (and ratings) to be invalid due to er-
rors or potentially gaming behaviors. To evaluate the validity of the individual
inputs, we ﬁrst work out the true risk status of diﬀerent sites using the dataset DS-
Reliability, which contains the assessment outcomes by WOT, SiteAdvisor (SA)
and Safe Web (SW) on 5,000 sites randomly selected from DS-Comment. This is
98
C.5. Analysis / Results
however not a straight forward task; the assessment outcomes of diﬀerent services
are known to be disagreeing with each other [11]. We map the assessment outcomes
of SA (Green, Yellow, Red, Gray) and SW (Safe or VerisignTrusted, Caution, Warn-
ing, Untested) to the default risk signals of WOT (Green: good, Yellow: caution,
Red: bad, Gray: unknown). We ﬁnd that, among the 302 good sites identiﬁed by
WOT, a majority of them receive the same verdict from SA and SW respectively.
However, out of the 4544 sites identiﬁed as bad by WOT, 1230 are co-identiﬁed as
bad by SA while only 47 sites are warned by SW. The large discrepancy between
SW and WOT can be attributed to the extremely low coverage of SW (29%) on the
5000 sites in our test sample. This leads us to ignore the assessments from SW in
the subsequent analysis. On the other hand, SA (with a coverage of 78%) has come
short in evaluating sites with an IP address and those hosted on shared domain
or free hosting services. Another factor contributing to the discrepancy between
SA and WOT is the larger evaluation scope of WOT. For example, SA does not
evaluate the vendor reliability aspect as WOT does. For these reasons, to study
the reliability of diﬀerent contributor groups, we approximate the true risk status
of sites based on (i) the aggregate assessment outcomes by WOT alone, (ii) the
common outcomes of WOT and SA.
C.5.4.1. Reliability in Evaluating Good and Bad Sites
Table C.4 shows the number of positive and negative comments given by diﬀerent
contributor groups that match the assessments by WOT alone, and that match the
common verdicts by WOT and SA. Note that we have excluded comments with the
‘Adult content’, ‘Child friendly’, ‘Hateful, violent or illegal content’, ‘Ethical issues’
and ‘Entertaining’ categories given that both SA and the default risk signaling
strategy of WOT do not evaluate content appropriateness or fun level.
There are several interesting ﬁndings here. First, notice that among sites that
have been co-identiﬁed as bad by WOT and SA, there are only two positive com-
ments wrongly made for these sites (see Table C.4, 5th column). A similar trend
can be observed for sites that have been identiﬁed as bad by WOT (a superset
of the previous case); the ratio of positive comments (error rate) is small except
for the case of u0 (see Table C.4, column 2-3). Here, the casual contributors (u0)
could be misinformed about the badness of the sites or attempting to game the
aggregate outcomes. Either way, the large error rate suggests the limitation of the
casual contributors as a whole in assessing bad sites reliably. On the other hand,
the reliability of serious contributors in assessing bad sites is applaudable. In fact,
u5 has found many more bad sites than SA.
Next, we look at the reliability of diﬀerent contributor groups in assessing the
good sites. Notice that there is a higher error rate (the ratio of negative to positive
comments) in general. Indeed, labeling a site as good involves a higher level of
subjectivity. Diﬀerent from the objective assessment on whether a site is malicious,
is a phishing site and so on, there is also a lack of well-deﬁned terminologies in
general to measure the good properties of a site. Interestingly, the error rate does
not diﬀer much across diﬀerent contributor groups. To be exact, the diﬀerence in
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the ratios of positive to negative comments given by u0 and u5 is not statistically
signiﬁcant considering sites evaluated as good by WOT (Table C.4, column 6-7)
(Fisher’s exact test, p=0.64), as well as sites co-evaluated as good by both WOT
and SA (column 8-9) (p=0.34). The casual contributors are thus not inferior to
the serious contributors when it comes to evaluating a good site correctly. We look
into the error cases by u5 and ﬁnd that 4 out of 9 false positive comments have
actually been removed from the scorecards of the related sites.
C.5.4.2. Veriﬁability: Reference and Comment Length
Table C.5 shows the percentage of comments that come with at least a URL link.
While it is not always the case, URLs in the user comments often lead to some
speciﬁc resources (e.g., further discussion) or references (e.g., to some online black-
lists) where the contributors have become aware of the evaluated sites. We use
the presence of a URL as an estimator of the veriﬁability of a comment. Notice
that only 3% of the comments given by the casual contributors (u0) contain a
URL. At the same time, only 49% of the comments given by u5 potentially con-
tain a reference URL, typically pointing to a blacklist provided by, for example,
joewein.net, cert.at, uribl.com, atma.es, malwareurl.com, spamtrackers.eu
and malwaredomains.com. Also given in Table C.5 is the mean length of comments
provided by diﬀerent contributor groups, excluding comments containing some non-
Latin characters. The mean comment length increases going from casual to serious
contributors; however, the increment is not statistically signiﬁcant. These ﬁndings
do signal the need of actions from WOT to improve the veriﬁability of user inputs.
We outline some potential pitfalls and suggestions in the following.
C.6. Discussion
C.6.1. Complementary Roles in Web Security
An important lesson learnt from our study is the complementary roles of casual and
serious contributors for community-based web security. Contrary to the skepticisms
that security is out of reach for ordinary users given that it is a highly specialized
domain requiring expert knowledge, our work shows that the casual contributors
can be helpful in diﬀerentiating the good and known sites from those that have yet
to be evaluated. Availability of such a ‘whitelist’ is valuable considering the large
number of bad and gray sites created daily. In addition, while serious contributors
may be sharp in evaluating the badness of a site (given the access to some reliable
blacklists and expert knowledge on malicious activities on the web), their judgment
on good sites (subjective) is not signiﬁcantly better than the less active contributors.
C.6.2. Applicability to Other Contexts
The complementary roles we ﬁnd in this paper are probably unique to web security
where conventional approaches are being overloaded with a large number of new
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sites, and where there is a need for subjective judgment (where personal experience
matters) and objective evaluation (where expert knowledge is required) on diﬀerent
aspects of sites. While the exact complementarily may not apply to other collab-
orative systems directly, the ﬁnding that diﬀerent members play diﬀerent roles
and exhibit diﬀerent potentials should be capitalized by community-based systems
across diﬀerent domains. Leveraging on the diﬀerent roles and natures of tasks, we
outline several design implications relevant to WOT and community-based systems
more generally in the following.
C.6.3. Design Implications
C.6.3.1. Context based Reliability
The ability to gauge and make use of the reliability of a contributor is an important
building block to many community-based systems. WOT currently weighs the user
inputs diﬀerently based on the reliability of individual contributors when computing
the aggregate outcomes. This provides an incentive for the community members to
contribute responsibly. Nevertheless, the actual formula used is hidden (arguably
to mitigate potential gaming behaviors). Our ﬁndings that diﬀerent contributor
types attend to sites of diﬀerent natures and realize diﬀerent levels of reliability
in evaluating bad and good sites, raise several important issues in designing the
reliability weighting mechanism. First, should the weighting be computed at per
contributor or per contributor-and-site-category level? We argue that the latter
would be more appropriate. Speciﬁc to WOT, a serious contributor who has been
consistently giving reliable evaluations on potentially malicious sites should not be
automatically given a heavy weight when, for example, evaluating the goodness or
content appropriateness of a site. Another issue lies with the subjective evaluation
aspects that WOT and many other reputation systems actually deal with. Does
the reliability weighting punish those who may have a diﬀerent expectation and
opinion than the majority on a subjective aspect? This is a tricky matter which
further highlights the need to acknowledge the diﬀerences across multiple evaluation
aspects: subjective or objective, requiring expert knowledge or not, and so on.
C.6.3.2. Veriﬁability of Objective and Subjective Evaluation
A way to increase the reliability of a community-based system is probably by im-
proving the veriﬁability of user contributions. WOT details on the use of inputs
from third party sources (if any) on the scorecard of each evaluated site, but the
community inputs seem to be lacking in veriﬁability currently. WOT requires the
users of the mass rating tool (the highly active members) to include a comment
describing the reasons of their ratings and to be always contactable on mywot.com.
However, our analysis shows that only 49% of the comments provided by the seri-
ous contributors do potentially contain a reference URL. The percentage is much
lower among the comments given by the casual contributors. These suggest a lack
of veriﬁability that could aﬀect user conﬁdence in the long run. We suggest putting
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in place a referencing system for objective evaluation (e.g., on whether a site is
malicious) and a more structured process when eliciting subjective evaluation. For
example, requiring the mass rating tool users to always include the supporting ref-
erence will help especially in the cases of false positives. This will also restrict the
tool from being wrongly used on aspects that are subjective and objectionable in
nature. On the other hand, casual contributors who we ﬁnd to be more likely to
attend to subjective aspects such as the goodness of a site, should be guided to
detail on their personal experience in a more structured manner. This can include
indicating if they are aﬃliated with the site, how frequently they visit it, how does
it matches a list of keywords, and so forth. The use of a referencing system and a
structured way of eliciting subjective inputs are not new. However, diﬀerent from
the Wikipedia and many other systems that deal with either objective or subjective
contributions solely, WOT exempliﬁes the case where both methods will be needed
at the same time to cater for a mix of objective and subjective evaluations.
C.6.3.3. Role based Coordination and Socialization
Reliability issues aside, under-provisioning is perhaps the most challenging problem
in community-based systems. Our study yields interesting insights on how we can
better coordinate and socialize the contributors depending on the roles they play
in the community. Currently, WOT does allow the site owners to reach out to the
community members and call for their assessments. We note that it could be inter-
esting to automatically distribute these requests to selected highly active members
with the necessary skill sets and experience, similar to SuggestBot presented in [13].
WOT can also consider introducing a more explicit community structure (e.g., es-
tablishing sub-communities that would specialize on certain objective aspects e.g.,
privacy and malicious contents) such that a core team of contributors could help to
set directions and guide the new contributors (as proposed for Wikipedia in [18]).
On the other hand, the heavy tailed attention distribution among the less active
contributors (as shown in Figure C.3) hints on the possibility of coordinating the
ordinary members to increase productivity. While there may be a privacy issue,
WOT could innovate on an opt-in feature that would automatically suggest to the
casual contributors to rate the unevaluated sites that they have been visiting. Gen-
erally, these should be done with care as certain socialization tactics may adversely
turn away the contributors [12]. All in all, coordination and socialization eﬀorts
should be done with a good understanding on the diﬀerent roles and potentials of
diﬀerent contributors.
C.7. Conclusions
We have found the interesting complementary roles of serious and casual contribu-
tors in Web of Trust (WOT). Serious contributors play an important role in report-
ing most of the malicious sites while casual contributors provide a large percentage
of attention to the goodness of sites. Although the casual contributors do not eval-
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uate malicious sites extensively and reliably, their evaluations on the good sites
are valuable as they enable WOT to diﬀerentiate the good and known sites from
those that have yet to be evaluated accordingly. This helps to steer users away
from the numerous bad sites created daily. In addition, while serious contributors
give reliable evaluations on bad sites, their evaluations on good websites are not
signiﬁcantly more reliable than the casual contributors. While the complementar-
ity we ﬁnd in this paper may be speciﬁc to web security, the ﬁnding that diﬀerent
community members contribute in diﬀerent roles and exhibit diﬀerent potentials
in diﬀerent tasks should be better capitalized by community-based systems across
diﬀerent domains.
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Abstract
Apart from mechanisms to make crowd-sourcing secure, the reliability of a collabo-
rative system is dependent on the economic incentives of its potential contributors.
We study several factors related to the incentives in a community-based security
system, including the expectation on the social inﬂuence and the contagion eﬀect of
generosity. We also investigate the eﬀects of organizing community members diﬀer-
ently in a complete, random and scale-free structure. Our simulation results show
that, without considering any speciﬁc incentive schemes, it is not easy to encourage
user contribution in a complete-graph community structure (global systems). On
the other hand, a moderate level of cooperative behavior can be cultivated when
the community members are organized in the random or scale-free structure (social
networks).
D. Incentives in Community-based Security
D.1. Introduction
Despite the popularity of reputation and recommender systems, relying on com-
munity eﬀort for security purposes is still a new concept to many. PhishTank [1]
and Web Of Trust (WOT) [2] are two of the few systems that employ user inputs
to improve web security. PhishTank relies on user reporting and voting against
suspected phishes, while WOT collates user ratings on several trust and security
aspects of websites. Researchers have looked at the reliability of Community-based
Security Systems (CSS). Moore and Clayton [18] argued that as participation in
PhishTank follows a power-law distribution, its outputs are particularly susceptible
to manipulation by the few highly active contributors.
Indeed, besides system design to prevent manipulation by dishonest users or
attackers, the reliability of a CSS is highly dependent on the incentives of its po-
tential contributors. When many users contribute actively, diverse user inputs serve
to cancel out the errors made by individuals and scrutinize against manipulative at-
tempts. On the other hand, when many users do not contribute, the outcomes can
be biased towards the judgment of a few, or be manipulated easily. In the reverse
manner of the tragedy of the commons [14] which depicts the situation whereby
individuals consume the common resource irresponsibly, motivating active partici-
pation in a CSS is a problem of public goods provisioning such that individuals face
a cost that discourages them from contributing to the common protection.
In this work, we look at several factors related to the incentives in a CSS. We
adapt the normalized total-eﬀort security game in [12, 13] to depict the scenario
of collaborative security protection, but our model takes into account of the long
term user consideration using the framework of inﬁnitely repeated games. We ﬁrst
describe the basic model in Section D.2 and extend it with the expectation on social
inﬂuence in Section D.3. We study the eﬀects of user dynamics and a possible
contagion eﬀect of generosity in Section D.4. We ﬁnd that it is easier to encourage
a moderate level of user contribution in a random or scale-free community structure
than in the complete-graph structure of global systems in Section D.5.
D.2. Basic Model & Analysis
Imagine a community-based system that collates evaluation reports from its mem-
bers on some trust or security aspects of websites. Inputs from all members are
important as they serve to diversify the inputs and cancel out errors made by indi-
viduals, in addition to enabling a level of scrutiny on each other’s inputs. Without
a suﬃcient level of contribution, a CSS will be deemed unreliable and abandoned
by its members. An equally undesired scenario arises when there is a highly skewed
participation ratio such that the system can be completely undermined when the
few highly active users become corrupted or stop participating [18].
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D.2.1. An Inﬁnitely Repeated Total-eﬀort Security Game
We use a n-player repeated game to model a CSS consisting of N rational members.
We ﬁrst consider a complete-graph community structure, as in global systems like
PhishTank and WOT, where the N = n members collaborates at all time (round)
t for common protection. Each game round evaluates a diﬀerent website (target).
We assume that all members value the beneﬁt of protection b equally and have
the same cost of contribution c. Assuming also that the inputs from all members are
equally important, we formulate the homogenous utility Ui,t received by member
i at game round t to be linearly dependent on the ratio of contribution by the
n collaborating members, following the notion of normalized total-eﬀort security
in [12, 13], as follows:
Ui,t =
∑
j aj,t
n
b − cai,t (D.1)
with ai,t denoting the binary action of either {1: contribute, 0: do not contribute}
by member i at game round t.
When all members contribute, each of them receives a utility of b − c. If no
one but only member i contributes, his utility is b/n − c. Assume b > c > b/n
such that contributing to a CSS is the case of n-person prisoner’s dilemma. We
further assume an inﬁnitely repeated game to depict the expectation by individual
members that the system will evaluate inﬁnitely many websites and exist until an
unforeseen future. If the system is known to last only for a ﬁnite amount of time,
not-contributing at all game rounds will be the (sub-game perfect) equilibrium
strategy.
We consider that individual members rank their inﬁnite payoﬀ stream using the
δ-discounted average criterion. The discount factor δi characterizes how a player
weighs his payoﬀ in the current round compared to future payoﬀs. In the context
of this paper, it can be interpreted as how a member perceives the long term
importance of common protection and his relationship with the n − 1 interacting
peers. We assume that δi is heterogeneous. A short-sighted member has δi ≈ 0,
while a player who values the long-term beneﬁt of the CSS system or who cares
about the long-term relationship with other members, has δi ≈ 1. Let 0 ≤ δi < 1,
the δ-discounted average payoﬀ of member i is given by:
(1 − δi)
∞∑
t=1
(δi)t−1Ut (D.2)
Analyzing the equilibrium behaviors of the n > 2 community members is more
complicated that a 2-player repeated game. A trivial setting is when all members
are assumed to employ a n-player ‘grim trigger’ strategy which considers each
member to be contributing initially, but threatens to stop contributing forever if he
realizes that any of his n peers has not contributed in the previous round. Given
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this largest threat of punishment, an equilibrium whereby all members will always
contribute can be achieved, if ∀i:
δi >
cn − b
bn − b (D.3)
A simple relationship between the cost c and beneﬁt b can now be established. If
c is close to b, the required δi approaches 1 as n increases. This reﬂects the real-life
scenario that user inputs are hard to obtain if the contribution cost is large relative
to the beneﬁt of protection.
A challenge in a repeated n-player game is that one cannot identify and punish
those who have not contributed without a centralized monitoring mechanism, which
can be expensive to build or threaten the anonymity of contributors. A player can
only work out the contribution ratio of the others in the previous round rt−1 based
on the payoﬀ he receives. The n-player ‘grim trigger’ strategy ineﬃciently punishes
everyone, making it to be an unrealistic strategy.
D.3. The Expectation on Social Inﬂuence
Rather than using the ‘grim trigger’ strategy, we adapt an idea from [11] such
that the community members reason for their respective choice of action, not only
depending on the past but also on their expectation as to how their actions can
inﬂuence the choice of others in the subsequent rounds. We construct two simple
inﬂuence rules, as follows:
Linear inﬂuence. A player believes that his contribution will have a positive
inﬂuence on his peers and increase their contribution ratio by γ in the subsequent
game rounds. Similarly, he expects that their contribution ratio will drop by −γ if
he does not contribute. The rule can be written as:
rˆγ = min(max(rt−1 + γ, 0), 1) (D.4)
Sigmoid inﬂuence. Same as linear inﬂuence. However, the contribution ratio in
the subsequent rounds is updated following a sigmoid curve. Speciﬁcally, a player
reasons that his action will have a reduced inﬂuence on others when the current
contribution level is close to the extremes, 0 or 1:
rˆγ =
1
1 + ew(rt−1+γ− 12 )
(D.5)
With the above expectation, a member i will contribute at time t, if:
Vc(rt−1) − Vn(rt−1) + δi1 − δi [Vc(rˆγ) − Vn(rˆ−γ)] > 0 (D.6)
with Vc and Vn denoting the utilities of contributing and not-contributing respec-
tively, based on the last observed contribution level rt−1 and the expected future
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contribution ratio rˆ. This assumes that a member believes that if he is to con-
tribute now, since his action will cause a positive inﬂuence on the others, he will be
better oﬀ to contribute also in the future. The same reasoning applies for the case
of not-contributing. These simple rules (D.4), (D.5) and (D.6) model the bounded
rationality of users. Indeed, it is non-trivial to reason for the best-responses in an
interconnected structure. Each member is not aware of the discounting factor of
others. One also may not know about his peers’ peers and how they perform in
their respective games.
D.3.1. Simulation Results
We consider several levels of expectation on how much an action can inﬂuence of
the action of others, as shown in Table D.1. Note that ±γ depicts the expectation
that contributing/not has a positive/negative inﬂuence on peers’ contribution ratio.
The appendix s denotes the use of sigmoid inﬂuence rule. Each expectation level is
simulated 50 times for computing the mean payoﬀ. In each simulation run, every
member is assigned a new discounting factor drawn uniformly between a minimum
value δmin and 1.
Figure D.1 shows the simulation results. With γ = −1.0, which is the equivalent
of the ‘grim trigger’ strategy, full contribution to give the maximum payoﬀ of b−c =
1 is a stable outcome when all members have a discounting factor higher than a
moderate threshold ≈ 0.5. This is shown by the dotdashed line in Figure D.1.
However, as aforementioned, the ‘grim-trigger’ strategy is not realistic in practice.
With γ = −0.5, that is when the members expect that non-contribution will
inﬂuence half of his peers to also stop contributing, a fully cooperative equilibrium
can only be achieved if all members place a large weight on the beneﬁt of long
term protection, as shown by the dotted line in Figure D.1. As the community
members expect that their respective action will have reduced inﬂuence on others’
motivation (e.g., γ = ±0.33s, ±0.25), we ﬁnd that the average payoﬀ U remains at
zero even as δmin approaches 1. In other words, no community members contribute
in equilibrium.
The above has several implications. First, the results show that, without the help
of any incentive schemes, the level of user contribution for a CSS can be expected
to be very low. Centralized mechanisms such as monitoring, reputation and micro-
payment may help to encourage contribution, but there can be challenges (including
cost and anonymity concerns) in implementing them in practice. The results also
highlight the role of education to cultivate a sense of social responsibility (i.e., to
increase the users’ perception of γ) and to inform about the long-term importance
and beneﬁt of collaborative security (i.e., to increase the δi of users). This is also
challenging as it is well-known that ordinary users do not regard security as their
primary concern [8].
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Table D.1.: Simulating Users’ Expectation on Social Inﬂuence
Var. Description Value(s)
N Total community members 100
c Contribution cost 1
b Beneﬁt of full protection 2
w Steepness of the sigmoid function 10
γ Expected social inﬂuence on ±0.25, ±0.33s,
the contribution ratio of peers −0.50, −1.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Gmin
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0.8
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C J:0.25
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C J:0.5
C J:1.0
Figure D.1.: Mean payoﬀ in a Complete-graph (C) community structure
D.4. The Eﬀects of User Dynamics & Generosity
We investigate if a cooperative spirit can be cultivated given the presence of a
small fraction of members θ ≥ 0 who would contribute to the common protection
unconditionally. These ‘nice’ users can be thought as those who are extremely
generous in real life, or those who have been employed to ensure a minimal level of
contribution in the system.
We also factor in a simple user dynamics in the CSS. In each game round, a
fraction m ≥ 0 of under-performing users (i.e. those with average payoﬀs ≤ 0 and
who have been through a minimum number of transient rounds τ) are programmed
to leave. When a user leaves, we assume that another user joins and connects with
the remaining members. This models the real life scenario where frustrated users
leave, while new users join the community continuously.
D.4.1. Simulation Results
Table D.2 summarizes the variables and values used in our simulation to study
the eﬀect of community dynamics and ‘nice’ users. As before, each scenario is
repeated with 50 simulation runs for computing the mean value. Without user
dynamics, as in Section D.2, we observe that the contribution ratio and average
payoﬀ settle quickly after several game rounds. With user dynamics, these values
ﬂuctuate, but only slightly as one member may leave (while another joins) per game
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Table D.2.: Simulating Community Dynamics and Nice Users
Var. Description Value(s)
θ Fraction of nice users per game round 0.04, 0.08
m Fraction of user leaving and joining per round 0.01
τ Transient rounds before user dynamics 5
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Gmin
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Figure D.2.: Mean payoﬀ in a Complete-graph (C) community structure, with a
fraction of ‘nice’ users θ = 0.04 and dynamics of m = 0.01.
round. Considering this, in each simulation run, we measure the average payoﬀ of
all community members only after t = 250 game rounds.
Figure D.2 plots the average payoﬀ of the community members when a small
fraction of ‘nice’ users (θ = 0.04) and dynamics (m = 0.01) are considered. In
every game round, the worst performing member is programmed to leave, while
4 members are randomly selected to contribute unconditionally. As shown in the
ﬁgure, the presence of 4 ‘nice’ members does help to increase the contribution level
(average payoﬀ) slightly from zero as seen in Figure D.1, to about 0.15 in Figure
D.2. This shows the role played by generous members or those who have been
employed, in encouraging the others to contribute.
However, notice that other than the case with γ = −0.5, the average payoﬀ is
ﬂat even as the minimum discounting factor δmin approaches 1. This hints on the
limited impact of the ‘nice’ users in a global system (complete-graph community
structure) after all. It also highlights the risk of over-reliance on a small group of
‘nice’ users, causing a highly disproportionate contribution ratio in the system. A
highly skewed contribution pattern can harm the Byzantine fault tolerance that
community-based systems sought for, making it susceptible to manipulation by the
few highly active users [18].
D.5. The Eﬀects of Community Structure
Thus far, we have studied only the complete-graph community structure, used in
global systems such as PhishTank and WOT. We consider two other structures,
mimicking the topology of social networks, in the following.
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Random (R). First, we consider a random network which connects any two mem-
bers with a probability p. To ensure that all members will engage in a multi-player
game, we require each user to have a degree k ≥ ψ initially. To build a random
network, we ﬁrst instantiate N members in the system. Then, for each member,
we randomly assign ψ peers selected from the N − 1 candidates with a uniform
probability. In every round of the repeated game, a member will play an n-person
game with his k peers, where n = k + 1. Note that a peer to this member will,
on the other hand, play a n′-person game, where n′ = k′ + 1, with her own peers,
including this member.
Scale-free (S). We also study a scale-free community structure. Many real-life
networks such as protein interactions, interlinked web pages and citation patterns,
have been shown to exhibit the scale-free property [6, 5] where the probability of
a vertex having a degree k follows a power law distribution: P (k) ∼ k−λ. Two
important processes for a scale-free network are growth and preferential selection.
Same as the random network, we require also each member to have at least a degree
k ≥ ψ initially. We build up a scale-free network by ﬁrst initializing ψ+1 users that
are fully connected. Then, for every subsequent member that newly arrives in the
community, we connect him to ψ peers, with each candidate j being selected with
a probability equals the candidate’s degree over the sum of degree of all existing
members, P (selectj) = kj/Σk. Like in the case of random network, in every game
round, each member i plays a ni-person game with their respective peers, where
ni = ki + 1.
Note that all members remain interconnected in the scale-free and random net-
works. Both structures can be used to model a ‘personalized’ system whereby
individual members interact only with peers in their personalized community. An
example of a ‘personalized’ system for security is NetTrust [7] which advocates
the use of ratings from personalized sources to provide reliable risk signals against
suspicious websites to individual users.
D.5.1. Simulation Results
As before, each simulation scenario is repeated with 50 runs to compute the mean
value. In each simulation run, the community structures are reconstructed and
we measure the average payoﬀ of all members only after t = 250 game rounds.
Simulation values in Table D.1 and D.2 are used. In every game round, the 4
most connected members (i.e., who have the highest degree k) are selected to be
‘nice’. User dynamics is also considered as before. The worst performing user is
programmed to leave while a new user joins the community and establishes links
with other members, following the characteristics of random or scale-free network.
The upper left and right of Figure D.3 plot the average payoﬀ of players in the
Random (R) and Scale-free (S) networks respectively. We see that the average
payoﬀ in the Random (R) and Scale-free (S) networks increases to about 0.6 and
0.4 when players believe that their actions can have a positive/negative inﬂuence
of ±0.25 and ±0.33 respectively. This is a signiﬁcant improvement compared to
the case in a Complete-graph (C) network (as shown in Figure D.2). Being ‘nice’
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Figure D.3.: Mean payoﬀ when considering the Random (R) and Scale-free (S)
community structures. Note that the level of user dynamics is m = 0.01 while the
fraction of ‘nice’ users is θ = 0.04. ψ denotes the minimum number of peers of each
community member at the start of each simulation run.
in the scale-free and random networks seems to have a contagious eﬀect as δmin
increases. A moderate level of cooperative behavior can emerge in a random or
scale-free network, rather than in the conventional complete-graph structure. The
results for the random and scale-free networks seem similar most likely due to the
limited structural variation given a relatively small N = 100.
When δmin is low or moderate, the presence of ‘nice’ users help to ensure a
minimum level of contribution in the system. Suppose that users adjust their
perception on the importance and beneﬁt of collaborative security (i.e., their δi)
based on their initial payoﬀ, the presence of some ‘nice’ users in the early phase of
the system will thus be crucial.
The bottom left and right of Figure D.3 show the average payoﬀ when each player
is connected to at least 8 peers (k ≥ ψ = 8) at the start of simulation, in the random
(R8) and scale-free (S8) structures respectively. We observe a maximum number
of 30 peers in R8, and 64 in S8. Compared to the performance when ψ = 4, the
graphs are steeper but still converge to a moderate level of average payoﬀ, when
using the linear ±0.25 and sigmoid ±0.33 inﬂuence rules. The condition for a
moderate level of contribution is harder but remains achievable in the scale-free
and random networks, as the minimum number of peers increases.
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D.6. Related Work & Discussion
Based on the initial work by Hirshleifer [15], Varian studied the problem of free-
riding and system reliability of three diﬀerent security games: total-eﬀort, best-
shot and weakest-link [24]. Grossklags et.al. extended the models to include the
possibility to self-insure, and studied several interesting aspects such as the eﬀects of
information asymmetry between na¨ıve users and security experts [12, 13]. Among
other ﬁndings, the problem of under provisioning was shown to worsen as the
number of players increases. This is an unfavorable ﬁnding for collaborative security
systems in general; however, the aforementioned works have not factored in the
players’ long-term consideration. We reason that a CSS can be modeled using an
inﬁnitely repeated game, and the value of common protection being determined by
the normalized sum of eﬀort given by individual members and their peers.
Kandori showed that cooperative behaviors can be sustainable when players place
suﬃcient weights on future payoﬀs through [16] in which players were repeatedly
matched into pairs to play the classical 2-player prisoner’s dilemma. In the P2P
domain, Feldman et.al. proposed a reciprocative decision function along with a
set of mechanisms (e.g., discriminatory server selection, maxﬂow-based subjective
reputation and adaptive stranger policy) to mitigate the problems of free-riding
and white-washing [9]. An insightful analytical model was also devised [10]. Yet,
these ﬁndings cannot be directly generalized for a community-based system where
there are n > 2 players interacting simultaneously. One cannot pin-point the non-
contributors in the multi-player game so to play a reciprocal strategy, such as the
well known Tit-For-Tat [4]. The threat of punishment on free-riders is diﬀused due
to the implicit anonymity in a multi-player game [17].
There is a wealth of literature that studied cooperative behaviors in biological
systems using the evolutionary game. Pioneered by [19], researchers started to look
at the eﬀects of spatial structures on the evolution of cooperation. A cooperative
behavior was found to be the dominant trait in a scale-free network [22]. Ohtsuki
et.al. [20] later showed that a cooperative action is preferred in various structures
(circle, lattice, random, regular and scale-free graphs) whenever the beneﬁt divided
by the cost of contribution is greater than the average degree of individual members,
i.e., b/c > k. However, these studies were also conducted using the classical 2-player
prisoner’s dilemma. Speciﬁcally, we note that the dilemma for contributing to the
common protection in a n-player setting diminishes if b/c > n, since every member
will strictly prefer to contribute or cooperate.
A few studies have looked at iterated multi-player games. Seo et.al. [23] analyzed
the impact of a local opponent-pool from where a ﬁxed amount of players (n =
4, 8, 16) were selected to play the n-player prisoner’s dilemma, in every iteration
of the population evolution. They found that the smaller the local opponent-
pool size, the easier it was for cooperation to emerge. Rezaei et.al. [21] studied
the co-evolution of cooperation and network structure using the iterated n-player
prisoner’s dilemma with 2 ≤ n ≤ 10. Our work is diﬀerent from theirs in two
ways. First, we use the framework of a repeated game with discounted future
payoﬀs (similar to in [3] which models the dishonest behavior of multi-cast agents
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in network overlays) instead of an evolutionary game. Second, we do not ﬁx the
number of players; each player engages in each game round with all his peers.
The number of peers per individual members varies depending on the underlying
community structure.
D.7. Concluding Remarks
Starting with a complete-graph which depicts the community structure of global
systems such as PhishTank and WOT, our analysis show that, without any in-
centive schemes, the level of user contribution can be expected to be very low.
Education may help to inform about the importance of common protection and to
cultivate a sense of social responsibility; however, this is challenging as users do
not perceive security as their primary concern. The presence of generous users in
a complete-graph community only helps in a very limited way to encourage contri-
bution. Meanwhile, over-reliance on a small group of generous users may result in
highly skewed contribution pattern, increasing the risk of manipulation.
Yet, this should not shun the idea of a community-based security system im-
mediately. Our analysis has not factored in potential incentive schemes such as
reputation, micro-payment and punishment mechanisms that have been proposed
in the ﬁeld of P2P networks. In addition, our simulation results show that it is
possible to encourage a moderate level of cooperative behavior in the random and
scale-free community structures. Designing a robust incentive scheme and a reli-
able aggregation strategy to collate user inputs from social networks for security
purposes remains as an interesting research area.
Future work. Our current analysis can be extended in several directions. First,
we note that it may be interesting to model a community-based security system as a
‘best-k-eﬀort’ game (adapting from the best-shot game in [12, 13, 15, 24]), if it would
suﬃce to have k out of n inputs from the community members for full protection.
It would be also interesting to consider an endogenous discounting-factor such that
individuals update their perception towards the long term importance the common
protection, based on the payoﬀ stream they receive. Extension work to consider
heterogeneous contribution cost and protection beneﬁt may also yield interesting
insights.
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Abstract
The problem of identifying inappropriate software is a daunting one for ordinary
users. The two currently prevalent methods are intrinsically centralized: certiﬁ-
cation of “good” software by platform vendors and ﬂagging of “bad” software by
antivirus vendors or other global entities. However, because appropriateness has
cultural and social dimensions, centralized means of signaling appropriateness is
ineﬀective and can lead to habituation (user clicking-through warnings) or disputes
(users discovering that certiﬁed software is inappropriate).
In this work, we look at the possibility of relying on inputs from personalized com-
munities (consisting of friends and experts whom individual users trust) to avoid
installing inappropriate software. Drawing from theories, we developed a set of de-
sign guidelines for a trustworthy application installation process. We had an initial
validation of the guidelines through an online survey; we veriﬁed the high relevance
of information from a personalized community and found strong user motivation
to protect friends and family members when know of digital risks. We designed
and implemented a prototype system on the Nokia N810 tablet. In addition to
showing risk signals from personalized community prominently, our prototype in-
staller deters unsafe actions by slowing the user down with habituation-breaking
mechanisms. We conducted also a hands-on evaluation and veriﬁed the strength of
opinion communicated through friends over opinion by online community members.
E. Trustworthy App Installation
E.1. Introduction
The versatility of mobile devices paves the way for a large array of novel applica-
tions; mobile devices today contain ever more sensitive information such as medical
data, user location and ﬁnancial credentials. As device manufacturers open up the
mobile platforms to encourage third party software development, applications from
diﬀerent sources are becoming available. Some of these applications, although not
malicious, are inappropriate in the sense that they can cause harm (e.g., loss of
privacy) or oﬀense (e.g., culturally or religiously-insensitive content) to some users.
The appropriateness of FlexiSpy – one of several commercial applications intended
to spy on the activities of the user of a mobile phone – has been contentious.
Mobile applications with potentially inappropriate content are becoming publicly
available1.
The bar for developing “applications” is also being lowered drastically. One can
now develop simple applications for mobile devices by using only scripting lan-
guages (e.g., using JavaScript+HTML+CSS for Palm webOS [2]), or even without
much programming experience using online tools (e.g., OviAppWizard [6] and Ap-
pWizard [1]). These applications are unlikely to be malicious (as they don’t do too
much) but we can expect a ﬂood of applications from a larger variety of originators
which increases the chance of a given application oﬀending a certain group of users.
E.1.1. What is Inappropriate Software?
StopBadware.org [8] deﬁnes badware as software that fundamentally disregards a
user’s choice about how his or her computer or network connection will be used.
In addition to software with malicious intent, the deﬁnition covers bad practices,
such as installing additional unexpected software, hiding details from users, and
incomprehensible End User License Agreement (EULA) that hinder an informed
consent. Our understanding of “inappropriate software” is close to this notion of
badware. In addition to maliciousness and disregard of user-choice, we consider
software appropriateness to cover also the cultural and social dimensions.
E.1.2. Software Certiﬁcation and its Limitations
A dominant approach for reducing the risk of malicious software on mobile plat-
forms (e.g., Symbian, BlackBerry, J2ME and Android) is to rely on software certiﬁ-
cation and platform security. Software certiﬁcation (e.g., Java Veriﬁed Program [4]
and Symbian Signed [9]) is usually subject to software testing conducted by an au-
thorized third party using publicly available criteria. But testing typically focuses
only on technical compliance such as proper usage of system resources, proper appli-
cation start/stop behavior and support for complete un-installation. Platform se-
curity (e.g., Symbian OS Platform Security [21] and Java Security Architecture [19]
1A search using the keyword ‘entertainment’ in the iTunes Appstore returns a number of appli-
cations with potentially mature content.
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Figure E.1.: The Skype PC version has a list of ‘featured extras’ that include both
Skype-certiﬁed and non-certiﬁed plugins. The visual diﬀerence when installing the
two types is only the color of certiﬁcation label (light-blue vs. soft-yellow).
refers to the isolation and access control features of the operating system or run-
time. Ideally, software certiﬁcation and platform security are used in tandem: an
application is granted the privileges it requires if it is signed by a party trusted by
the device platform. However, certiﬁcation does not guarantee software security. It
also does not consider the social and cultural aspects of software appropriateness.
Uncertiﬁed software: The Risk of Habituation. Many application in-
stallers (in mobile or desktop environment) resort to displaying warning and dis-
claimer notices to signal risks when software to be installed is not certiﬁed. Visual
diﬀerence when installing certiﬁed and non-certiﬁed software is often low; the text
is also typically uninformative (see Figure E.1). Providing system-generated no-
tiﬁcations to which user attends to maintain security is the practice of “security
by admonition” [33]. Besides degrading user experience, such notices lead to a
high rate of false-positives causing many users to habitually click-through them.
Click-through behavior is further entrenched when warnings equating “uncertiﬁed
software” as possibly “harmful” may contradict other signals a user receives. An
example of this is the installation of Gmail application (Figure E.2, left); the in-
staller warns that it is ‘untrusted’ and ‘maybe harmful’ since it is not certiﬁed. A
user, who trusts Google and who has just downloaded the application from Google’s
website will ignore and click-through the warning.
Certiﬁed software: The Risk of Centralized Judgment. On the other
hand, software certiﬁed by a central authority may be perceived as inappropriate
by some communities. An example of this is FlexiSpy – advertised as a tool to
monitor the work force and protect the children and is available on most mobile
platforms. The application has a number of characteristics that can be construed
inappropriate: it spies on user activities (call, SMS, email, location), is invisible
in the application list, uses a deceptive name (RBackupPro) and allows the device
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Figure E.2.: (Left) Gmail is not certiﬁed. (Right) FlexiSpy is certiﬁed [3].
to be controlled remotely. F-Secure ﬂagged it as spyware that may be used for
malicious purposes illegally [3] but as FlexiSpy fulﬁlls the certiﬁcation criteria, it
is Symbian certiﬁed. In other words, a user is given a warning (Figure E.2, left)
when he tries to install Gmail although he may likely trust it, whereas FlexiSpy
can be installed without warnings (Figure E.2, right) even though he may belong
to the group of people who consider it inappropriate.
On iPhone, Apple decides which third party applications can be distributed
through the iTunes Appstore; we regard this as a scheme of implicit certiﬁcation.
Apple has also the means to activate a “kill-switch” to disable applications that
may have been “inadvertently” distributed and later deemed “inappropriate by Ap-
ple”. Apple’s review criteria are, however, not publicly available. This has resulted
in outcomes that are contested by developers and the Electronic Frontiers Founda-
tion [5]. South Park, Eucalyptus and the Stern.de reader were among applications
that were deemed “inappropriate by Apple” but later approved after protests [5].
Such contentions exemplify that centralized judgment can hardly cater for the value
systems of diﬀerent users.
E.1.3. Our Contribution
• We derived a set of design guidelines, grounded in cognitive and informa-
tion ﬂow theories, for a trustworthy software installation process (Section 2).
Although we focus on mobile devices here in this paper, the guidelines are
applicable to other platforms (e.g., desktop, Facebook) where installation by
end-users can take place.
• We surveyed for the behaviors during installation, and we found high rele-
vance of information from friends/family and user motivation to protect them.
(Section 3)
• We built and evaluated a prototype system (Section 4 & 5). Although we
could not test the eﬃcacy of our prototype against habituation, we veriﬁed
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that opinion by friend is of higher impact than that of by online community
through the user study.
E.2. Designing a Trustworthy Installation Process
We consider that a trustworthy installation process to be one that helps users to
avoid installing inappropriate application. Besides providing risk signals that are
perceived reliable and relevant, the installer should take into account of the risk of
habituation, which undermines the eﬃcacy of many security mechanisms involving
end-users.
E.2.1. Cognition during Application Installation
In the conventional installation task ﬂow, as a user deﬁnes his expectation or desired
software functionality (for a task at hand), he starts by searching for an application
in the application market or on the web that meets his requirements. When such an
application is found (and downloaded), the user will have to perform some “post-
selection” actions such as accepting security-related conditions and conﬁguration
options before he is able to use it (objective attained). These “post-selection”
steps are nearly always made without the user paying attention to what is asked.
Habituation to click-through this “post-selection” phase could be attributed to
current design of installation that lacks understanding for user’s cognition.
To develop guidelines that take into account of user’s cognition, we draw on the
dual processing theory [23] in cognitive science, which identiﬁes two main types of
cognitive processes: controlled and automated processes.
Controlled processes are goal-directed; a user deﬁnes an objective and plans a
path that (in his opinion) will lead to the objective. At certain points, the user
will make an appreciation of the current context in order to decide on the next
best-move in achieving his end goal. This process is highly dynamic and requires
logical thinking. For these reasons, one can execute only one controlled process at
a time. Appreciation of the current context and decision for a course of action,
over time, can be based on superﬁcial comparison of contexts. This leads to faster
decision making [18, 23]. Despite a potential high degree of automation in decision
making, it remains a controlled process as one will always have to compare between
multiple contexts.
Automated processes such as habits, on the other hand, pose little to no cognitive
load. Habits develop from deliberate into thoughtless actions towards a goal. If the
context for an action is nearly identical over a series of performances, the action
becomes mentally associated with the context; observing the context is enough to
trigger the action [11, 26]. The simpler a task, the more frequently it is executed and
the higher similarity in context, the stronger a habit can become. New information
that invalidates the initial conditions (which led to an action or habit) will go
unnoticed.
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Figure E.3.: (Left) A constant context results in habitual behavior. (Right) Using
the attention capture process with the dominant context as reference prevents this.
The diﬀerence between habits (automated) and automation in decision making
(controlled) lies in the constancy of the context. Habits are developed if the context
is (nearly) always the same. With the latter, context varies between a number of
states with reasonable likelihood, thus requiring a controlled process of context
comparison.
The constant context (lack of context-sensitive information) during installation
makes the action of conﬁrmation a habit. This is exempliﬁed in Figure E.3 (left);
the context of a normal installation ﬂow (C1) demands the decision of action A1
(install) that results in R1. An abnormal context (C2) should lead to R2 (installa-
tion aborted). But as context C1 occurs much more often (denoted with probability
.99) than context C2, user will over time expect context C1 and habitually selects
action A1. This is more likely if there is no clear visual diﬀerence between the con-
texts (e.g., Figure E.1). Furthermore, from a user perspective, the choice (install
or abort) is asked after the last conscious step of having decided to download and
install a particular application. Users also rarely face immediate consequence for
installing inappropriate software.
We argue that habituation can be avoided by eliminating the need for user action
in the normal and frequent context (an easy target of habituation) altogether.
Depicted in Figure E.3 (right), context C1 can be taken as reference context with
an implied action A1. User can then be made aware of the deviation from this
reference context through attention capture – the process of making a user aware of
a change in environment that (may) require the user to attend to a new task [29].
A predominant view is that attention capture is an automated, stimulus-driven
process modulated by the current controlled task [27]. The cognitive load required
for the current task, as well as the strength and the relevance of the stimulus to the
current task, aﬀect the likelihood that a person will act on the stimulus. Thus, in
addition to visual salience, the relevance and strength of a warning (risk signal) are
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paramount to ensure that users will take note of and evaluate the warning, during
the installation process.
E.2.2. Information Flow & Risk Signaling
Software warnings (risk signals) have conventionally been communicated to users
in a hypodermic-needle manner by expert entities (e.g., antivirus vendors). These
risk signals are designed against malware and do not cover for aspects such as the
respect for user choice and the social/cultural factors of software appropriateness.
In search of risk signals that are relevant and of high impact, we refer to the two-
step ﬂow theory [24] – the founding work of innovation diﬀusion theory – which
describes how communication can be more eﬀective through a network of people
(rather than through the hypodermic-needle fashion). Central to the theory are
the information brokers (originally known as opinion leaders in [24]) who are not
necessarily the most knowledgeable but are nevertheless skillful in interconnecting
people [14]. Information brokers guide the information ﬂow from sources into sepa-
rate groups (ﬁrst step) given incentives such as early information access and social
capital [14]. When information gets into a particular group, competition among
group members can serve to encourage each other to improve own knowledge and
exchange opinions, which constitutes the second step of information ﬂow [14]. Social
media such as Twitter and Facebook are successful examples that have harnessed
the power of social networks for eﬀective communication. Use of social networks
for provisioning or relaying of risk signals is, however, still an early concept.
PhishTank [7] and Web of Trust (WOT) [10] are systems that employ “wisdom of
crowds” (using a global community, not personalized network) to improve web se-
curity. PhishTank solicits reports and votes against phish-sites, while WOT collects
public opinions on the trustworthiness, vendor-reliability, child-safety and privacy-
handling of websites. Both systems aggregate user ratings into global (rather than
personalized) values. Such global values can, however, be susceptible to exploita-
tion. Moore and Clayton [25] argued that as participation in PhishTank follows a
power-law distribution, its results can be easily inﬂuenced by the few highly active
users2.
Prior work has pointed to the advantages of using inputs from personalized net-
works instead of the global community. Against phishing, Camp advocated for the
use of social networks to generate risk signals that are trustworthy as the incentive
to cheat is low among members who share (long-term) social ties [15]. Inputs from
social networks can also be veriﬁed through oﬄine relationship, allowing incompe-
tent or dishonest sources to be removed [15]. Personiﬁed risks are also perceived
greater than anonymous risks [12]; this may help to mitigate the psychological
bias (known as valence eﬀect) in which people overestimate favorable events for
themselves. Inputs from social networks are also socially and culturally relevant.
2We note that this may be not too serious as determining whether a website is a phishing
site (similar to whether an application is malicious) is usually objective. But judging if a
website is trustworthy (with WOT, similar to evaluating the subjective factors of software
appropriateness) can be contentious and prone to dishonest behavior (e.g., Sybil attack [17]).
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E.2.3. Design Guidelines
To sum up, we consider that a trustworthy installation process should:
• Avoid requiring user actions that can be easily habituated. User
actions in a normal and frequent context could be made implicit and com-
plemented with an attention capture mechanism to signal any deviation from
this context.
• Employ signals that are visually salient, relevant and of high impact.
Signals should cover both the objective and subjective factors of software
appropriateness.
• Incorporate mechanisms to gather and utilize feedbacks from user’s
personalized community. In this work, we refer a personalized commu-
nity to friends and experts whom individual users trust in providing valuable
inputs about software appropriateness. Experts could be vendors or gurus
who are knowledgeable in the technical evaluation of software. A list of rep-
utable experts can be set for all users by default. Meanwhile, Friends refer to
ones whom users have personal contacts with and whom could help by shar-
ing personal experience about applications or relaying information. Here, we
hypothesize that risk signals from the personalized community can be more
eﬀective (due to their relevance and trustworthiness) than that of from global
community. We veriﬁed the relevance and strength of inputs from friends in
our survey (Section 3) and user study (Section 5).
E.3. Web-based Survey
We conducted an online survey to identify the installation behaviors and to evaluate
the potentials of a personalized community in providing relevant and helpful signals.
E.3.1. Recruitment and Demographics.
We recruited our participants mainly from universities. We put up posters around
popular campus areas. Emails were also sent to colleagues in other universities
with the request to take part and to the forward the invitation to their contacts.
Throughout the recruitment and responding process, we referred our survey as a
study on user behaviors during installation using the title: “A Survey on Software
Installation”. Considerations were taken to avoid priming of secure behaviors. The
reward for participation was to receive a cinema ticket on a lucky draw basis.
Winners who do not reside in the Nordic region were rewarded with a souvenir-
book. The lucky draw was made a few weeks after the data collection.
The survey was open for participation for 3 weeks. In total, 120 participants
took part in the survey. Participants who did not complete all questions, or whose
total response time was unrealistically low (<10 minutes) were excluded. The ﬁnal
population consists of 106 subjects (36% females). 12% have a PhD degree, 42%
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Table E.1.: Demographics of survey participants
Education or Work background Age group
IT or Engineering 61% 18–24 15%
Business or Finance 12% 25–29 41%
Science or Math 8% 30–39 32%
Arts and Social Science 10% 40–49 11%
Others 9% 50+ 1%
Table E.2.: When know of digital risks
User would always or often inform
friends or family 62%
members of online community 15%
expert individuals 14%
expert organizations 8%
antivirus software company 6%
have a Master degree while 28% have a Bachelor degree. 61% have a background
in IT or engineering (power, electrical, mechanical, etc.) while 39% have a non-
technical background (see Table E.1). Subjects took 15 minutes on average to
complete the survey, which was structured into 12 questions with 105 items in
total. We mostly used a 4-point Likert scale on the perceived importance of an
element and the likelihood or frequency of performing an action.
E.3.2. Results.
We present a few interesting ﬁndings that we obtained. Finding-1 concerns the
behaviors during installation while the others demonstrate the potentials of ratings
from a personalized community. The percentage values were computed after reduc-
ing the responses from 4-point Likert scales into nominal levels of important/not,
likely/not, or usually/seldom.
i. Information during installation is mostly ignored. 83%, 90% and 75%
of the subjects reported that they seldom read the EULA, privacy policy
and disclaimer notices respectively during the installation process. Similarly,
78% of the subjects seldom check for digital signatures (or software certiﬁ-
cates), nor abort installation when they are absent. Only 30% usually abort
installation given warnings from the installer. However, 69% usually abort
installation if unnecessary personal questions were asked. 76% usually abort
installation if warned by antivirus software, while 53% usually abort instal-
lation in the presence of advertisement pop-ups.
ii. Security vendors, experts and friends are important sources for
information on digital risks. About 90% of the subjects reported that
antivirus software is an important source of information about digital risks
(e.g., harmful or inappropriate software/services). Expert organizations and
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individuals also scored high (75%). Undeniably, security vendors and experts
are the most important sources of information on digital risks. The survey
gave further interesting results. 65% of the subjects regarded the ﬁrst-hand
experience by friends and family members as important. In comparison, fewer
subjects (50%) considered the experience from members of an online commu-
nity to be important. This diﬀerence was statistically signiﬁcant (p<.01,
Chi-square). This suggests that users regard inputs from friends and family
members to be more relevant than that of from an online community.
iii. When users know about digital risks, they are motivated to inform
friends or family rather than the online community. 60% reported that
they could usually ﬁnd security-related information by themselves. However,
only 34% have been asked by friends or family members on whether software is
trustworthy or appropriate. This could be due to the lack of existing system
to share their opinions about software with his friends or family members.
Indeed, we ﬁnd that motivation to inform friends or family members about
digital risks is high. 62% of the subjects would inform them about digital risks.
Comparatively, only 15% were motivated to inform the online community
(see Table E.2). The diﬀerence was statistically signiﬁcant (p<.0001). This
suggests that users have more motivation to protect his friends than members
of online community. This supports the feasibility of a rating system based
on personalized communities over the global-community compatriot.
iv. Users consider reviews from trusted sources to be helpful. With con-
siderations to the limited screen size of mobile devices, 80% regarded reviews
from trusted sources to be important/helpful information during software
installation.
E.3.3. Limitation and Discussion.
We note that the education level of the participants was high, and 61% of the sub-
jects have a background in IT or engineering. Yet, even though we might expect
the subjects to be more aware of digital risks, there is an evident ‘click-through’
behavior. Excluding those with an IT/Engineering background, slightly fewer sub-
jects (51%) could usually ﬁnd security-related information themselves. However,
the key results remain unchanged: 66% regarded friends as important source of
risk information; 60% would inform friends or family when know about digital
risks (compared to only 12% would inform such risks to an online community);
72% perceived reviews and ratings from trusted sources to be important/helpful
information during software installation.
E.4. System Architecture and Prototype
Two important components in our architecture are: (i) software repository, which
maintains a list of applications available for installation and a software catalog
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Figure E.4.: System Architecture. The prototype was implemented on the Nokia
N810 tablet, while a rendezvous server was setup on an Ubuntu desktop. The
prototype interacts with conventional software repositories to obtain application
catalog and installation packages.
(containing metadata such as price, author, description and keywords); (ii) ren-
dezvous server, which issues identity certiﬁcates and manages the user database,
social graph and application reviews. To use the prototype installer (developed
on the Nokia N810 tablet), a user must ﬁrst register and obtain his credentials
at the rendezvous server. Thereafter, the user can add friends and experts whom
he trusts into his personalized community, and share software reviews with them,
using the prototype. Sharing is done through the rendezvous server, Bluetooth or
email. Software reviews are digitally signed and veriﬁed on the prototype to ensure
authenticity and integrity.
The installation task ﬂow was redesigned. When a user deﬁnes his requirements
and searches for suitable applications (using some keywords), our prototype displays
a list of related software (Figure E.5, top). The right panel shows basic information
of a selected application, while detailed reviews from user’s personalized community
can be accessed by clicking on the “learn more” button. The “install” button will
install an application without further prompting (if it has not been ‘ﬂagged’ as
potentially inappropriate by the user’s personalized community). This removes
user actions (in the post-selection phase of conventional task ﬂow) that are prone
to habituation.
For an application that has received negative reviews (i.e. ﬂagged by the person-
alized community), a risk signal is shown prominently to catch the user’s attention.
To reﬂect the personal/social dimension of the warning, we chose a non-conventional
risk symbol: a Pacman-like monster. Warning triangles and stop signs may signal
that it is an “objective” opinion by some authorities.
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Figure E.5.: Prototype. (Top) The front-page shows an application list with ba-
sic description on the right panel. (Bottom) The experimental ‘bin-the-monster’
mechanism: user clicks on a monster to read the negative review; he has to drag
it into the bin if he chooses to disregard the review. (Note that the reviews and
ratings were artiﬁcially generated for evaluation purposes only).
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The symbol is shown for ﬂagged applications only; salience is increased by not
showing positive cues. It is placed at the same level as the application name, and
is enlarged when the application is highlighted. If the user decides to install an
application that has been ﬂagged, he is redirected to the review-page (Figure E.5,
bottom) where he has to read the detailed reviews. Textual review improves the
relevance of a risk signal as user can appreciate what is said better than numerical
values [28]. Negative reviews are framed in red (bottom-up salience). To mitigate
a potential click-through when attending to the negative reviews, we experimented
with two habituation-breaking tasks (to improve the eﬃcacy of attention-capture):
• Delay: User has to read every negative review by clicking on each of the
monsters with some time interval. When clicked, a monster will disappear
into an icon with numerical rating only after a few seconds, before the next
review can be read.
• Bin-the-monster: As before, but the monster only disappears when it is
dragged into the bin. User cannot install until all monsters have been binned
(Figure E.5).
E.5. User Evaluation
We conducted a hands-on evaluation and investigated the strength of opinion given
by friends compared to opinion given by online community members.
E.5.1. Recruitment & Demographics.
Participants were mainly recruited from universities. We distributed recruitment
notes around popular campus areas especially in the social science and science/-
math faculties. A web-form was also created to allow subjects to sign-up online.
Participants of our survey were especially encouraged to take part if they reside
in the Nordics; they were directed to the signup form upon completing the survey.
Each participant was rewarded with two cinema tickets. There were in total 20 par-
ticipants (7 females) consisting of students, researchers and a few working adults.
6 participants came from an IT background. The remaining subjects comprised of
6 mechanical, electrical or power engineering students, 4 science/math graduates,
3 art/design graduates, and 1 psychology undergraduate.
E.5.2. Experimental Setting.
We speciﬁed 4 testing days and arranged with the participants a suitable session
of an hour each. Individual participants were invited to our premises where the
study took place. Each session was preceded with a brief interview. The main task
was structured into four evaluation scenarios. In the end, we asked for the overall
experience with our prototype before a ﬁnal debrief.
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Table E.3.: (Left) 4 evaluation scenarios. (Right) Installation ratio in each scenario
Didn’t
Install Install
S1 No reviews from online community nor friends were provided 13 7
S2 Negative reviews were given by online community but friends
gave positive reviews
10 10
S3 Positive reviews were given by online community but friends
gave negative reviews
4 16
S4 Same as S3; the “bin-the-monster” mechanism was activated.
After noting down the installation decision, subject was required
to try installing the application (regardless of his decision) to
experience the habituation-breaking interaction.
7 13
In the brief interview, we asked if a subject has encountered situations where he
had diﬃculties or doubts in determining the appropriateness of certain software; all
subjects responded that they had been in such situations before. We then requested
the subject to write down the names of two friends whose opinions could be useful
in these situations. We then keyed in these two names into our prototype system.
We gave the subject a script containing the description of the initial setting and
the four evaluation scenarios (denoted as S1, S2, S3 and S4). The initial setting
depicts a situation where there was a special oﬀer on 4 applications which the
subject would have to decide if he would like to buy and install. The special oﬀer
was meant to provide motivation to buy/install the applications in the evaluation
scenarios. Two games, a browser and a media player (denoted as A1, A2, A3 and
A4) were selected such that the likelihood of subjects having prior experience with
them was low.
Having understood the initial setting, the subject was required to decide if he
would buy/install a speciﬁc application in each evaluation scenario based on some
basic description (application name, ﬁle size, name of developer, a short text pro-
vided by developer) and software reviews provided by online community members
as well as the two friends mentioned during the brief interview.
Four negative reviews were scripted to signal a mild level of inappropriateness.
They concerned advertisement pop-ups, pornographic content, program crashes
(data loss) and suspicious elements. A set of positive reviews were also scripted.
Each application was associated with a ﬁxed pair of negative and positive reviews.
The evaluation scenarios were designed to present to the subject, positive and
negative reviews from either friends or online community, as described in Table E.3
(left). We assigned the applications (A1, A2, A3 and A4) to the four scenarios
in a rotating manner. Speciﬁcally, subject-1 would decide whether to buy/install
applications A1, A2, A3 and A4, while subject-2 go through applications A2, A3, A4
and A1 in the ﬁxed order of scenarios (from S1 to S2, S3 and ﬁnally S4). Rotating
the applications in this manner avoided the potential bias due to the characteristics
of individual applications and their ﬁxed pair of positive/negative reviews.
The subject was required to write down his decision to whether buy/install in
each scenario and the reason on the evaluation script. In scenario S3, we asked
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Table E.4.: Results of hypothesis testing
Chi-square Binomial Result
T1 p = .080 p = .122 NH1 cannot be rejected
T2 p < .001 p < .001 NH2 is strongly rejected
T3 p = .004 p = .006 NH3 is strongly rejected
for feedbacks on the use a Pacman-like monster as risk symbol. In scenario S4, we
asked for experience with the “bin-the-monster” habituation-breaking mechanism.
We used a 5-point Likert scale in both tasks.
Upon completing the four evaluation scenarios, we asked the subject his overall
experience in using our prototype system in the form of descriptive feedback and
a 5-point Likert scale (from terrible to great-idea). In the debrief, we informed the
subject that all applications used were in reality good software available for the
N810 tablet; all ratings and reviews had been scripted for experimental purposes
only.
E.5.3. Results.
Installation count in each evaluation scenario is shown in Table E.3 (right). In
S1, without any software reviews, 65% of the subjects went ahead to buy/install
an application. The installation ratio decreased slightly (from 65% to 50%) in
scenario S2 but dropped drastically (to 20%) in S3. Using the installation ratios,
we evaluated the T1, T2 and T3 tests with the respective null hypothesis NH3,
NH4 and NH5:
(T1) NH1: Negative community review does not overrule positive review by friend
(T2) NH2: Negative review by friend does not overrule positive community review
(T3) NH3: Overall strength of review by friend is not stronger than that of com-
munity review
Installation ratio in S1 served as the baseline of T1 and T2 tests (i.e. T1 compared
the ratio in S2 to S1, while T2 compared the ratio in S3 to S1). Meanwhile, T3
was performed by comparing the ratio in S3 to S2. The hypothesis tests were
evaluated using (one-tailed) Chi-square (good-of-ﬁt) and binomial exact test. We
favor results from binomial test as Chi-square statistics works better with a larger
sample size.
We could not reject NH1 in T1. Although users reacted to negative reviews from
online community members (resulting in a slightly smaller installation ratio in S2),
the eﬀect was not statistically signiﬁcant. While we believe that users tend to react
more towards negative reviews; warnings by online community members do not
overrule positive feedbacks given by friends.
With T2, it was evident that negative reviews provided by friends overruled
positive reviews by online community members. This was signiﬁcant at 0.1% level.
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Table E.5.: On using Pacman-like monster as
risk symbol (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree)
μ σ2
Monster draws attention 4.3 .69
Monster gives clear message 2.8 1.3
Monster gives warning 3.8 1.1
Prefer monster over “!” sign 3.2 1.1
Prefer monster over “Stop” sign 3.4 1.1
Table E.6.: Overall user experi-
ence (1=terrible, 5=great idea)
μ σ2
Experience with
habituation-breaking
3.5 1.5
Experience with so-
cial rating integrated
with software instal-
lation
4.4 .61
The large ratio diﬀerence (30%) between S3 and S2 suggested the higher impact of
information from friends. We evaluated this in T3. The overall strength of reviews
by friends is stronger than reviews by online community members (signiﬁcant at 1%
level). The strength of (risk) signals communicated via friends should be exploited
to mitigate click-through and careless behaviors during software installation.
We observed that the installation ratio in S4 (35%) was higher than in S3 (20%).
We tested if the “bin-the-monster” mechanism had inadvertently reduced the ef-
fectiveness of risk signaling, and found that the eﬀect was signiﬁcant at 10% level.
With our experimental “bin-the-monster” mechanism, a bin was shown after some
delay when user clicked on a monster. However, the sudden appearance of the bin
might have that caused subjects to prioritize binning the monster over reading the
review. As it might not be obvious that the monster could be binned, we tried to
assist the users by showing a hint (Figure E.5, bottom). The short hint (“read the
review and bin the monsters”) might have been also construed as an instruction (or
suggestive that it was ok to install) rather than to encourage a conscious decision.
Our experimental ‘bin-the-monster’ mechanism was not a very successful one. An
improved design could be to display the bin constantly to avoid a sudden appear-
ance. The hint would need to be rephrased. A more direct association between the
monster and review may also be helpful. For example, when user drags a monster
into the bin, the corresponding review should be dragged together to signal that
he is disregarding a review from his personalized community.
The reactions to the use of the monster as risk symbol were mixed (Table E.5).
While most subjects agreed that it drew attention (salient), a few noted that they
did not get a clear message of risk/warning. Subjects remained neutral on preferring
the monster over the conventional “stop” and “exclamation-mark” symbols. We
interpret these as using a new risk symbol would demand extra eﬀort in educating
the users.
Experience with the experimental “bin-the-monster” habituation-breaking mech-
anism was diverse (Table E.6). Some liked it and found it interesting, while a few
found such mechanism unnecessary. We note that habituation-breaking mecha-
nisms are designed to trade oﬀ some level of convenience for safer user actions, and
may be hard to satisfy all users. Feedback on social rating (for software appro-
priateness) integrated with the installation process was, on the other hand, very
positive. This suggests that it could be a useful feature on mobile devices (or other
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computing environments that involve installation of third party applications by
ordinary users).
E.5.4. Limitation and Discussion.
There are two weaknesses with regard to our user study. We note that the T3 test
might have an order-bias as subjects were always required to complete scenario S2
before proceeding to S3. We should have mitigated this by randomizing the order
of test scenarios.
We note that also the initial setting of “software oﬀer” to provide subjects with
motivation might not be very realistic. An alternative setting is to have the subjects
to decide whether to buy/install an application on behalf of someone whom they
care. However, we think that both settings have limitations that are hard to avoid
in a laboratory testing. We could create a sense of realistic risks, for example
by informing the subjects that they would be required to login to his email/bank
account using the test device after the study. Yet, we thought that this was not too
relevant as we did not require the subjects to evaluate whether to install software
that are potentially harmful; our study concerned only applications that may be
mildly inappropriate.
E.5.5. Summary of Findings
i. Opinions by friends are stronger than that of by online community; warnings
by friends overruled positive feedbacks by online community, but not vice-
versa
ii. The experimental “bin-the-monster” mechanism needs to be improved; de-
signing and evaluating an eﬀective habituation-breaking mechanism remain
as interesting research problems
iii. The response towards habituation-breaking mechanisms and a new risk sym-
bol was mixed; yet, majority was very positive with the idea of integrated
social rating
E.6. Related Work
It is well-known by now that improving only the visual salience of risk signals is not
enough to ensure secure user behaviors. Studies [30, 31] have shown the ineﬃcacy of
security toolbars and site-authentication images, which mainly rely on an improved
risk salience. Brustoloni and Villamar´ın-Salomon [13] suggested using polymorphic
dialogs (that will vary the order of decision options) to capture user attention and
break habituation. They advocated also the use of audited dialogs that would keep
track of user decisions to hold them accountable for irresponsible actions. However,
subjects regarded audit dialogs as intrusive; audited dialogs also did not assist users
to make better decisions. In addition to improving the visual salience (through a
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better interface design), our work here increased the relevance of risk signals by
employing inputs from user’s personalized community.
Compared to FireFox’s approach of making potentially unsafe actions (e.g., brow-
sing a site with invalid certiﬁcate) more diﬃcult to slow-down the users, our exper-
imental habituation-breaking mechanisms (albeit need further improvements) are
complemented with context-relevant information from personalized communities,
that is absent in FireFox.
Related to software installation is the study by Good et.al. [20] which found that
displaying a short summary (especially right-after the normal EULA notice) can
eﬀectively reduce the installation of unwanted applications. Yan et.al. concluded
that visualizing the reputation and a personalized trust value for applications can be
a helpful feature on mobile devices [32]. These studies highlighted the importance
of timely signals. Our work integrated risk signals from personalized communities
with the installation process. This integration was very well received in our user
study.
Our idea of the personalized community is similar to NetTrust’s [15] which em-
ploys personalized rating against the threat of phishing. NetTrust employs implicit
inputs of browsing and bookmarking history of friends, as well as, explicit recom-
mendations from third parties like banks and Google. Continuing from the initial
work in [22, 16], in this paper, we have provided supports for the use of inputs from
personalized communities, based on theories, a survey and a hands-on study on a
prototype system.
E.7. Discussion & Future Work
Use of inputs from personalized communities is not without several shortcomings.
We outline several challenges along with the potential mitigation strategies worth
of future investigation.
Reliability. Inputs provided by user’s personalized community may not be
always correct. Information from technical sources may also be misinterpreted
when guided through ordinary users. These issues can be mitigated by making the
evaluation process more structured. For example, an evaluation can be divided into
several aspects of software appropriateness rather than a single overall rating.
Coverage. Although users are likely to encounter similar applications with
(some of) his friends in practice, undeniably ordinary users will have limited expo-
sure and resources to identity all possible inappropriate applications. This is why
we have included the notion of expert users (whom individual users trust) into the
structure of a personalized community. A list of experts can be set by default (for
all users) to deliver critical risk information. We could also extend our work to
compute or infer recommendations for speciﬁc applications when there is no di-
rect input from the personalized community. We note that there is much to learn
from the ﬁeld of recommender systems. However, this should be done with care so
that the high relevance and strength of risk signals, as perceived by users, do not
diminish.
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Scalability. Software features such as usable contact and review sharing, re-
usability of reviews (across mobile platforms) as well as robust handling of software
versions would be helpful to scale our implementation. Rather than building a
system of social networks from scratch, we plan to merge the prototype with existing
services (such as Facebook) that are now seamlessly integrated with smart phones.
Incentives. Like any community-based systems, there are challenges in initi-
ating and sustaining user eﬀorts. An important future work is thus to design an
incentive scheme that would encourage active user participation. Here, we note
that in contrast to a “crowds” system (i.e. one that employs a global community,
such as PhishTank and WOT) where the success of the system is a public good,
our work can beneﬁt from unselﬁsh behaviors among members in the personalized
community. Indeed, we have seen strong motivation to protect friends and family
members in our survey.
E.8. Conclusions
We developed a set of design guidelines grounded on theories for a trustworthy
software installation process. Through a survey, we veriﬁed the high relevance of
inputs from a personalized community and user motivation to protect friends and
family. We implemented a prototype system with contact management and reviews
sharing capabilities as well as a redesigned installation task-ﬂow. Our user evalu-
ation conﬁrmed the strength of information communicated through friends, while
the idea of integrated ratings from a personalized community during application
installation was very well-received.
There may be some challenges that need to be addressed in future work; given
the high relevance and strength of inputs from known sources, we show in this
paper, the potentials of relying on personalized communities to evaluate software
appropriateness and to mitigate the problem of click-through habituation during
installation.
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Abstract
Third-party applications (apps) drive the attractiveness of web and mobile appli-
cation platforms. Many of these platforms adopt a decentralized control strategy,
relying on explicit user consent for granting permissions that the apps request.
Users have to rely primarily on community ratings as the signals to identify the
potentially harmful and inappropriate apps even though community ratings typ-
ically reﬂect opinions about perceived functionality or performance rather than
about risks. With the arrival of HTML5 web apps, such user-consent permission
systems will become more widespread. We study the eﬀectiveness of user-consent
permission systems through a large scale data collection of Facebook apps, Chrome
extensions and Android apps.
Our analysis conﬁrms that the current forms of community ratings used in app
markets today are not reliable indicators of privacy risks of an app. We ﬁnd some
evidence indicating attempts to mislead or entice users into granting permissions:
free applications and applications with mature content request more permissions
than is typical; “look-alike” applications which have names similar to popular ap-
plications also request more permissions than is typical. We also ﬁnd that across
all three platforms popular applications request more permissions than average.
F. Is this App Safe?
F.1. Introduction
Ever since the personal computer changed the lives of people around the world,
we have become accustomed to the notion of software applications. The personal
computer world started out with completely open platforms where all applications
(apps) ran with the same complete set of privileges available to the user. This
quickly gave rise to the phenomenon of malicious and inappropriate software [19].
Operating system and runtime platform security schemes can be used to ap-
ply the principle of least authority to applications. Although various platform
security schemes were developed since the 1990s, they saw widespread deployment
only when they were incorporated into Java Security Architecture and into mobile
device platforms [26]. All modern mobile device application platforms incorpo-
rate permission-based platform security schemes. Web application platforms like
Facebook and browser extension runtimes like Google Chrome extensions also use
permission-based platform security. Some of these platforms such as Apple’s iOS
rely on a central authority to decide what permissions can be granted to a given
application. Others rely on the user making the authorization decisions. We will
call the former category centralized permission systems and the latter user-consent
permission systems.
In the smartphone arena, centralized permission systems are currently dominant,
with the exception of the Android platform. However several HTML5 APIs (e.g.,
the geolocation API) support a user-consent permission system. The availability
of comprehensive APIs including oﬄine caching makes it possible for HTML5 web
apps to oﬀer similar functionality as native applications. If HTML5 web apps
become dominant [28], their decentralized nature will also imply that user-consent
permission systems will become more widespread.
Centralized permission systems take the burden of judgment away from users.
While this is a beneﬁt in terms of usability, it is problematic if the judgment
in question is subjective. People and organizations may disagree on whether a
certain application is privacy-invasive or oﬀensive [17]. The biggest problem in
user-consent permission systems is that users may become habituated to permission
queries and may carelessly click through them. Even careful users have to make
access control decisions based only on a few signals such as the average numerical
rating given by other users, number of ratings and downloads. Users who care
about their privacy [16, 13], may not have the ability to protect it in user-consent
permission systems if the signals are unreliable or can be manipulated by developers
of malicious apps.
In this paper, we investigate the current state of risk signaling on privacy intru-
siveness of apps, and if there is any evidence of attempts to mislead or entice users
of user-consent permission systems into compromising their privacy. Speciﬁcally
we ask:
1. Do popular apps ask for more permissions than is typical for apps in general?
2. Are currently available signals about an application reliable in indicating
privacy risks associated with that application?
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3. Do developers of free apps and those with mature content ask for more per-
missions than is typical?
4. Do apps with “look-alike names” (i.e., names similar to popular apps) ask for
more permissions than is typical?
Our paper is structured as follows. We start with a survey of related work in
Section F.2 and describing the data collection processes in Section F.3. We present
a basic analysis on app popularity, ratings and permissions in Section F.4 before
proceeding to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of current risk signals (Section F.5) and
potential trends of enticements and tricks (Section F.6). We conclude by revisiting
the above four questions and discussing the implications and mitigation measures
in Section F.7.
F.2. Related Work
With the growing popularity of Android, there have been a number of publications
on Android OS security and its permission system. Enck et al. [21] proposed Kirin
certiﬁcation to help identifying Android apps that request a suspicious permission
combination using a set of predeﬁned rules. Barrera et al. [15] studied the relation-
ship between the permissions requested by 1,100 most popular and free Android
apps by machine learning and proposed a methodology to improve the expressive-
ness of app permissions without increasing its overall complexity. Our study diﬀers
from theirs in that we do not look into the patterns of permission requests in details
but we study the how the number of permissions requested by apps correlate with
several signals (e.g., community ratings) that the users receive.
Felt et al. [24] studied the eﬀectiveness of permission systems on Android and
Chrome platforms. Using 1,000 most popular Chrome extensions, they pointed
out that the ﬁrst 500 most popular extensions have requested signiﬁcantly more
permissions than the second 500 extensions. However, they observed no diﬀerences
between the 756 most popular and 100 most recent Android apps. With a much
larger dataset, our study shows that there is a positive correlation between the
number of installations and the number of permissions requested by the app on
all three web and mobile application platforms: Facebook, Chrome and Android.
In addition, we look into whether speciﬁc types of apps, including those with ma-
ture content, those ﬂagged by external ratings and those with suspicious look-alike
names, request for more permissions than is typical.
In comparison, fewer studies have investigated the Facebook permissions. King
et al. [25] conducted a survey on the privacy knowledge, behaviors and concerns of
Facebook app users. Our study diﬀers from theirs in two ways. First our analysis
relies on a large scale data collection rather than a self-reported survey. Second
while they focused on the interaction between user’s understanding, concerns and
behaviors when using Facebook apps, we look at the availability of reliable risk
signals on Facebook (as well as Chrome and Android) and how the absence of
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them may have been exploited by some developers to entice or trick the users with
questionable apps.
Moore and Edelman [29] studied the ecosystem of the typo-squatting fraud –
the intentional registration of misspellings of popular website addresses. They esti-
mated that at least 938,000 typo domains targeted the 3,264 popular .com sites they
studied. They also found that 80% of the typo-squatting domains were supported
through proﬁts from advertising, typically from the pay-per-click advertisements.
Our study is one of the ﬁrst to analyze the naming exploitations in apps. While
we have not conducted an in-depth analysis on the motivation and proﬁtability of
such naming tricks, we analyzed whether apps with look-alike names request for
more permissions than is typical. A related work is by Barrera et al. [14] which
studied the problem of a non-global app ID system for Android apps. They pro-
posed Stratus to standardize the app IDs across diﬀerent Android marketplaces.
Our analysis in this paper focuses on look-alike names rather than look-alike app
IDs. We expect the users to pay less attention to app IDs especially on Facebook
and Chrome where the app IDs are in the form of a string of random digits or
characters.
F.3. Data Collection
We detail the data collection processes for Android apps, Chrome extensions and
Facebook apps in the following. We share our datasets on our project site [7].
F.3.1. Android Apps
Prior studies on Android OS security (e.g., [15, 21, 23, 24]) have mainly focused
on the most popular apps on Android Market. In order to broaden the scope we
used both the oﬃcial Android Market [1] and AppBrain.com [3] to construct two
datasets Android (pop) and Android (new).
Android (pop) consists of popular Android apps selected randomly from the
top-selling-free and top-selling-paid listings of Android Market, as well as the list
of the most popular apps according to AppBrain.com on 15 June 2011. After
removing duplicates, it contains 650 unique apps (323 paid and 327 free). Android
(new) consists of 1210 new apps (610 paid and 600 free) which ﬁrst appeared on
the most-recent-apps section of AppBrain.com in mid June 2011 and were still
available in early October. We kept track of these new apps and updated our
database accordingly for changes in app details.
In addition to the above, to investigate the behavior of apps with look-alike
names, we collected also a separate much larger dataset Android (mr). The dataset
consists of 20,500 new Android apps (11,095 free and 9,405 paid) constructed from
the list of 20 most recent apps according to AppBrain.com on an hourly basis from
mid August to early October 2011.
The application information page on Android Market provides a number of details
that we use in this paper, including app installation count, average community
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rating, rating count, developer URL, price, content maturity level, and permissions
requested by the app.
F.3.2. Facebook Apps
We constructed the Facebook dataset by downloading the entire list of 34,370 Face-
book apps (app names, IDs, and developer IDs) from SocialBakers [8], a portal
providing the usage statistics of various social media. We then attempted to access
the Facebook application page of each of these (using the Watir [9] library to login
to Facebook). We excluded apps that have become unavailable or otherwise invalid
or redirected to a page outside Facebook. Out of the remaining 27,029 Facebook
apps, 18,205 request at least one permission from the user. For each of the 27,029
apps, we downloaded details including the number of monthly active users, the av-
erage rating, rating count, description and category. This constitutes the Facebook
(all) dataset.
F.3.3. Chrome Extensions
Chrome Web Store [6] lists up to 1,000 most popular extensions in 12 diﬀerent
categories. As some of the categories such as ‘Sports’ and ‘Shopping’ have far less
than 1,000 extensions, even the more recent extensions such as those with less than
10 users, were present on the lists. We constructed our dataset by downloading
all 12 lists. Removing duplicates and extensions that became unavailable during
data collection, the resulting Chrome (all) dataset consists of 5,943 extensions. It
contains details from the information page of each extension, including the instal-
lation count, average community rating, rating count, developer URL, version of
extension, supported languages, as well as the permission warnings associated with
the extension.
F.4. Basic Analysis
We ﬁrst study the link between app popularity and user ratings, and the statistics
of permissions in the following.
F.4.1. App Popularity and User Ratings
We deﬁne the popularity of an app as the number of installations (in the case of
Android apps and Chrome extensions) or the number of monthly active users (in
the case of Facebook apps). Figure F.1 shows log-log plots of app popularity versus
the number of user ratings the app has received. While we did not test if both
the distributions of app popularity and the number of ratings per app follow a
speciﬁc heavy-tailed distribution (e.g., Power-Law, Log-normal), they appear to be
highly skewed visually. All four app popularity distributions curve in the log-log
plot. On the other hand, other than the Android (pop) dataset where no apps
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Figure F.1.: Distribution of the number of installations and number of ratings per
app.
have less than 30 ratings, the rating contribution patterns appear to be straight
lines in the log-log plot, suggesting that they could be a Power Law. Indeed, many
online peer production systems can be characterized by a Power Law contribution
pattern that is explainable by the participation momentum rule [31]. The skewed
nature of the app popularity and the number of ratings per app prompted us to
use the logarithmic values, i.e., log(#installation) and log(#rating) for popularity
and rating count respectively in subsequent analysis.
We found a strong (Pearson) correlation between app popularity and the number
of ratings of the app has received (with r ranging from 0.67 to 0.90, p<.001, see
Figure F.2). Indeed, users are more likely to rate an app that they have installed.
However, somewhat counter-intuitively, the average rating of an app, avgr, does
not positively correlate with app popularity. In fact, avgr is negatively and weakly
correlated to the app popularity (r=−0.15, p<.001) among the new Android apps.
We ﬁgure that the average user rating can indeed be misleading without factor-
ing in its conﬁdence level. Considering the conﬁdence of an average rating to be
proportional to the number of ratings that it has received, we thus measure the
adjusted average rating to be:
avgra = (avgr − 3) ∗ log(#rating) (F.1)
The –3 transformation is necessary as user ratings range from 1 to 5 across the
diﬀerent app platforms. As also shown on Figure F.2, there is a strong correlation
between the app popularity and the adjusted average rating (with r ranging from
0.45 to 0.72, and p<.001). We evaluate if avgra serves as an eﬀective risk signal
against potentially intrusive or inappropriate apps in Section F.5.
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F.4.2. Permission Statistics
Understanding the complex permission models of web and mobile apps can be a
daunting task for many ordinary users. We brieﬂy describe the permission systems
from the most granular (Android) to the least (Chrome) below. In each case, we
identify three sets: the set of all permissions P , the set of dangerous permis-
sions Pdanger, and the set of dangerous and information relevant permis-
sions Pdinfo. Pdanger consists of permissions for actions that can be potentially
harmful to the user while Pdinfo is the subset of Pdanger consisting of permissions
that permit access to sensitive personal information of the user.
Android: Android permissions are categorized into 4 categories, namely Sig-
nature, Signature-or-System, Normal and Dangerous. The ﬁrst two categories,
Signature-or-System and Signature permissions protect the most sensitive opera-
tions on the Android devices. These permissions can only be granted to apps pre-
installed into the device’s /system/root folder and/or apps signed with the device
manufacturer’s private key. Requests to use these permissions by other apps with-
out the right keys will be ignored [24]. On the other hand, the Normal permissions
govern the functionalities which can be annoying (e.g., vibrating the phone), while
the Dangerous permissions protect the user from operations that can be potentially
harmful including those that cost money or potentially privacy intrusive [24]. The
details of individual Android permissions can be found on [2].
We observed 137 diﬀerent permissions in our dataset, out of which 65 are dan-
gerous permissions. Following [22], we classiﬁed 34 of the 65 permissions in Pdanger
as belonging to Pdinfo. Table F.1 shows the most frequently requested dangerous
permissions among the popular and new Android apps. The full list is available on
our project site [7].
Facebook: The Facebook permissions have evolved as the platform and its user
base grows. Each of the permissions protects a speciﬁc piece of personal information
or a speciﬁc functionality on the platform (e.g., to login to Facebook chat system,
publish user’s activity on his wall). We consider all Facebook permissions to be
dangerous. There are in total 62 Facebook permissions [4], which are grouped and
presented to the users in 23 diﬀerent categories. Each category is highlighted in
bold and visualized with a unique icon on the permission request screen, while the
individual permissions are described in gray text with a smaller font size under
their respective category. The individual permissions requested can also be found
on the URL of the permission request screen but we do not expect the ordinary
users to notice them. For these reasons, in this study, we have focused on the
permission categories as opposed to the individual permissions. For simplicity, we
refer to Facebook permission categories as permissions interchangeably.
14 out of the 23 permission categories are information relevant. Table F.2 shows
the most frequently requested permission categories. Notice all apps requesting a
permission must also request for the ‘Access my basic information’ permission. The
most dangerous permission is perhaps ‘Access my data any time’ which allows an
app to access the user’s information even when he is not online. Another interesting
permission is ‘Access information people share with me’ which allows the app to
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access not information about the user himself, but the personal information of his
friends.
Chrome: Among the three platforms, Chrome permissions are the least granu-
lar. There are only 9 permission warnings in total as detailed on [5]. Inline with
the categorization of Android and Facebook permissions, we regard all Chrome
permissions to be both dangerous and dangerous-and-information-relevant, except
the permission ‘Your tabs and browsing activity’ which was unnecessarily required
for creating a new tab in earlier versions of Chrome browser [5].
The most dangerous is the permission to access ‘All data on your computer and
the websites you visit’ which is requested by the plugin-type extensions. These
plugin extensions are basically native executables that run with full privileges on
the user’s machine. They are manually reviewed by Chrome before being accepted
to appear on the Chrome Web Store [5]. We found only 47 plugin extensions in our
dataset. Among the extensions that request for the permission to access ‘Your data
on <some> websites’, the top 10 most frequently requested sites are: google.com,
facebook.com, tiny-url.info, plus.google.com, twitter.com, youtube.com,
mail.google.com, g2me.cn, api.flickr.com, and reddit.com.
Summary: Table F.4 shows the mean, median and maximum number of P ,
Pdanger, and Pdinfo that an app requests in the diﬀerent datasets. The ratio of apps
requesting at least a permission is high across all four datasets: Android (pop)
(91%), Android (new) (74%), Facebook (all) (67%) and Chrome (all) (85%).
Another trend that holds across the diﬀerent platforms is that most apps request
only a small fraction of the total available permissions. On average (medium),
Facebook and Android apps request for only 1/23 = 4% and 3/65 = 5% (3%
among the new apps) of the total available dangerous permissions respectively. In
addition, there is a noticeable trend that some permissions are more frequently
requested than the others (see Table F.1, F.2, F.3). These reinforce the ﬁndings by
Felt et al. [24] that an application permission system has the beneﬁts of allowing
the platform owners (i) to avoid granting the full privileges to third party apps,
and (ii) to possibly recognize apps with anomalous permission request patterns for
triaging the manual review process.
However, as it is with other security problems, the permission systems will not
be eﬀective if users do not comprehend how they work, or if the permission sys-
tems contradict other signals the users receive. One can easily exploit the lack of
understanding and the absence of reliable risk signals for questionable or malicious
purposes.
F.5. Eﬀectiveness of risk signals
We look into the availability of reliable and intuitive risk signals during the process
of app installation in the following.
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Correlation with log(#installation)
Perm. Android Android FB Chrome
type (pop) (new) (all) (all)
P 0.26 0.12 0.28 0.15
Pdanger 0.26 0.11 0.28 0.12
Pdinfo 0.22 0.10 0.28 0.12
Table F.5.: Correlation between app popularity and the number of P , Pdanger and
Pdinfo requested. All values are statistically signiﬁcant with p<.001
Correlation with avgra
Perm. Android Android FB Chrome
type (pop) (new) (all) (all)
P 0.15 0.08* 0.11 0.18
Pdanger 0.14 0.06◦ 0.11 0.16
Pdinfo 0.11 0.04◦ 0.12 0.16
Table F.6.: Correlation between the adjusted average rating avgra and the number
of P , Pdanger and Pdinfo requested. All values are statistically signiﬁcant with
p<.001, except for the case of new Android apps where * indicates p<0.1 and ◦
indicates p>0.1.
F.5.1. App Popularity
Table F.5 shows that there is a weak positive correlation between app popularity
and the number of permissions requested. The trend holds true not only for our
Chrome extension dataset (which is much larger than the dataset used by Felt
et al. [24]), but also for Android and Facebook apps. Also, the correlation is
stronger in popular Android apps than in new Android apps. As Felt et al. [24]
hypothesized, a possible explanation is that popular apps need more permissions
in order to oﬀer more functionality that makes them more interesting or useful
and hence popular. While this phenomenon is perhaps not surprising, it underlines
the fact that careful users concerned about their privacy have to make a tradeoﬀ
between the functionality oﬀered by an app and its potential for compromising their
privacy. Although popularity of an app is an easily available and understandable
signal to users of app marketplaces, it is not necessarily a reliable signal for privacy
risk – a user cannot conclude that a popular app is a safe one.
F.5.2. Community Rating
Community rating reﬂects how the users perceive an app. As with the popularity
measure, it is a meaningful signal that is also widely available in app marketplaces.
If it is to be an eﬀective signal for enabling the user to detect privacy risks, it
would exhibit a negative correlation with the number of permissions requested.
We found no such negative correlation between the adjusted average rating and
number of permissions (Table F.6). In fact there was a weak positive correlation
in all cases except for the case of the new Android apps, where the correlation was
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not statistically signiﬁcant. Again, the likely explanation is that user ratings in app
marketplaces are based on functional aspects like features and performance rather
than privacy risks.
F.5.3. External Ratings
Next, we studied how ratings from sources external to the marketplaces relate to
the number of permissions. We considered two sources. First is the Web of Trust
(WOT) [10] service. WOT is a community rating system which allows users to
rate a website in four dimensions: trustworthiness, vendor reliability, privacy and
child safety. It aggregates user ratings as well as information from other sources
into a rating along each of the dimensions as well as a combined score. WOT
ratings are usually given at the granularity of fully qualiﬁed domain names, unless
a subdomain has received enough input ratings on its own. Websites where multiple
users control their own subsections thus typically share a common rating inherited
from the parent domain. Second is AppBrain.com which is a website for discovering
Android apps. It provides a number of useful listings including the most popular
Android apps in diﬀerent countries and age groups, as well as the latest apps that
appear in Android Market. To help its users, AppBrain.com labels apps created
by developers who have made a high fraction of apps without any rating or with
below average ratings, as spam.
We studied how WOT rating of the website of the app developer (where available)
relates to the permissions requested by it. Table F.7 shows the average number of
permissions requested by apps whose developer websites are deemed suspect (bad or
caution) by WOT. We classiﬁed a WOT rating into bad, caution, good or unknown
following the default risk signaling strategy of WOT as detailed in [18]. We ignored
the good ratings from WOT as many developers use a shared domain as their website
and WOT’s verdicts will not be accurate in these cases. Contrasting with the mean
values in Table F.4, we see that that the suspect apps consistently request more
permissions than on average in all cases. The diﬀerences in the average number
of P , Pdanger and Pdinfo between suspect Facebook apps and Facebook apps in
general are statistically signiﬁcant with p<.001. The sample size is too small in the
case of Android apps (see Table F.7). As for Chrome extensions, the diﬀerences are
statistical signiﬁcant with p<.05 for P , while p<.1 for Pdanger and Pdinfo. Further,
we found no correlation between the WOT’s suspect rating and community rating.
New Android apps which have been regarded as spam by AppBrain.com also
request for a higher number of permissions on average with P , Pdanger and Pdinfo
equal 3.3, 2.2, and 1.2 respectively (as compared to 3.0, 2.1 and 1.0 typically, as
shown in Table F.4). The diﬀerences in the average number of P and Pdinfo are
signiﬁcant with p<.1.
F.5.4. Signals from the Developer
So far we have looked at aggregated signals available in the marketplace (popu-
larity and community rating) and signals from external sources. Now we turn our
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Perm. Android Android FB Chrome
type (pop) (new) (all) (all)
P 6.0 3.0 3.4 1.8
Pdanger 3.6 2.2 3.4 1.0
Pdinfo 2.0 1.2 2.6 1.0
# apps 5 11 88 65
Table F.7.: Average number of P , Pdanger and Pdinfo requested by apps whose
developer website has been labelled as bad or caution by WOT.
attention to signals that originate from the developers themselves. We considered
three diﬀerent signals:
Availability of a developer website: The availability of a developer website
of Android apps and Chrome extensions correlates positively with the number of
permissions requested by an app. Thus, the presence of a developer website (devel-
oper identity) does not imply a less intrusive app; in fact the reverse was observed.
We have not measured the same eﬀect for Facebook apps as the developer website
is not shown on the user-consent permission dialogs. One may be able to obtain
the developer website in the Contact Developer link on the app information page.
However, we found that, in many cases, the link provides a means to contact the
developer via Facebook’s messaging system, rather than a valid developer website.
Availability of a privacy policy: The availability of a privacy policy with a
Facebook app correlates negatively, albeit weakly, with Pdanger (r=–0.12, p<.001)
and Pdinfo (r=–0.14, p<.001). In other words, there is some weak evidence that
Facebook apps accompanied by a privacy policy are more likely to request fewer
permissions. Note that the privacy policy URLs were obtained from the user-
consent permission dialogs. We have not looked for the privacy policy URLs of
Android apps and Chrome extensions as they are not readily available.
Multiple apps from the same developer: Surprisingly, the number of apps
a developer has published is negatively correlated to both log(#installation) and
avgra among Facebook apps, Chrome extensions and new Android apps. The more
apps a developer publishes, the more likely his apps have a lower popularity and
community rating. This could be due to that proliﬁc developers actually make low
quality apps, or that users actually cast a higher expectation on regular developers;
it may be worth further investigation. The number of apps a developer makes has
no correlation with the number of permissions their apps request except for the case
of new Android apps, where there is a very weak link (r=–0.09, p<.01) between
the number of apps the developer has made and the number of permissions. Thus,
one cannot judge the potential privacy intrusiveness of an developer based on the
number of apps he has published.
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Corr. with maturity Corr. with price=free
Perm. Android Android Android Android
type (pop) (new) (pop) (new)
P 0.30 0.27 0.22 0.43
Pdanger 0.33 0.30 0.23 0.41
Pdinfo 0.30 0.32 0.19 0.35
Table F.8.: Correlation between the number of P , Pdanger and Pdinfo requested by
Android apps, the content maturity level and whether an app is free. All values
are statistically signiﬁcant with p<.001.
Perm. Android (pop) Android (new)
type paid free paid free
P 3.9 5.2 1.6 4.1
Pdanger 2.6 3.5 1.1 2.8
Pdinfo 1.4 1.9 0.5 1.4
Rp (%) 86 96 56 92
Table F.9.: Average number of P , Pdanger and Pdinfo requested by the free and
paid Android apps. Rp measures the percentage of apps requesting at least one
permission.
F.6. Enticements and Tricks
We investigated if there is any evidence of attempts to entice or mislead the user
into granting sensitive permissions. In Section F.6.1 we study if free apps or those
containing mature content require more privileges than average. In Section F.6.2
we study the permission request patterns of apps whose names look similar to the
popular ones.
F.6.1. Free and Mature Apps
Android Market requires the developer of an app to rate its content maturity by
selecting one of four labels describing the age of the target audience: everyone,
low, medium or high maturity. Table F.8 shows that there is a positive correlation
between the content maturity rating and the number of permissions required. There
is also a positive correlation between the requested permissions and whether the
app is free. Table F.9 shows the diﬀerence between paid and free apps in terms
of the average number of permissions they request: free apps consistently request
more permissions than paid apps. Note that also there is a bigger proportion of
free apps requiring at least one permission than the paid apps; this is particularly
evident among the new Android apps. Previous studies [15, 24] found that more
free apps request for the INTERNET permission, possibly only to load advertisements.
It is interesting to note that the INTERNET permission is not part of Pdinfo in our
analysis. The consistently higher number of Pdinfo of free apps among both popular
and new Android apps suggests some suspicious enticement. We further compared
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Figure F.3.: Average number of P , Pdanger and Pdinfo requested by Chrome exten-
sions and Facebook apps whose developer site has been identiﬁed as bad/caution
or child-unsafe by WOT.
between free and paid apps excluding permissions that are commonly required due
to third party advertisement libraries. Not counting ACCESS COARSE LOCATION,
ACCESS FINE LOCATION, ACCESS NETWORK STATE, READ PHONE STATE, WAKE LOCK as
well as INTERNET, we found that free apps still request for a higher number of P ,
Pdanger and Pdinfo on average. The diﬀerences are statistical signiﬁcant with p<.01
in all cases (except for Pdinfo of popular Android apps where p<.05).
Facebook apps and Chrome extensions are always free. There is also no content
rating systems for these. We divided these apps into three sets in terms of the WOT
ratings of the developer: those labeled as child-unsafe, those labeled as suspect (bad
or caution) (as we have discussed in Section F.5.3), as well as the set of all apps.
The ﬁrst category (child-unsafe) consisted of 34 chrome extensions and 70 Facebook
apps. The second category (suspect sites) consisted of 65 chrome extensions and
88 Facebook apps (also shown in Table F.7). Figure F.3 shows the results. Suspect
apps and apps with potentially child-unsafe content request more permissions than
is typical. This eﬀect is particularly pronounced in the case of Facebook apps
where all diﬀerences are signiﬁcant with p<.001. Meanwhile, the diﬀerences in the
average number of Pdanger and Pdinfo between the set of Chrome extensions whose
developer website has been identiﬁed as child-unsafe by WOT and the set of all
extensions are signiﬁcant with p<0.1.
F.6.2. Look-Alike App Names
Apps are uniquely identiﬁable on the respective application platforms through
unique strings, such as bbncpldmanoknoahidbgmkgobgmhnafh for Last.fm extension
on Chrome, 102452128776 for FarmVille on Facebook, and com.rovio.angrybirds
for Angry Birds on Android. However, unique identiﬁers are typically long and un-
intuitive. One would thus expect the users to recall or discover an app through
its name or other visually distinctive features, rather than the IDs. On the ap-
plication platforms, developers are free to choose his preferred app name; the app
names need not be unique even on individual platforms. This creates opportunities
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Figure F.4.: Ratio of look-alike app names in speciﬁc ranges of normalized edit
distance, distn
for exploitation, for example, to create “look-alike” apps with names exactly the
same or similar to the popular ones, so to free ride on their success or as a means
to distribute potentially malicious apps.
We looked into the problem of name look-alike apps on Android, Chrome and
Facebook. To measure name similarity, we use the popular Damerau-Levenshtein
edit distance [20, 27]. Given two strings s1 and s2, we deﬁne the normalized edit
distance as follows:
distn(s1, s2) =
distDL(s1, s2)
max(len(s1), len(s2))
(F.2)
where distDL(s1, s2) is the Damerau-Levenshtein distance between s1 and s2, len(s)
is the length of string s in terms of the number of characters, and max(a, b) returns
the larger value between a and b.
We outlined the top 200 most popular apps on Facebook, Chrome and Android
respectively, and calculated the normalized name edit distance between them and
the rest of the apps. We ignored the name pairs where both apps are published
by the same developers. We also omitted apps with non-Latin based names in this
study. Together, we have investigated 19,344 Android apps, 13,181 Facebook apps,
and 5,322 Chrome extensions.
Figure F.4 shows the ratios of apps whose normalized edit distance to any of the
popular counterparts falls in a speciﬁc range. As shown by the ﬁrst three bars (i.e.,
distn ≤ 0.05), there is a higher ratio of extremely look-alike apps on Facebook than
on Android and Chrome platforms. Using a similarity threshold of distn=0.30, we
found 1.15% of the Android apps, 1.20% of the Facebook apps, and 1.47% of the
Chrome extensions have either intentionally or unintentionally used a look-alike
name to a popular app.
Next, we manually categorized the look-alike app names into the following ﬁve
classes:
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Popular App Look-alike App
Letter change:
A Tap Fish TapFish
A Chess Free WChess free
F FarmVille SarmVille
F PhotoMania Pho.to Mania
C Facebook Notiﬁcations Facebook Notiﬁcation
Term change:
A Advanced Task Killer Advanced Task Manager
A Blue Skies Live Wallpaper Blue Wave Live Wallpaper
F Angry birds Angry bears
F FarmTown FameTown
C Google +1 Button Google Plus Button
Term addition/deletion:
A Yahoo! Mail My Yahoo! Mail
A Ringtone Maker MP3 Ringtone Maker
F Yearbook myYearbook
C Facebook Notiﬁcations Facebook Chat Notiﬁcation
C Reader Plus Reader to Plus
Serialization:
A Advanced Task Killer Advanced Task Killer Pro
F Pool Master 2 Pool Master
F Daily Horoscope Free Daily Horoscopes
C Reader Plus ReaderPlus+
C Speed Dial 2 Speed Dial 2 (ru)
Table F.10.: Example look-alike app names of diﬀerent classes on Android (A),
Facebook (F) and Chrome (C ). Pairs of exactly the same names are not shown.
• Same: Exact same name of the original counterpart
• Letter change: Some letters of a term of the original counterpart is changed
• Term change: Some terms of the original counterpart is substituted with
new terms
• Term addition/deletion: Some terms are added into or deleted from the
original counterpart
• Serialization: Special terms indicating a diﬀerent version (e.g., 2, Free) are
added to the original
Table F.10 lists some examples of look-alike names we have found, while Table F.11
gives the percentage breakdown of the diﬀerent classes of look-alike names. We
found a total of 223, 158 and 78 look-alike names on Android, Facebook and Chrome
respectively. Going through the list manually, we observed that the look-alike
names in the Same, Letter change and Serialization classes are created with a
higher level of questionable intention. We delved into look-alike apps of these three
classes in the following.
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Similarity class Android Facebook Chrome
Same 6.7 19.6 7.7
Letter change 2.7 23.4 11.5
Term change 78.9 47.5 65.4
Term addition/deletion 4.0 5.7 9.0
Serialization 7.6 3.8 6.4
Table F.11.: Percentage (%) of look-alike names in diﬀerent similarity classes.
Perm. Android Chrome Facebook
type l-a original all l-a original all l-a original all
P 3.9 4.2 3.0*** 1.8 2.3 1.4 2.1 2.5 1.2***
Pdanger 2.6 2.7 2.1** 1.2 1.6 0.8 2.1 2.5 1.2***
Pdinfo 1.3 1.5 1.0** 1.2 1.6 0.8 1.5 1.9* 0.9***
avgra 2.2 7.4*** 2.3 1.7 3.3*** 1.2 1.8 4.2*** 1.1***
avgr 3.8 4.5 4.4 4.1 4.2 4.4 3.9 4.0 3.8
Table F.12.: Comparing the look-alike (l-a) apps to (i) the original counterparts,
and (ii) all apps as a whole. Rows 1–3 compare the average number of P , Pdanger
and Pdinfo requested. Rows 4–5 compare the adjusted average rating avgra, and
the average rating avgr. ***p<.01, **p<.05, and *p<.1 indicate if a measurement
given by the original counterparts, and the set of all apps, is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from that of given by the look-alikes.
Table F.12 compares the characteristics of suspect look-alike apps (Same, Letter
change and Serialization) to the set of targeted original counterparts, and the set
of all apps in general. As shown on the ﬁrst three rows, the average number of
P , Pdanger and Pdinfo requested by the look-alike apps are in general lower than
the original counterparts. However, the diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant
(except for Pdinfo of Facebook). While this suggests that the look-alike apps are
not more privacy-intrusive than the original counterparts (i.e., the popular apps),
we cannot rule out the potential risks of these look-alike apps immediately. Indeed,
the average number of permissions requested by the look-alike apps are higher that
is typical (i.e., comparing with the set of all apps). The increase in the average
number of permissions is statistically signiﬁcant for both Android and Facebook
look-alike apps. This suggests some level of suspicious activities among the look-
alike apps on Android and Facebook platforms.
We further analyzed how community ratings respond to look-alike apps currently.
First, we found that the adjusted average rating, avgra of the targeted counter-
parts is signiﬁcantly higher than that of the look-alike apps across three platforms.
However, we should not assume that community ratings are warning against look-
alike apps adequately. The higher avgra value of the targeted apps can be likely
due to the higher number of user ratings the apps have received, following their
popularity. Indeed, we found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the average rating,
avgr of the look-alike apps and the targeted counterparts. Also, the average rat-
ing of the look-alike apps are not low, ranging from 3.8 to 4.1. In addition, the
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adjusted average rating of the look-alike Facebook apps is signiﬁcantly higher than
that of all Facebook apps in general. These suggest the lack of the current commu-
nity rating systems in signaling against the look-alike apps, especially on Facebook.
Facebook does not even present the number of user ratings nor app popularity on
the user-consent permission dialogs.
F.7. Discussion and Conclusions
Revisiting the questions we started with in Section F.1, we summarize and discuss
the implications of our ﬁndings, and provide recommendations in the following:
1. Popular apps request more permissions: Dissecting the API calls of
940 apps, Felt et al. [23] found that one third of them request for unused permis-
sions, attributable to errors and confusion over the insuﬃcient API documentation.
Without a source- or binary-code analysis, we have not singled out the cases where
apps request for more permissions due to developer errors rather than questionable
intentions. Yet, does not matter the causes (errors or bad intentions), unfortu-
nately, there appears to be no disincentives for developers who over privilege their
apps currently. There is in fact a positive correlation between app popularity and
the number of permissions the app requests on all three platforms, even when con-
sidering information sensitive permissions only. More worrying is that the trend
holds true despite the diﬀerent UI designs and permission granularities of Face-
book, Chrome and Android. Ongoing research in improving risk communication
(e.g., [30]) must take into account the high permission request frequency by popular
apps to be eﬀective.
2. No reliable app risk signals currently: As users are ‘trained’ to accept
the requests from popular apps, permission systems can become more ineﬀective
over time. The problem is compounded by the fact that the currently available
signals about an app are unreliable in indicating the privacy risks associated with
that app. We investigated several such signals including the adjusted community
rating, the availability of a developer website and the number of apps published
by the developer. If they are to be reliable signals for helping users detect privacy
intrusive apps, they should exhibit negative correlation with the number of danger-
ous permissions requested (and hence with potential privacy intrusiveness of the
app). None of the above signals exhibit the expected negative correlation. The only
exception we found is the presence of a privacy policy on the permission request
screen of Facebook apps that weakly correlates with a lower number of requested
permissions. However, if users start relying on this as a signal, it could lead to
adverse selection as malicious developers can easily put up a ‘privacy policy’ that
they do not adhere to.
On the other hand, we found some external services that show potential in sig-
naling app risks. One is the website reputation scores from the Web of Trust
(WOT) and another is the ﬂagging of spam Android apps by AppBrain.com. App
marketplaces can prominently display signals from similar sources to help users
recognize potentially intrusive apps. Facebook is already receiving the website rep-
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utation scores from WOT to protect against malicious URLs posted onto the users’
wall [12]. It will not be too diﬃcult to adapt the scores to warn against suspicious
apps and developers.
3. Enticement of free and mature apps: We found evidence indicating
attempts to mislead or entice users into granting permissions with free apps and
mature content. The trend holds even when focusing on information relevant per-
missions only. Particularly, excluding the INTERNET permission necessary for adver-
tisement revenue (and a few others commonly required by third party ad libraries),
free apps still request for more permissions than the paid apps.
4. Look-alike name trick: We also found “look-alike” apps to request more
permissions than is typical. While the fraction of look-alike apps is small, there
is an underlying problem of ‘cheap identity’ with app names (and IDs) currently.
Charging for a developer ID or for publishing an app may help, but platform owners
may be reluctant to do so in the competitive market to attract developers and apps.
An option is to leverage on community inputs for reputation scores on app se-
curity and privacy. WhatApp.org [11] is a website which collates user and expert
reviews on the privacy, security and openness of web and mobile apps. However,
it is still in its beta version and has not attracted much reviews to date. Indeed
there are many challenges in crowd-sourcing of security and privacy inputs. As we
found in this paper, the number of ratings is highly correlated to the popularity
of an app. This gives rise to the question of who will review suspicious apps or
grayware? There is probably no one size that ﬁts all. We see that a successful
model will need to combine community inputs with automated evaluations.
Limitations and future work: One limitation of our analysis is that we have
not done any source- or binary-code analysis of the apps. While we pointed out
the trends that free, mature and look-alike apps request more permissions than is
typical, we cannot directly infer the maliciousness of a particular app judging from
the permissions it requests. Secondly, while our analysis conﬁrms the higher risk
with free and mature apps, and that there is a lack of reliable signals, we are not
sure if users (in particular mature app users) are actually aware of the privacy risks
and making the tradeoﬀ willingly. Studies to examine the privacy tradeoﬀ of users
will be interesting. Leveraging on large datasets, we also plan to explore the use of
machine learning methods for automatic classiﬁcation of app privacy intrusiveness.
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